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英文文献：Defensive Disclosure under Antitrust Enforcement-反垄断执法下的防御性披露
英文文献作者：Ajay Bhaskarabhatla,Enrico Pennings
英文文献摘要：
We formulate a simple model of optimal defensive disclosure by a dominant firm facing uncertain antitrust enforcement and test its implications using unique data on defensive disclosures and patents by IBM. Our results indicate that stronger antitrust enforcement leads to more defensive disclosure, that quality inventions are also disclosed defensively, and that defensive disclosure served as an alternative, but less successful, mechanism to patenting at IBM in appropriating returns from R&D. We extend our analysis to two other exceptionally large firms with defensive-disclosure activity, AT&T and Xerox, and show that their patenting propensity declined under increased antitrust enforcement relative to other firms in the industry. Overall, we show how these firms used defensive disclosure as a strategy to balance the benefits of patenting with the costs of uncertain antitrust enforcement.
我们制定了一个简单的模型，由一个面临不确定的反垄断执法的主导公司的最佳防御性披露，并测试其影响使用独特的数据，防御性披露和专利由IBM。我们的结果表明，更强的反垄断执法导致更多的防御性披露，高质量的发明也被防御性披露，而防御性披露作为一种替代，但不太成功的机制，以专利在IBM从研发中挪用的回报。我们将我们的分析扩展到另外两家具有防御性披露活动的特别大的公司，AT&T和施乐，并表明在反垄断执法力度加大的情况下，他们的专利申请倾向相对于业内其他公司有所下降。总的来说，我们展示了这些公司如何使用防御性披露作为一种策略，以平衡专利的利益与不确定的反垄断执法的成本。
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