经济GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN PRODUCTION AND INCENTIVES THEORY:A REVIEW OF RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS

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GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN PRODUCTION AND INCENTIVES THEORY:A REVIEW OF RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS

文献名称	GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN PRODUCTION AND INCENTIVES THEORY:A REVIEW OF RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS
文献作者	B. Caillaud, R. Guesnerie, P. Rey and J. Tirole
作者所在单位	M.I.T., Cambridge, MA.;EHESS, Paris.;ENSAE, Paris.
文献分类	已发表文献
学科一级分类	经济
学科二级分类	经济思想史
文献摘要	This paper reviews the recent literature on regulation under asymmetric information. If first develops the conceptual framework and offers a reminder of the techniques used in the field. It then applies the framework and techniques to a variety of situations, with or without the use of accounting data. Next, the analysis is extended to dynamics with or without commitment. The paper concludes with desirable directions for research.
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关键字	Asymmetric information, Regulation, Public firms, Incentives,Auditing.
发表所在刊物（或来源）
发表时间	December 1987
适用研究领域	经济思想史
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