管理LIMIT PRICING AND ENTRY UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: AN EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

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LIMIT PRICING AND ENTRY UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: AN EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

文献名称	LIMIT PRICING AND ENTRY UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: AN EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
文献作者	PAUL MILGROM AND JOHN ROBERTS
作者所在单位	Northwestern University ;Stanford University
文献分类	已发表文献
学科一级分类	管理
学科二级分类	管理学
文献摘要	Limit pricing involves charging prices below the monopoly price to make new entry appear unattractive. If the entrant is a rational decision maker with complete information, pre-entry prices will not influence its entry decision, so the established firm has no incentive to practice limit pricing. However, if the established firm has private, payoff relevant information (e.g., about costs), then prices can signal that information, so limit pricing can arise in equilibrium. The probability that entry actually occurs in such an equilibrium, however, can be lower, the same, or even higher than in a regime of complete information (where no limit pricing would occur).
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关键字	LIMIT PRICING AND ENTRY;INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ; AN EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
发表所在刊物（或来源）	Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 2 (March, 1982)
发表时间	March, 1982
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