经济Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts

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Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts

文献名称	Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
文献作者	Eric Maskin, Jean Tirole
作者所在单位	Harvard University，Massachusetts Institute of Technology
文献分类	已发表文献
学科一级分类	经济
学科二级分类
文献摘要	We scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature. This literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing—or of even foreseeing—the possible states of nature in advance. We argue, however, that such transaction costs need not interfere with optimal contracting (i.e. transaction costs need not be relevant), provided that agents can probabilistically forecast their possible future payoffs (even if other aspects of the state of the nature cannot be forecast). In other words, all that is required for optimality is that agents be able to perform dynamic programming, an assumption always invoked by the incomplete contract literature. The foregoing optimality result holds very generally provided that parties can commit themselves not to renegotiate. Moreover, we point out that renegotiation may be hard to reconcile with a framework that otherwise presumes perfect rationality. However, even if renegotiation is allowed, the result still remains valid provided that parties are risk averse.
参考文献
关键字	Incomplete Contracts，Transction cost
发表所在刊物（或来源）	Review of Economic Studies Volume 66, Issue 1, pages 83–114, January 1999
发表时间	1999-01-01
适用研究领域	合约理论，机制设计理论。
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