Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia |
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文献名称 | Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia | ||||||
文献作者 | Benjamin A. Olken | ||||||
作者所在单位 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Harvard University - Society of Fellows | ||||||
文献分类 | 已发表文献 | ||||||
学科一级分类 | 经济 | ||||||
学科二级分类 | 行为与实验经济学 | ||||||
文献摘要 | This paper uses a randomized field experiment to examine several approaches to reducing corruption. I measure missing expenditures in over 600 village road projects in Indonesia by having engineers independently estimate the prices and quantities of all inputs used in each road, and then comparing these estimates to villages' official expenditure reports. I find that announcing an increased probability of a government audit, from a baseline of 4 percent to 100 percent, reduced missing expenditures by about 8 percentage points, more than enough to make these audits cost-effective. By contrast, I find that increasing grass-roots participation in the monitoring process only reduced missing wages, with no effect on missing materials expenditures. Since materials account for three-quarters of total expenditures, increasing grass-roots participation had little impact overall. The findings suggest that grass-roots monitoring may be subject to free-rider problems. Overall, the results suggest that traditional top-down monitoring can play an important role in reducing corruption, even in a highly corrupt environment. | ||||||
参考文献 | |||||||
关键字 | Monitoring Corruption,Field Experiment | ||||||
发表所在刊物(或来源) | NBER Working Paper No. W11753 ,November 2005 | ||||||
发表时间 | November 2005 | ||||||
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上传时间 | 2011-1-30 11:44 | ||||||
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