行为经济学与制度经济学的联系和区别（系列）

张三李四兄老是谦虚，这个点评整个就是非常恰当的行为经济学解释嘛，非常感谢。

3246.rar (6.13 KB)

2004-11-18 12:33:00 上传

行为经济学与制度经济学的联系和区别（系列）

这个文件是一个图，表达了组织经济学的各种脉络的关系，非常简练。有助于学习行为微观经济学，特别是行为经济学对企业理论的贡献

那咱们要看看!

3332.rar (83.08 KB)

2004-11-19 08:04:00 上传

行为经济学与制度经济学的联系和区别（系列）

Persuasion in Politics Kevin M. Murphy and Andrei Shleifer University of Chicago and Harvard University January 8, 2004

We present a model of the creation of social networks, such as political parties, trade unions, religious coalitions, or political action committees, through discussion and mutual persuasion among their members. The key idea is that people are influenced by those inside their network, but not by those outside. Once created, networks can be “rented out” to politicians who seek votes and support for their initiatives and ideas, which may have little to do with network members’ core beliefs. In this framework, political competition does not lead to convergence of party platforms to the views of the median voter. Rather, parties separate their messages and try to isolate their members to prevent personal influence from those in the opposition.

[此贴子已经被作者于2004-11-19 8:07:34编辑过]

3333.rar (203.11 KB)

2004-11-19 08:06:00 上传

行为经济学与制度经济学的联系和区别（系列）

The Market for News
Sendhil Mullainathan
MIT and NBER
Andrei Shleifer
Harvard University and NBER 
December 30, 2003
Abstract
We investigate the market for news under two assumptions: that readers hold beliefs that
they like to see confirmed, and that newspapers can slant stories toward these beliefs. We
show that, on the topics where readers share common beliefs, one should not expect accuracy
even from competitive media: competition results in lower prices, but common slanting toward
reader biases. However, on topics where reader beliefs diverge (such as politically divisive issues),
newspapers segment the market and slant toward the biases of their own audiences, yet in the
aggregate a conscientious reader could get an unbiased perspective. Generally speaking, reader
heterogeneity is more important for accuracy in media than competition per se.

4162.rar (255.79 KB)

2004-11-27 17:07:00 上传

行为经济学与制度经济学的联系和区别（系列）

Is Addiction \Rational"? Theory and Evidence1 Jonathan Gruber, MIT and NBER Botond K}oszegi, MIT January 31, 2001

A standard model of addictive processes is Becker and Murphy's "rational addiction" model, which has the key empirical prediction that the current consumption of addictive goods should re-spond to future prices, and the key normative prediction that the optimal government regulation of addictive goods should depend only on their interpersonal externalities. While a variety of previous studies have supported this empirical contention, we demonstrate that these results are very fragile. We propose a new empirical test for the case of cigarettes, using state excise tax increases that have been legislatively enacted but are not yet eective, and monthly data on consumption. We nd strong evidence that consumption drops when there are announced future tax increases, providing more robust support for the key empirical prediction of the Becker and Murphy model. But we also propose a new formulation of this model that makes only one change, albeit a major one: the incorporation of time inconsistent preferences which are likely provide a much better platform for understanding the smoking decision. We nd that with these preferences the model continues to yield the predictions for forward-looking behavior that have been tested by others and by ourselves. But it has strikingly dierent normative implications, as with these preferences optimal government policy should depend as well on the "internalities" imposed by smokers on themselves. We estimate that the optimal tax per pack of cigarettes should at least one dollar higher under our formulation than in the rational addiction case.

4163.rar (142.27 KB)

2004-11-27 17:09:00 上传

行为经济学与制度经济学的联系和区别（系列）

Health Anxiety and Patient Behavior
Botond K}oszegi, UC Berkeley
August 20, 2002
Abstract
Economic models of patient decisionmaking emphasize the costs of getting medical
attention and the improved physical health that results from it. This paper builds a
model of patient decisionmaking when fears or anxiety about the future{captured as
beliefs about next period's state of health{enter the patient's utility function. Anxiety
can lead people to avoid doctor's visits or other easily available information about their
health. However, this avoidance cannot take any form: patients will never avoid the
doctor with small problems, and under regularity conditions they will never go to a
bad doctor to limit the information received. In general, information with a potential
\bad surprise" is least preferred by agents.

4164.rar (291.55 KB)

2004-11-27 17:10:00 上传

行为经济学与制度经济学的联系和区别（系列）

Anxiety and the Doctor-Patient Relationship: Theory and Some
Evidence
Botond K}oszegi, UC Berkeley
September 2003
Abstract
This paper identies an array of complications in doctor-patient communication that arise
when the patient suers from anxiety. I assume that the patient derives utility from health
outcomes as well as the anticipation of the exact same outcomes, and that the doctor wishes
to maximize the patient's utility. The doctor privately (and probabilistically) observes a diagnosis,
which aects the optimal treatment. She then sends a message to the patient, who
chooses a treatment. If the doctor cannot certiably communicate the diagnosis, communication
is endogenously limited to a treatment recommendation, which the doctor distorts toward
the treatment that is optimal when the patient is relatively healthy. Paradoxically, more emotional patients get worse recommendations, even though basing their treatment choice on better recommendations would make them less anxious. If the doctor can certiably communicate the diagnosis, she does so for good news, but unless she needs to \shock" the patient into behaving correctly, she pretends not to know what is going on when the news is bad. If the patient visits two doctors in a row, the second doctor reveals more information than the rst one, and the rst one gives more information to patients who do not want to know what will happen to them than to those who do want to know. Results from an original survey of practicing physicians conrm that doctors care about patients' emotions, and alter their recommendations and other communication in response to them.

11楼说的不是前景理论（prospect theory）吗？卡内曼和特维斯基的著名解释，似乎是由于人们对于损失比对于收益更为风险厌恶？但是，如果通过对效用函数的不同部分（收益、损失）加权，是否依然可以用经典的动态规划来求解？

以下是引用nie在2004-11-29 0:07:33的发言： 11楼说的不是前景理论（prospect theory）吗？卡内曼和特维斯基的著名解释，似乎是由于人们对于损失比对于收益更为风险厌恶？但是，如果通过对效用函数的不同部分（收益、损失）加权，是否依然可以用经典的动态规划来求解？

怎么用动态规划来求解?请nie兄指教.