摘要翻译:
我们考虑了一个交易网络中的配对模型,在该模型中,企业可以签订双边合同。在交易网络中,稳定的结果可能不存在,它对任意一组公司的偏差具有免疫力。我们定义了一个新的解的概念,称为轨迹稳定性。跟踪稳定的结果不受关联公司之间连续的、成对的偏差的影响。我们证明了当企业的选择函数满足完全替代条件时,任何具有双边合约的交易网络都有一个跟踪稳定的结果。对于跟踪稳定的结果,我们证明了关于格结构、农村医院定理、战略证明性和企业进入和退出的比较静力学的结果。我们还引入了弱轨迹稳定性,这是完全可替换下的轨迹稳定性所隐含的。我们描述了解决方案概念之间的关系。
---
英文标题:
《Trading Networks with Bilateral Contracts》
---
作者:
Tam\'as Fleiner, Zsuzsanna Jank\'o, Akihisa Tamura, Alexander
Teytelboym
---
最新提交年份:
2018
---
分类信息:
一级分类:Computer Science 计算机科学
二级分类:Computer Science and Game Theory 计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述:Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面,包括机制设计的工作,游戏中的学习(可能与学习重叠),游戏中的agent建模的基础(可能与多agent系统重叠),非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
--
一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述:Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
--
一级分类:Quantitative Finance 数量金融学
二级分类:Economics 经济学
分类描述:q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学,包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
--
---
英文摘要:
We consider a model of matching in trading networks in which firms can enter into bilateral contracts. In trading networks, stable outcomes, which are immune to deviations of arbitrary sets of firms, may not exist. We define a new solution concept called trail stability. Trail-stable outcomes are immune to consecutive, pairwise deviations between linked firms. We show that any trading network with bilateral contracts has a trail-stable outcome whenever firms' choice functions satisfy the full substitutability condition. For trail-stable outcomes, we prove results on the lattice structure, the rural hospitals theorem, strategy-proofness, and comparative statics of firm entry and exit. We also introduce weak trail stability which is implied by trail stability under full substitutability. We describe relationships between the solution concepts.
---
PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1510.01210


雷达卡



京公网安备 11010802022788号







