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摘要翻译：
我提出了一个动态的，自愿的贡献机制，公益博弈，并得出其潜在的结果。在每个阶段，参与者通过进行代价高昂的投资来内生地决定贡献生产率。生产力的贡献水平从一个时期到另一个时期，创造了一个时期之间的动态联系。这种投资类似于对生产国防或清洁环境等公共产品的技术存量的投资。在投资之后，玩家决定他们剩余的钱有多少用于提供公益，就像在传统的公益游戏中一样。分析了博弈的三种结果：最低收益结果、纳什均衡和社会最优行为。在最低收益结果中，所有玩家获得零收益。纳什均衡发生在参与者投入任何数量，并根据贡献生产率贡献全部或不贡献的情况下。因此，纳什均衡策略是无限多的。最后，当玩家在早期投入一切，然后在某个时候切换到贡献一切时，社会最优结果就会出现。我的目标是发现并解释这一点。我用数学分析和计算机模拟来推导结果。
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英文标题：
《Analysis of a Dynamic Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Public Good Game》
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作者：
Dmytro Bogatov
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最新提交年份：
2018
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Econometrics 计量经济学
分类描述：Econometric Theory, Micro-Econometrics, Macro-Econometrics, Empirical Content of Economic Relations discovered via New Methods, Methodological Aspects of the Application of Statistical Inference to Economic Data.
计量经济学理论，微观计量经济学，宏观计量经济学，通过新方法发现的经济关系的实证内容，统计推论应用于经济数据的方法论方面。
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英文摘要：
I present a dynamic, voluntary contribution mechanism, public good game and derive its potential outcomes. In each period, players endogenously determine contribution productivity by engaging in costly investment. The level of contribution productivity carries from period to period, creating a dynamic link between periods. The investment mimics investing in the stock of technology for producing public goods such as national defense or a clean environment. After investing, players decide how much of their remaining money to contribute to provision of the public good, as in traditional public good games. I analyze three kinds of outcomes of the game: the lowest payoff outcome, the Nash Equilibria, and socially optimal behavior. In the lowest payoff outcome, all players receive payoffs of zero. Nash Equilibrium occurs when players invest any amount and contribute all or nothing depending on the contribution productivity. Therefore, there are infinitely many Nash Equilibria strategies. Finally, the socially optimal result occurs when players invest everything in early periods, then at some point switch to contributing everything. My goal is to discover and explain this point. I use mathematical analysis and computer simulation to derive the results.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.04621
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