摘要翻译:
继Lloyd Shapley关于Shapley值的工作和Guillermo Owen的工作之后,我们对Robert J.Weber在1978年的论文“博弈的概率值”中的部分工作提供了一个替代的非概率公式。具体地说,我们关注合作博弈的有效而非对称的价值分配。我们保留了标准的效率和线性,并提供了一个替代条件,“合理性”,以取代其他通常的公理。在对结果的追求中,我们发现了描述分配的线性映射的性质。通过应用Krein-Milman定理,这在一类特殊的博弈中达到顶点,对于这种博弈,任何其他“合理、有效”的映射都可以写成这一类特殊分配的成员的凸组合。
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英文标题:
《Shapley-like values without symmetry》
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作者:
Jacob North Clark, Stephen Montgomery-Smith
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最新提交年份:
2019
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分类信息:
一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述:Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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一级分类:Mathematics 数学
二级分类:Combinatorics 组合学
分类描述:Discrete mathematics, graph theory, enumeration, combinatorial optimization, Ramsey theory, combinatorial game theory
离散数学,图论,计数,组合优化,拉姆齐理论,组合对策论
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英文摘要:
Following the work of Lloyd Shapley on the Shapley value, and tangentially the work of Guillermo Owen, we offer an alternative non-probabilistic formulation of part of the work of Robert J. Weber in his 1978 paper "Probabilistic values for games." Specifically, we focus upon efficient but not symmetric allocations of value for cooperative games. We retain standard efficiency and linearity, and offer an alternative condition, "reasonableness," to replace the other usual axioms. In the pursuit of the result, we discover properties of the linear maps that describe the allocations. This culminates in a special class of games for which any other map that is "reasonable, efficient" can be written as a convex combination of members of this special class of allocations, via an application of the Krein-Milman theorem.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.07747