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摘要翻译：
当代理人以意想不到的方式对新的监管制度做出反应以规避执法时，通过执行法规来遏制非法活动的尝试变得复杂。我们提出了一种研究策略来揭示这种反应，并允许程序评估这种适应性行为。我们的干预措施旨在通过(a)监测和惩罚出售非法鱼类的商贩或(b)利用宣传运动劝阻消费者购买来减少对极度濒危的太平洋鳕鱼的过度捕捞。商贩试图通过隐藏销售和其他手段规避禁令，我们利用神秘购物者跟踪这些手段。与按可预测时间表进行的访问相比，通过限制这种欺骗，建立随机监控访问在降低真实hake可用性方面更加有效。更高频率的监控（旨在限制非法销售的时间转移）会适得其反，因为目标代理人学习更快，欺诈更有效。因此，复杂的政策设计对于确定执法的持续、长期影响至关重要。从渔民、供应商和消费者那里收集的数据使我们能够记录整个供应链的上游、下游、溢出和均衡效果。与随机监测相比，消费者信息运动产生了三分之二的收益，但对政府来说实施起来更简单，几乎同样具有成本效益。
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英文标题：
《Enforcing Regulation Under Illicit Adaptation》
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作者：
Andres Gonzalez Lira and Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak
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最新提交年份：
2018
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：General Economics 一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance 数量金融学
二级分类：Economics 经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
Attempts to curb illegal activity by enforcing regulations gets complicated when agents react to the new regulatory regime in unanticipated ways to circumvent enforcement. We present a research strategy that uncovers such reactions, and permits program evaluation net of such adaptive behaviors. Our interventions were designed to reduce over-fishing of the critically endangered Pacific hake by either (a) monitoring and penalizing vendors that sell illegal fish or (b) discouraging consumers from purchasing using an information campaign. Vendors attempt to circumvent the ban through hidden sales and other means, which we track using mystery shoppers. Instituting random monitoring visits are much more effective in reducing true hake availability by limiting such cheating, compared to visits that occur on a predictable schedule. Monitoring at higher frequency (designed to limit temporal displacement of illegal sales) backfires, because targeted agents learn faster, and cheat more effectively. Sophisticated policy design is therefore crucial for determining the sustained, longer-term effects of enforcement. Data collected from fishermen, vendors, and consumers allow us to document the upstream, downstream, spillover, and equilibrium effects of enforcement on the entire supply chain. The consumer information campaign generates two-thirds of the gains compared to random monitoring, but is simpler for the government to implement and almost as cost-effective.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.09887
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