摘要翻译:
我们研究了一个具有报酬外部性和可观察行为的重复博弈,其中两个参与者随着时间的推移接收关于潜在报酬相关状态的信息,并在战略上协调他们的行为。玩家从私人信号以及其他人的行动中了解真实的状态。他们通常学习真实的状态(Cripps et al.,2008),但并不是在每一个平衡中都协调一致。我们证明了对于任何折扣因子,存在稳定的均衡,在均衡中,参与者可以克服不利的信号实现,并最终在正确的行动上协调。对于高折扣因素,我们证明了另外,参与者还可以获得有效的收益。
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英文标题:
《Repeated Coordination with Private Learning》
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作者:
Pathikrit Basu, Kalyan Chatterjee, Tetsuya Hoshino and Omer Tamuz
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最新提交年份:
2018
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分类信息:
一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述:Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要:
We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true state from private signals, as well as the actions of others. They commonly learn the true state (Cripps et al., 2008), but do not coordinate in every equilibrium. We show that there exist stable equilibria in which players can overcome unfavorable signal realizations and eventually coordinate on the correct action, for any discount factor. For high discount factors, we show that in addition players can also achieve efficient payoffs.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.00051