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摘要翻译：
我们确定，当且仅当不可能从已实现的经验技能分布中唯一识别雇主观察到的信号结构时，统计判别是可能的。统计歧视的不可能被证明等同于存在公平的、依赖于技能的工人报酬。最后，我们将统计歧视文献与贝叶斯说服联系起来，建立了如果不存在歧视，那么最优信号传递问题将导致线性支付函数（以及一种逆函数）。
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英文标题：
《A characterization of "Phelpsian" statistical discrimination》
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作者：
Christopher P. Chambers and Federico Echenique
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最新提交年份：
2018
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
We establish that statistical discrimination is possible if and only if it is impossible to uniquely identify the signal structure observed by an employer from a realized empirical distribution of skills. The impossibility of statistical discrimination is shown to be equivalent to the existence of a fair, skill-dependent, remuneration for workers. Finally, we connect the statistical discrimination literature to Bayesian persuasion, establishing that if discrimination is absent, then the optimal signaling problem results in a linear payoff function (as well as a kind of converse).
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.01351
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