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摘要翻译：
声誉机制为在有道德风险的电子市场中建立信任提供了一种有效的替代核查机构的方法。未来的客户通过考虑过去交易的反馈来指导他们的商业决策；如果如实曝光，作弊行为就会受到制裁，从而变得非理性。因此，确保理性的客户有正确的激励来诚实地报告变得非常重要。作为明确奖励真实报告的附带支付方案的替代方案，我们表明，当客户在市场上重复出现时，诚实可以成为一种理性行为。为此，我们描述了一种机制，它支持获得真实反馈的平衡。然后我们刻画了该机制的Pareto最优平衡点集，并导出了该机制所能记录的误报率的一个上界。rational客户可以建立诚实报告的声誉，这一事实在这个约束的存在中扮演了一个重要的角色。
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英文标题：
《Obtaining Reliable Feedback for Sanctioning Reputation Mechanisms》
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作者：
B. Faltings, R. Jurca
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最新提交年份：
2011
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分类信息：

一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Artificial Intelligence        人工智能
分类描述：Covers all areas of AI except Vision, Robotics, Machine Learning, Multiagent Systems, and Computation and Language (Natural Language Processing), which have separate subject areas. In particular, includes Expert Systems, Theorem Proving (although this may overlap with Logic in Computer Science), Knowledge Representation, Planning, and Uncertainty in AI. Roughly includes material in ACM Subject Classes I.2.0, I.2.1, I.2.3, I.2.4, I.2.8, and I.2.11.
涵盖了人工智能的所有领域，除了视觉、机器人、机器学习、多智能体系统以及计算和语言（自然语言处理），这些领域有独立的学科领域。特别地，包括专家系统，定理证明（尽管这可能与计算机科学中的逻辑重叠），知识表示，规划，和人工智能中的不确定性。大致包括ACM学科类I.2.0、I.2.1、I.2.3、I.2.4、I.2.8和I.2.11中的材料。
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英文摘要：
  Reputation mechanisms offer an effective alternative to verification authorities for building trust in electronic markets with moral hazard. Future clients guide their business decisions by considering the feedback from past transactions; if truthfully exposed, cheating behavior is sanctioned and thus becomes irrational.   It therefore becomes important to ensure that rational clients have the right incentives to report honestly. As an alternative to side-payment schemes that explicitly reward truthful reports, we show that honesty can emerge as a rational behavior when clients have a repeated presence in the market. To this end we describe a mechanism that supports an equilibrium where truthful feedback is obtained. Then we characterize the set of pareto-optimal equilibria of the mechanism, and derive an upper bound on the percentage of false reports that can be recorded by the mechanism. An important role in the existence of this bound is played by the fact that rational clients can establish a reputation for reporting honestly.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1111.0043

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关键词：Transactions Presentation MORAL HAZARD Intelligence Verification 反馈 支付 获得 理性 客户