摘要翻译:
研究了一个混合种群信任博弈的动力学问题,在这个博弈中,具有购买者角色的个体被迫与预定数量的销售者进行博弈,销售者是他们动态选择的。作为销售商的代理商也可以根据收益调整其产品的物有所值水平。在战略更新率的特定值下,动态经历了一个转变,超过这个值,就会观察到一个新兴的卡特尔组织,在那里卖方有类似的低于最优货币价值的价值。这种卡特尔组织不是由于代理人之间的明确勾结;相反,它是从个人收益最大化中自发产生的。这种动态的特点是大部分参数空间的波动很大,而且高度不可预测,这是对某些商品价格所观察到的高水平和波动的一种合理的定性解释。
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英文标题:
《No need for conspiracy: Self-organized cartel formation in a modified
trust game》
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作者:
Tiago P. Peixoto, Stefan Bornholdt
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最新提交年份:
2013
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分类信息:
一级分类:Quantitative Finance 数量金融学
二级分类:General Finance 一般财务
分类描述:Development of general quantitative methodologies with applications in finance
通用定量方法的发展及其在金融中的应用
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一级分类:Computer Science 计算机科学
二级分类:Computer Science and Game Theory 计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述:Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面,包括机制设计的工作,游戏中的学习(可能与学习重叠),游戏中的agent建模的基础(可能与多agent系统重叠),非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类:Physics 物理学
二级分类:Physics and Society 物理学与社会
分类描述:Structure, dynamics and collective behavior of societies and groups (human or otherwise). Quantitative analysis of social networks and other complex networks. Physics and engineering of infrastructure and systems of broad societal impact (e.g., energy grids, transportation networks).
社会和团体(人类或其他)的结构、动态和集体行为。社会网络和其他复杂网络的定量分析。具有广泛社会影响的基础设施和系统(如能源网、运输网络)的物理和工程。
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英文摘要:
We investigate the dynamics of a trust game on a mixed population where individuals with the role of buyers are forced to play against a predetermined number of sellers, whom they choose dynamically. Agents with the role of sellers are also allowed to adapt the level of value for money of their products, based on payoff. The dynamics undergoes a transition at a specific value of the strategy update rate, above which an emergent cartel organization is observed, where sellers have similar values of below optimal value for money. This cartel organization is not due to an explicit collusion among agents; instead it arises spontaneously from the maximization of the individual payoffs. This dynamics is marked by large fluctuations and a high degree of unpredictability for most of the parameter space, and serves as a plausible qualitative explanation for observed elevated levels and fluctuations of certain commodity prices.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1201.3798