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摘要翻译：
众所周知，多维类型空间中的最优（即收入最大化）销售机制可能涉及随机化。我们得到了将两个相同的、不可分割的对象卖给单个买主的确定性机制是最优的条件。我们分析了两种设置：(i)递减边际值(DMV)和(ii)递增边际值(IMV)。因此，买方对两个单位的价值不是独立的。我们证明了在分布的一个众所周知的条件下（由于McAfee和McMillan(1988))，(a)在DMV模型中确定出售第一个单位是最优的，(b)在IMV模型中确定出售第一个单位是最优的。在较强的分布充分条件下，确定性机制在DMV模型中是最优的。我们的结果适用于异构对象，当有一个指定的序列必须在其中出售两个对象时。
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英文标题：
《Selling Two Identical Objects》
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作者：
Sushil Bikhchandani and Debasis Mishra
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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英文摘要：
  It is well-known that optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) selling mechanisms in multidimensional type spaces may involve randomization. We obtain conditions under which deterministic mechanisms are optimal for selling two identical, indivisible objects to a single buyer. We analyze two settings: (i) decreasing marginal values (DMV) and (ii) increasing marginal values (IMV). Thus, the values of the buyer for the two units are not independent.   We show that under a well-known condition on distributions~(due to McAfee and McMillan (1988)), (a) it is optimal to sell the first unit deterministically in the DMV model and (b) it is optimal to bundle (which is a deterministic mechanism) in the IMV model. Under a stronger sufficient condition on distributions, a deterministic mechanism is optimal in the DMV model.   Our results apply to heterogeneous objects when there is a specified sequence in which the two objects must be sold.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2009.11545

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关键词：distribution Contribution Coordination Environments Applications objects values 最优 确定 对象