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摘要翻译：
在销售信息产品时，销售者可以提供一些免费的部分信息来改变人们的估价，从而有可能增加整体收入。我们通过揭示部分信息来研究广告信息产品的一般问题。我们考虑作为决策者的买家。决策问题的结果取决于买家不知道的世界状态。买家可以做出自己的观察，从而可以对世界的状态持有不同的个人信仰。有一个信息卖家可以访问世界的状态。卖家可以通过透露部分信息来推广信息。我们假设卖方选择了一个长期的广告策略，然后向它承诺。卖方的目标是最大化预期收益。我们在两个背景下研究这个问题。（1）卖方以某一类型的买方为目标。在这种情况下，寻找最优广告策略相当于寻找一个简单函数的凹闭包。该函数是两个量的乘积，即似然比和不确定性代价。在此基础上，我们证明了最优机构的一些性质，这些性质允许我们用有限大小的凸程序求解最优机构。如果世界的状态具有一定数量的可能实现，或者买方面临具有一定数量的选择的决策问题，那么凸规划将具有多项式大小。对于一般问题，我们证明了寻找最优机制是NP难的。（2）当卖方面对不同类型的买方，并且只知道其类型的分布时，我们给出了一个近似算法，当预测可能的买方类型不太困难时，我们将进行购买。对于一般问题，我们证明了求常因子逼近是NP难的。
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英文标题：
《Optimal Advertising for Information Products》
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作者：
Shuran Zheng and Yiling Chen
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：

一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  When selling information products, the seller can provide some free partial information to change people's valuations so that the overall revenue can possibly be increased. We study the general problem of advertising information products by revealing partial information. We consider buyers who are decision-makers. The outcomes of the decision problems depend on the state of the world that is unknown to the buyers. The buyers can make their own observations and thus can hold different personal beliefs about the state of the world. There is an information seller who has access to the state of the world. The seller can promote the information by revealing some partial information. We assume that the seller chooses a long-term advertising strategy and then commits to it. The seller's goal is to maximize the expected revenue. We study the problem in two settings. (1) The seller targets buyers of a certain type. In this case, finding the optimal advertising strategy is equivalent to finding the concave closure of a simple function. The function is a product of two quantities, the likelihood ratio and the cost of uncertainty. Based on this observation, we prove some properties of the optimal mechanism, which allow us to solve for the optimal mechanism by a finite-size convex program. The convex program will have a polynomial-size if the state of the world has a constant number of possible realizations or the buyers face a decision problem with a constant number of options. For the general problem, we prove that it is NP-hard to find the optimal mechanism. (2) When the seller faces buyers of different types and only knows the distribution of their types, we provide an approximation algorithm when it is not too hard to predict the possible type of buyers who will make the purchase. For the general problem, we prove that it is NP-hard to find a constant-factor approximation.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.10045

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