摘要翻译:
我们建立了一个简单的理论博弈模型来分析选举制度与政府贸易政策选择之间的关系。我们发现,国际压力或外国游说的存在改变了政府对贸易政策的最终决定,比例选举制国家的贸易政策比多数选举制国家的贸易政策更具保护主义色彩。此外,在实行比例代表制的国家,游说团体支付更多的费用来影响贸易政策的结果。
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英文标题:
《Electoral systems and international trade policy》
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作者:
Serkan Kucuksenel, Osman Gulseven
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最新提交年份:
2020
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分类信息:
一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:General Economics 一般经济学
分类描述:General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述:Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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一级分类:Quantitative Finance 数量金融学
二级分类:Economics 经济学
分类描述:q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学,包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要:
We develop a simple theoretic game a model to analyze the relationship between electoral sys tems and governments' choice in trade policies. We show that existence of international pressure or foreign lobby changes a government's final decision on trade policy, and trade policy in countries with proportional electoral system is more protectionist than in countries with majoritarian electoral system. Moreover, lobbies pay more to affect the trade policy outcomes in countries with proportional representation systems.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.05725