摘要翻译:
我们考察一个有耐心的球员在一系列短视的对手面前建立声誉时的行为。在正概率下,耐心型球员是一个承诺型球员,他在每个时期都发挥他的Stackelberg动作。我们描述了平衡状态下患者玩家的动作频率。我们的结果阐明了声誉在多大程度上可以改善耐心玩家的行为,并为进入威慑、商业交易和资本税收提供了新的见解。我们的证明通过建立一个新的集中不等式做出了方法上的贡献。
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英文标题:
《Equilibrium Behaviors in Repeated Games》
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作者:
Yingkai Li, Harry Pei
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最新提交年份:
2021
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分类信息:
一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述:Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要:
We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We characterize the patient player's action frequencies in equilibrium. Our results clarify the extent to which reputations can refine the patient player's behavior and provide new insights to entry deterrence, business transactions, and capital taxation. Our proof makes a methodological contribution by establishing a new concentration inequality.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2007.14002