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Evidence on the Audit Risk Model； Do Auditors Increase Audit Fees in the Presence of Internal Control Deficiencies?
Conclusions:In this study, we investigate how auditors respond to the higher levels of control risk experienced by firms subsequently disclosing internal control deficiencies. Our results show that audit fees are significantly higher for ICD firms after controlling for size, risk, and profitability. Furthermore, the fee increment is highest for firms that have the most substantial internal control problems. Our tests also indicate that internal control deficiency firms have higher levels of inherent risk and information risk than their industry counterparts, and that these risks are positively related to fees as well.
To the extent that audit fees are a proxy for audit effort, our results suggest that auditors are increasing their audit effort where appropriate to maintain an acceptable overall level of audit risk, consistent with the audit risk model. As stated earlier, our ability to draw inferences about audit effort and increased control risk relies on audit fees being an adequate proxy for audit effort, which has been found to be the case both in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley time period(Bell et al. 2011) and in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley period (Bedard and Johnstone 2006). However, we cannot rule out the alternative explanation that the increased fees we observe are due to the existence of a risk premium for firms with internal control problems rather than to increased testing.
Fees Paid to Audit Firms, Accrual Choices, and Corporate Governance
AbstractWe examine the relation between the fees paid to auditors for audit and non-audit services, and the choice of accrual measures for a large sample of firms. Using our pooled sample, we find that the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees has a positive relation with the absolute value of accruals similar to Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson[200]. However, using latent class mixture models to identify clusters of firms with a homogenous regression structure reveals that this positive association only occurs for about 8.5% of the sample. In contrast to the fee ratio results, we find consistent evidence of a negative relation between the level of fees (both audit and non-audit) paid to auditors and accruals (i.e., higher fees are associated with smaller accruals). The latent class analysis also indicates that this negative relation is strongest for client firms with weak governance. Overall, our results are most consistent with auditor behavior being constrained by the reputation effects associated with allowing clients to engage in unusual accrual choices.
Audit Fees and Auditor dismissals in the Sarbanes-oxley era
SynopsisThe accounting scandals and Sarbanes-oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 resulted in large increases in required audit work, and corresponding increases in audit fees for public companies. This study provides early evidence regarding the relationship between higher audit fees, both levels and changes, and auditor dismissals in the period immediately subsequent to the passage of SOX. We find that clients paying higher fees are more likely to dismiss their auditors. We also find that dismissals are associated with smaller companies, companies with going-concern reports, and companies that later reported material weaknesses in their internal control. Among dismissing clients, smaller Big 4 clients, paying higher fees, tend to hire non-Big 4 successor auditors. This result holds when auditors are dividend into Big 4, national, and local tiers. We also find evidence that dismissing clients. In particular clients hiring new non-Big 4 auditors, experience smaller fee increases than nonswitching clients in the following year. These results are consistent with the notion that in the immediate post-SOX period, some companies dismissed their auditors in expectation of lower fees from the succeeding auditor.
Audit effort, audit fees, and the provision of nonaudit services to audit clients这个太多，就摘点了The results reported in this article provide no empirical evidence for the argument that providing nonaudit services for audit clients creates circumstances that may lead auditors to compromise their objectivity. Further research is needed to investigate other ways in which auditors may benefit from the joint provision of services, such as the effects of auditor tenure on client-firm bonding and economic rents earned through nonaudit services.
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