英文文献:Quantity Versus Quality in the Soviet Market for Weapons-苏联武器市场的数量与质量
英文文献作者:Mark Harrison,Andrei Markevich
英文文献摘要:
Military market places display obvious inefficiencies under most arrangements, but the Soviet defense market was unusual for its degree of monopoly, exclusive relationships, and intense scrutiny (in its formative years) by a harsh dictator. This provided the setting for quality versus quantity in the delivery of weapons to the government. The paper discusses the power of the industrial contractor over the defense buyer in terms of a hold-up problem. The typical use that the contractor made of this power was to default on quality. The defense ministry’s counter-action took the form of deploying agents through industry with the authority to verify quality and reject substandard goods. The final compromise restored quality at the expense of quantity. Being illicit, it had to be hidden from the dictator.
在大多数安排下,军事市场表现出明显的低效率,但苏联的国防市场不同寻常,因为它的垄断程度、排他性关系,以及严厉的独裁者(在形成的年代)的严格审查。这为政府的武器交付提供了质量和数量的设置。本文从一个延迟问题的角度讨论了工业承包商对国防买方的权力。承包商利用这种权力的典型做法是对质量违约。国防部采取的应对措施是通过授权工业部署代理商,对质量进行检验并拒收不合格产品。最后的妥协是以牺牲数量恢复了质量。因为是非法的,所以必须对独裁者隐藏起来。


雷达卡


京公网安备 11010802022788号







