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In mid-March the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT)—the Belgium-based global interbank transfer system—disconnected about 30 Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), in line with new EU legislation. The move will clearly tighten the pressure on Iran, and make it more difficult for firms to import and export, but will not halt Iranian trade.
Although EU law in theory allows SWIFT to handle legitimate trade with the named banks, the transfer firm—being unable to distinguish between valid and invalid transactions—had no option but to remove the targeted institutions completely from the system. SWIFT’s move accords with the gradual tightening of US and EU sanctions on the Islamic republic in recent months, including an EU decision to ban imports of Iranian oil from July 1st, and a new US law in January to sanction global financial institutions that deal with the CBI. In the same month the US added Tejarat Bank (Iran’s third largest) to its banned list, which now incorporates all major Iranian banks; others include Melli, Saderat, Mellat and Sepah.
The disconnect from SWIFT, alongside other financial sanctions, will make it substantially more complicated for Iranian enterprises and businesses to import and export, and, by increasing Iran’s cost of doing business, will stoke inflation, potentially undermining popular support for the regime. However, the EU and US financial sanctions (including the SWIFT disconnect) will by no means bring trade to a halt, and workarounds will be sought and found. Most obviously, Iran can conduct legitimate trade without using the SWIFT network, although this presents a number of logistical obstacles, such as agreeing secure methods of communication and negotiating the precise terms of business with individual banks. Alternatively, if an Iranian trader and its foreign partner hold accounts at the same bank, transfers could be carried out internally. In addition, Iran could conceivably engage a Chinese bank (for example) to serve as its proxy, using payments owed for Iranian oil to purchase imports on Iran’s behalf. There may also be an increase in barter trade, and in cash and bullion transactions.
Smaller Iranian banks not on the sanctions list (numbering about 20) could also step in, although their relative lack of experience and capital would lead to higher risks for all involved. Moreover, as quickly as Iran tries to find alternatives, the US and the EU will attempt to close the loopholes. Notably, although the EU is principally targeting the oil trade, rather than non-oil business, the financial sanctions (and the SWIFT disconnect) will potentially prove more disruptive for non-oil transactions. This is primarily because non-oil trade is very diverse, involving many more suppliers and, in general, smaller individual transactions. This makes it much harder to find workarounds, in comparison with the oil trade, which is based on large and valuable but less frequent shipments to a narrow range of customers. Provided Iran’s key oil buyers, such as Japan, China and India, remain co-operative, Iran will continue to generate hard currency.
Iran’s trade will not be stopped by financial sanctions but it will be stifled and costs will inevitably rise. Iranian domestic industry could gain from the sanctions-driven increase in trade costs, as imported goods become more expensive in the local market, although firms reliant on imported raw materials would benefit less. Some of the cost burden will fall on EU and US suppliers: several have not been paid since the US tightened financial sanctions in January, while the SWIFT action will clearly exacerbate the problem. SWIFT’s reputation as a neutral intermediary has also been tarnished, although the firm had little option but to act given US and EU pressure. There seems little doubt that financial sanctions will intensify during the coming year, led by the US and the EU, which are, for example, mooting the removal of all Iranian banks from the SWIFT network. However, without the wholehearted support of Iran’s other key trade partners, including Japan, China, India and the United Arab Emirates, financial sanctions could prove to be more of an irritant than a decisive factor in bringing Iran back to the nuclear negotiating table.
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