[英文文献] Third Down with a Yard to Go: The Dixit-Skeath Conundrum on Equilibria in C... [推广有奖]

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个人社保222 发表于 2005-4-1 17:24:05 |AI写论文

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英文文献：Third Down with a Yard to Go: The Dixit-Skeath Conundrum on Equilibria in Competitive Games
英文文献作者：Grant, S.,Kajii, A.,Polak, B.
英文文献摘要：
In strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies are invariant to changes in the ultimate prizes. Dixit & Skeath (1999) argue that this seems counter-intuitive. We show that this invariance is robust to dropping the independence axiom, but is removed if we drop the reduction axiom.