英文文献:A Theory of Precautionary Regulatory Capital in Banking-银行业的预防性监管资本理论
英文文献作者:Phong T. H. Ngo
英文文献摘要:
The orthodox assumption in the banking literature is that capital requirements are a binding constraint on banking behaviour. This is in conflict with the empirical observation that banks hold a bu¤er of capital well in excess of the minimum requirements. This paper develops a model where capital is endogenously determined within a profit maximising equilibrium. Optimality involves balancing the reduction in expected costs associated with regulatory breach with the excess cost of financing from increasing capital. We demonstrate that when the equilibrium probability of regulatory breach is less than one half, banks are expected to hold precautionary capital.
银行业文献中的正统假设是,资本金要求是对银行业行为的约束性约束。这与经验观察相悖,经验观察认为银行持有的资本远远超过了最低要求。本文建立了一个资本在利润最大化均衡中内生决定的模型。最优性包括平衡与违反监管相关的预期成本的减少与增加资本融资的超额成本。我们证明,当违反监管的均衡概率小于二分之一时,银行预计将持有预防性资本。


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