二、契约理论和企业理论
企业的资源理论(8篇)
1.Toward a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm
2. The Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
3. Knowledge-Based Approaches to the Theory of the Firm Some Critical Comments
4. Capabilities and the Theory of the Firm
5. The Resource-Based Perspective:An Assessment and Diagnosis of Problems
6.The Resource-Based Tangle: Towards a Sustainable Explanation of CompetitiveAdvantage
7.A Resource-Based View of the Firm
8. The Resource-Based View of the Firm: Ten Years After
不完全契约(Incomplete Contract Theory)的10篇文献
1.BROUSSEAU, Eric and M’hand FARES, 2000, "Incomplete Contracts and Governance Structures: Are Incomplete Contract Theory and New-Institutional Economics Substitutes or Complements?", in Ménard C., (ed.), Institutions, Contracts, Organizations, Perspectives from New-Institutional Economics, Edward Elgar.
2.Garcia, Diego, 2001, "Incomplete Contracts in Investment Models",working paper
3.Anderlini, L. and L. Felli, 1998, “Indescribability and agency problems”, European Economic Review, 42: 35-59
4.Brynjolfsson, Erik, 1994, "An Incomplete Contracts Theory of Information, Technology and Organization", MIT working paper
5.Hart, O. and J. Moore (1988), “Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation”, Econometrica 56: 755-785.
6.Chung, T.-Y. (1991), “Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk-Sharing”, Review of Economic Studies 58: 1031-1042.
7.Bolton, P. and M. Whinston (1993), “Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration, and Supply Assurance”, Review of Economic Studies 60: 121-148.
8.Tirole, J. (1999), “Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?”, Econometrica 67: 741-781.
9.Aghion, P. and P. Bolton (2003), “Incomplete Social Contracts”, Journal of the European Economic Association
10.INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS by Oliver D. Hart NBER Reporter, Summer95, p18, 5p
Jensen学术论文集
Brousseau—契约经济学
公司金融和公司治理文献—Rajan和Zingales
1.Rajan的“公司金融”,参考https://bbs.pinggu.org/thread-455-1-1.html
2.Zingales的“公司治理”
(1)Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm
(2)公司治理和企业理论
3.Zingales发表在《金融学杂志》上的《寻找新基础》
4. Power in a Theory of the firm R. Rajan & L. Zingales QJE, Vol. 113, No.2 (May, 1998)
欧洲企业理论夏令营讲义
关于“拍卖理论”,一个是最新综述,另一个是Maskin在武大的讲稿ppt
聂辉华专辑
1、企业的本质:一个前沿综述
2、论企业与市场的相互融合
3、企业:一种人力资本使用权交易的粘性组织
4、全球化时代的企业运营, http://rushang.cn/baisha/dispArticle.Asp?ID=60
5、新制度经济学中不完全契约理论的分歧与融合
6、不完全契约理论:一个综述
张维迎演讲稿
1.《企业理论与中国企业改革》
主要内容:张维迎的博士论文和他关于信任的文章。
2.《信息与激励》
主要内容:张维迎《博弈论与信息经济学》第二部分的一些内容。
契约理论最新论文——Hart等(2004)
Foss关于企业理论的综述
奈特—风险、不确定性和利润
不完全金融契约理论:阿洪-博尔顿—关于融资契约的一个不完全契约方法
克莱因等—纵向一体化、可占用性租金与竞争性缔约过程(1978)
Klein, B., R. Crawford and A. Alchian, 1978, “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process”, Journal of Law and Economics, 21: 297-326.
Lars Stole 的合约和组织讲义
Dewattripone—契约理论导论
科尔奈—理解软预算约束, Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint
Maskin ,Moore—Implementation and Renegotiation
哈特和霍姆斯特朗
1.Hart and Moore— Contracts Rule Out But not Rule In
2. Oliver Hart , John Moore —Cooperatives VS. Outside Ownership
3. Bengt Holmstrom —Future of Cooperatives : A Cooperative Perspective
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
Jean Tirole—Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring, 1988
1.The Nature of the Firm: Origin, pp. 3-17, R. H. Coase
2.The Nature of the Firm: Meaning, pp. 19-32, R. H. Coase
3.The Nature of the Firm: Influence, pp. 33-47
Michael Novak(1996)—The Future of the Corporation
陈郁编—所有权、控制权与激励的英文文献
沃因、韦坎德[编]—契约经济学
Joskow、Demsetz和Shleifer
1.Joskow,1985:纵向一体化和长期契约(JEL);
2.哈罗德.德姆塞茨:作为一种进入壁垒的广告;
3.施莱佛等:家族企业,工作论文。
一个关于契约理论的阅读文献综述A reading list of Contract Theory
周其仁---公有制企业性质
Oliver Hart 1995 "Corporate governance:Some Theory and Implications" Economic Journal 105 p678-689
Robert Gibbons,2004:Four Formal Theories of the Firm
Nicolai J. Foss 2005: “The Theory of the Firm and Its Critics: A Stocktaking and Assessment
蔡宏斌(2003)—一个联合所有权理论
G-H-M Model
Shleifer, A., and R.W. Vishny (1994), “Politicians and Firms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109: 995-1025.
Hart, O. and J. Moore (1999), “On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization”, mimeo, Harvard.
Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1983), “An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem”, Econometrica 51: 7-45.
奥利弗·威廉姆森—资本主义经济制度
MIT—契约经济学