制度分析与公共政策研究必读书目

North, Douglas C.1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglas Cecil.1981. Structure and ChangeinEconomic History. W.W.Norton & Company, Inc.
　　
　　
Olson, Mancur, Jr. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action, Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
　　
    Ordeshook, Peter C. 1986. Game Theory and Political Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ordeshook, Peter C. 1992. Constitutional Stability. Constitutional Political Economy . 3(2) 137-175.
Ordeshook, Peter C. 1993. Some Rules of Constitutional Design. Social Philosophy and Policy . 10(2) 198-232.
Ordeshook, Peter C. 1995. Institutions and Incentives. Journal of Democracy . 6(2) 46-60.
　　
    Ostrom, Elinor, Larry Schroeder, and Susan Wynne. 1993. Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
　　Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner, and James Walker. 1994. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
　　Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
　　Ostrom, Elinor. 1992. Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems. San Francisco, Calif.: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.
Ostrom, Elinor. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Ostrom, Elinor; Gardner, Roy; Walker, James 1995. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources . Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
　　
    Ostrom, Vincent, David Feeny, and Hartmut Picht, eds. 1993. Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development: Issues, Alternatives, and Choices. 2d ed. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.
　　Ostrom, Vincent, Robert Bish, and Elinor Ostrom. 1988. Local Government in the United States. San Francisco, Calif.: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.
Ostrom, Vincent. 1974. The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration. University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press.
　　Ostrom, Vincent. 1987. The Political Theory of a Compound Republic: Designing the American Experiment. 2d rev. ed. San Francisco, Calif.: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.
　　Ostrom, Vincent. 1989. The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration. 2d ed. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
　　Ostrom, Vincent. 1991. The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-Governing Society. San Francisco, Calif.: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.
Ostrom, Vincent. The Meaning of Democracy and The Vulnerability of Democracies: A Response to Tocqueville’s Challenge. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997.
Ostrom, Vincent. The Political Theory of Compound Republic. Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1987.
Ostrom, Vincent.1991.The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-governing Society, Institute for Contemporary Studies.
　　
    Piaget, Jean. 1969. The Moral Judgment of the Child. New York: Free Press.
　　Pipes, Richard. 1974. Russia under the Old Regime. New York: Charles Scribner.
　
Polanyi, Michael. 1951. The Logic of Liberty, Reflection and Rejoinders. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
　　
    Popkin, Samuel. 1979. The Rational Peasant. Berkeley: University of California Press.
　
Powell, G. Bingham 1981. Party Systems and Political System Performance: Voting Participation, Government Stability and Mass Violence in Contemporary Democracies. American Political Science Review . 75(4) 861-879.
Powell, G. Bingham 1982. Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence . Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Powell, G. Bingham 1989. Consitutional Design and Citizen Electoral Control. Journal of Theoretical Politics . 1(2) 107-130.
Powell, G. Bingham 1990. Holding Governments Acoountable: How Constitutional Arrangements and Party Systems Affect Clarity of Responsability for Policy in Contemporary Democracies . Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco.
　
Przeworski, Adam 1991. Democracy and the Market . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Przeworski, Adam 1995. Sustainable Democracy . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Przeworski, Adam; Limongi, Fernando 1993. Political Regimes and Economic Growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives . 7(3) 51-69.
Przeworski, Adam; Teune, Henry 1970. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry . New York: John Wiley.
　　
    Putnam, Robert D. [with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti]. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
　　Raiffa, Howard. 1982. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Rheinstein, Max, ed. 1967. Max Weber on law in Economy and Society. Clarion Bond edition. New York: Simon and Schuster.
　
Riker, William H. 1964. Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance . Boston: Little, Brown.
Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism Against Populism. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
　　Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. San Francisco, California: W. H. Freeman.
Riker, William H. 1983. Liberalism Against Populism . San Francisco: W.H. Freeman.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1978. On the Social Contract. Roger D. Masters, ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
　　
    Sabetti, Filippo. 1984. Political Authority in a Sicilian Village. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.
　　
    Sawyer, Amos. 1992. The Emergence of Autocracy in Liberia: Tragedy and Challenge. San Francisco, California: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.
Scharpf, Fritz W. 1989. Decision Rules, Decision Styles and Policy Choices. Journal of Theoretical Politics . 1(2) 149-176.
　　Schmid, A. Allan. 1989. Benefit-Cost Analysis: A Political Economy Approach. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Schofield, Norman 1995. Democratic Stability. in Knight, Jack; Sened, Itai (eds.) Explaining Social Institutions . Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. pp. 189-215.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1979. Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models. American Journal of Political Science . 23 27-59.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1989. Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach. Journal of Theoretical Politics . 1(2) 131-148.
　　Shubik, Martin. 1983. Game Theory in the Social Sciences: Concepts and Solutions. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. [For those with a good mathematical background.]
Shugart, Matthew Soberg; Carey, John M. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, Adam. 1880(1776): An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
Smith, Adam. N.d. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.
Solberg, Winton U., ed. 1958. The Federal Convention and the Formation of the American States. Indianapolis: Bobbs-merrill.
　　Sproule-Jones, Mark. 1993. Governments at Work: Canadian Parliamentary Federalism and Its Public Policy Effects. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
　
Tiebout, Charles 1956. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. Journal of Political Economy . 64 416-424.
　
Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1945. Democracy in America. Philips Bradley, ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1955. The Old Regime and the French Revolution. Garden City, New York: Doubleday.
　　Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1988. Democracy in America. New York: Harper & Row.
　　Tocqueville. 1955. The Old Regime and the French Revolution. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
　
Tsebelis, George 1990. Nested Games. Rational Choice in Comparative Politics . Berkeley: University of California Press.
Weaver, Kent R.; Rockman, Bert (eds.) 1993. Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the US and Abroad . Washington: The Brookings Institution.
Weber, Max. 1967. On Law in Economy and Society. Max Rheinstein, ed. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Weingast, Barry 1995. The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development. Journal of Law, Economics & Organization . 11(1) 1-31.
　　
    Williamson, Oliver. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.
　　Wilson, Woodrow. 1956. Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics. New York: Meridian Books.
　
Wittman, Donald 1995. The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions Are Efficient . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
　　
    Wunsch, James, and Dele Olowu, eds. 1995. The Failure of the Centralized State: Institutions and Self-Governance in Africa. 2d ed. San Francisco, Calif.: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.

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