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2012诺贝尔经济学
Harvard, Alvin E.Roth(http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/profile.aspx?facId=6594)
His research, teaching, and consulting interests are in game theory, experimental economics, and market design. The best known of the markets he has designed (or, in this case, redesigned) is the National Resident Matching Program, through which approximately twenty thousand doctors a year find their first employment as residents at American hospitals.
UCLA, Lloyd S.Shapley（http://www.econ.ucla.edu/shapley/index.html）
Along with the Shapley value, stochastic games, the Bondareva-Shapley theorem (which implies that convex games have non-empty cores), the Shapley–Shubik power index (for weighted- or block voting power), the Gale–Shapley algorithm (for the stable marriage problem), the concept of a potential game (with Dov Monderer), the Aumann–Shapley pricing, the Harsanyi–Shapley solution, and the Shapley–Folkman lemma & theorem bear his name.
Besides, his early work with R.N.Snow and Samuel Karlin on matrix games was so complete that little has been added since. He has been instrumental in the development of utility theory, and it was he who laid much of the groundwork for the solution of the problem of the existence of Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets. His work with M.Maschler and B.Peleg on the kernel and the nucleolus, and his work with Robert Aumann on non-atomic games and on long-term competition have all had a tremendous impact in economic theory.
In his 80s, Shapley continues publishing in the areas of specialization he created or advanced, such as multi-person utility (with Manel Baucells) and authority distribution (a generalization to the Shapley–Shubik power index and useful in ranking, planning and group decision-making).
2007诺贝尔经济学
Roger B. Myerson , U of Chicago(http://home.uchicago.edu/~rmyerson/)
[size=0.8em] In game theory, he introduced refinements of Nash's equilibrium concept, and he developed techniques to characterize the effects of communication when individuals have different information. His analysis of incentive constraints in economic communication introduced some of the fundamental ideas in mechanism design theory, including the revelation principle and the revenue-equivalence theorem in auctions and bargaining. Professor Myerson has also applied game-theoretic tools to political science, analyzing how political incentives can be affected by different electoral systems and constitutional structures.
[size=0.8em] Myerson is the author of Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict (1991) and Probability Models for Economic Decisions (2005). He also has published numerous articles in Econometrica, the Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Decisions, and the International Journal of Game Theory, for which he served as an editorial board member for 10 years.
Leonid Hurwicz (deceased )
Leonid "Leo" Hurwicz (Russian: Леони́д Гу́рвич; August 21, 1917 – June 24, 2008) was a Polish-American economist and mathematician of Jewish descent, born in Moscow.[1][2] He originated incentive compatibility and mechanism design, which show how desired outcomes are achieved in economics, social science and political science. Interactions of individuals and institutions, markets and trade are analyzed and understood today using the models Hurwicz developed.[3] To date, Leonid Hurwicz is the oldest Nobel Laureate, having received the prize at the age of 90.
Hurwicz was Regents' Professor of Economics (Emeritus) at the University of Minnesota. He was among the first economists to recognize the value of game theory and was a pioneer in its application.[4][5] Hurwicz shared the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences with Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson for their work on mechanism design.
Eric S. Maskin(http://scholar.harvard.edu/maskin/)
Dr. Maskin, whose work in economic theory has had a deep influence on many areas of economics, political science, and law, is recognized by The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences for “having laid the foundation of mechanism design theory.” According to the citation, the theory has among other things helped economists identify efficient trading mechanisms, regulation schemes and voting procedures.
2005诺贝尔经济学
Robert J. Aumann (http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~raumann/)
Aumann's greatest contribution was in the realm of repeated games, which are situations in which players encounter the same situation over and over again.
Aumann was the first to define the concept of correlated equilibrium in game theory, which is a type of equilibrium in non-cooperative games that is more flexible than the classical Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, Aumann has introduced the first purely formal account of the notion of common knowledge in game theory. He collaborated with Lloyd Shapley on the Aumann-Shapley value. He is also known for his agreement theorem, in which he argues that under his given conditions, two Bayesian rationalists with common prior beliefs cannot agree to disagree.
Aumann and Maschler used Game Theory also to analyze Talmudic dilemmas.They were able to solve the mystery about the "division problem", a long-time dilemma of explaining the Talmudic rationale in dividing the heritage of a late husband to his three wives, depending on the worth of the heritage compared to its original worth.The article in that matter was dedicated to a son of Aumann, Shlomo, who was killed during the 1982 Lebanon War while serving as a tank gunner in the Israel Defense Forces's armored corps.
U of Maryland, Thomas C. Schelling(http://www.econ.umd.edu/faculty/profiles/schelling)
The Strategy of Conflict, which Schelling published in 1960, pioneered the study of bargaining and strategic behavior in what Schelling refers to as "conflict behavior". It is considered one of the hundred books that have been most influential in the West since 1945. In this book he introduced concepts like focal point and credible commitment. Chapter headings include A Reorientation of Game Theory, Randomization of Promises and Threats, and Surprise Attack: A Study of Mutual Distrust.
1996诺贝尔经济学
William Vickrey(deceased )
Vickrey's paper, Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders, was the first of its kind using the tools of game theory to explain the dynamics of auctions. In his paper, Vickrey derives several auction equilibria, and provides an early revenue equivalence result. The revenue equivalence theorem remains the centrepiece of modern auction theory. The Vickrey auction is named after him.
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