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英文文献：Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse-资源出售:腐败、民主和自然资源诅咒
英文文献作者：Richard Damania,Erwin Bulte
英文文献摘要：
A puzzling piece of empirical evidence suggests that resource-abundant countries tend to grow slower than their resource-poor counterparts. We attempt to explain this phenomenon by developing a lobbying game in which rent seeking firms interact with corrupt governments. The presence or absence of political competition, as well as the potential costs of political transitions, turn out to be key elements in generating the ?‘resource curse.?’ These variables define the degree of freedom that incumbent governments have in pursuing development policies that maximize surplus in the lobbying game, but put the economy off its optimal path. We test our predictions by adding measures of democracy and authoritarianism to existing regression models of the resource curse, and obtain support for our hypotheses.
一项令人困惑的经验证据表明，资源丰富的国家往往比资源贫乏的国家增长缓慢。我们试图通过开发一个游说游戏来解释这一现象，在这个游戏中，寻租公司与腐败的政府相互作用。政治竞争的存在或不存在，以及政治过渡的潜在成本，是产生“资源诅咒”的关键因素。这些变量决定了现任政府在推行发展政策时所拥有的自由度，这些政策在游说活动中实现盈余最大化，但却使经济偏离了最佳轨道。我们通过在现有的资源诅咒回归模型中加入民主和威权措施来检验我们的预测，并获得对我们假设的支持。
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