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雷达卡
Fudenberg and Tirole game theory 书上Example 6.1（P212）看不懂,中文版亦可参考张维迎三联书店版第150页。
文章说
To maximize his expected payoff, player i will
contribute if his cost Ci is less than 1 *( 1- Zj). which is his benefit from the
public good times the probability that player j does not contribute.
我的问题是如果j不contribute,那么就算i contribute,他的最大benefit应该为(1-Ci)*(1-Zj),最小为0*(1-Zj).
然后下文出现了Ci与1-Zj之比较，更不明白了。
有谁看过，能和我说一说么？
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