A Political Theory of Inter-Governmental Grants-政府间资助的政治理论

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英文文献：A Political Theory of Inter-Governmental Grants-政府间资助的政治理论
英文文献作者：Philip J. Grossman
英文文献摘要：
This paper formulates a political theory of intergovernmental grants. A model of vote-maximizing federal politicians is developed. Grants are assumed to buy the support of state voters and the 'political capital or resources' of state politicians and interest groups which can be used to further increase the support of state voters for the federal politician. The model is tested for 49 states. Similarity of party affiliation between federal and state politicians and the size of the Democrat majority in the state legislature increases the per capita dollar amount of grants made to a state. Likewise, increases in both the size of the state bureaucracy and union membership lead to greater grants for a state. Over time, the importance of interest groups (bureaucracy and unions) has increased relative to political groups (state politicians). Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

本文提出了政府间资助的政治理论。建立了一个联邦政客选票最大化的模型。假定赠款用于购买州选民的支持，以及州政客和利益集团的“政治资本或资源”，可用于进一步增加州选民对联邦政客的支持。该模型在49个州进行了测试。联邦和州政客之间相似的党派关系以及州立法机构中民主党占多数的人数增加了给予一个州的人均拨款金额。同样地，州官僚机构和工会成员人数的增加也会给州带来更多的拨款。随着时间的推移，利益集团(官僚机构和工会)相对于政治集团(州政客)的重要性有所增加。版权所有:Kluwer学术出版社

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