The Global Growth Quest

是 否 +2 论坛币

k人 参与回答

经管之家送您一份

应届毕业生专属福利!

求职就业群

赵安豆老师微信：zhaoandou666

经管之家联合CDA

送您一个全额奖学金名额~ !

立即领取

感谢您参与论坛问题回答

经管之家送您两个论坛币！

+2 论坛币

What is the most urgent economic priority shared bycountries as diverse as Brazil, China, Cyprus, France, Greece, Iceland,Ireland, Korea, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States?
It is not debt and deficits; and it is not dealing with theaftermath of irresponsible lending and borrowing. Yes, these are relevant and,in a handful of cases, urgent. But the number one challenge facing thesecountries is to develop growth models that can provide more ample, well-paid,and secure jobs amid a secular re-alignment of the global economy.
For both theoretical and practical reasons, this is achallenge that will not be met easily or quickly. And, when it is met, theprocess will most likely be partial and uneven, accentuating differences andposing tricky coordination issues at the national, regional, and global levels.
The last few years have highlighted the declining potencyof long-standing growth models. Some countries (for example, Greece andPortugal) relied on debt-financed government spending to fuel economy activity.Others (think Cyprus, Iceland, Ireland, the UK, and the US) resorted tounsustainable surges in leverage among financial institutions to fundprivate-sector activities, sometimes almost irrespective of underlyingfundamentals. Still others (China and Korea) exploited seemingly limitlessglobalization and buoyantinternational trade to capture growing market shares. And a final group rodeChina’s coattails.
Recent data from the International Monetary Fund highlightthese models’ simultaneous loss of effectiveness. Global growth averaged only2.9% in the most recent five-year period, well below the level for virtuallyany such multi-year period going back to 1971. While emerging economies haveout-performed developed countries, both have slowed. Growth has been virtuallyflat in developed economies and, at 5.6% in the emerging world, is well belowthe 7.6% average in the previous five-year period.
Highly leveraged systems in finance-dependent economieswere the first to hit awall, surprising many who had uncritically bought into the “Great Moderation” – the idea thatmacroeconomic and asset-market volatility had eased permanently. The boldpolicy action that countered the initial disorder prevented a globaldepression, but it encumberedpublic-sector balance sheets.
As a result, highly indebted governments were the next tohit the wall. Some were pushed there by the high cost of containing the damagefrom banks’ irresponsible behavior. Facing immediate credit rationing and large outputcontractions, they could be stabilized only by exceptional official financingfrom abroad, and, in some extreme cases, by defaulting on past commitments(including to bondholders and, most recently, bank depositors).
For other countries, including the US, medium-term issuescame to the fore. But, rather than catalyzing sensible policy discussions,these issues played into polarizedand polarizing politics, creating new and more immediate headwinds to economicgrowth.
Meanwhile, a highly interdependent and (now) less dynamic worldeconomy has been limiting the scope for external growth drivers. Accordingly,even countries with sound balance sheets and manageable leverage haveexperienced a growth slowdown.
The consequences have become painfully clear, especially inWestern countries. With insufficient growth to deleverage safely, social costshave been considerable. Alarmingly high youth unemployment, shrinking socialsafety nets, and under-investment in infrastructure and human capital areburdening current generations and, in a growing number of cases, will adverselyaffect future generations as well.
In the process, inequality has risen further. And yet,despite the urgent need for major policy adaptations at the national level, andmuch better regional and global coordination, progress has been disappointing.
With the political context undermining the right mix ofshort- and longer-term measures, national policymaking has stumbled into partialapproaches and unusual experimentation. The focus has been on buying time,rather than on implementing a sensible transition to a sustainable policystance. And potential national outcomes would be less uncertain if excessiveinequality were not treated as an afterthought.
The regional and multilateral dimensions are similarlyinadequate. The absence of well-articulated common analyses and policycoordination has accentuatedlegitimacy deficits, encouraging leaders and publics to opt for partialnarratives and eroding confidence in existing institutional structures.
Given these trends, the search for more robust growthmodels will take much longer and be more complicated than many recognize –especially as the world economy pivots away from unfettered globalization and high levels of leverage.
We should expect countries like the US to benefit fromdynamic bottom-up entrepreneurship and traditional cyclical economic healing. Notwithstanding adysfunctional Congress, the private sector will increasingly convert aparalyzing uncertainty premium, which impedes much investment, into a lessdisruptive risk premium. But, without a short-term economic turbo-charger, therecovery in growth and jobs will remain gradual, vulnerable to political andpolicy risks, and disproportionately beneficial to those with favorable initialendowments of wealth and globalized talents.
Governments’ role will be different in countries likeChina, where officials will guide a shift from dependence on external sourcesof growth to more balanced demand. As this requires some fundamental domesticre-alignments, the rebalancing will be both gradual and non-linear at times.
The outlook for other economies is more uncertain.Undermined by a lack of policy flexibility, it will take a long time forcountries like Cyprus to overcome the immediate shock of crisis and revamp their growthmodels.
Left to their own devices, these multi-speed dynamics wouldtranslate into higher global growth overall, coupled with larger internal andcross-country disparities– often exacerbatedby demographics.The question is whether existing governance systems can coordinate effectiveintervention to counter the resulting tensions.
Simultaneous progress on both substance and process isneeded. Parliaments and multilateral institutions must do a better job atfacilitating cooperative policy implementation, which will require awillingness to reform outmodedinstitutions, including political lobbying.
No one should underestimate the growth challenge facingtoday’s global economy. The stronger sectors (within countries and across them)will continue to recover, but not enough to pull up the global economy whole Asa result, weaker sectors risk being surpassed at an ever-faster pace. Thesetrends will become more difficult to reconcile and keep orderly if governancesystems fail to adjust.

扫码加我 拉你入群

请注明：姓名-公司-职位

以便审核进群资格，未注明则拒绝

分享0 收藏0 回帖

关键词：Growth Global lobal Quest GROW false challenge economic relevant

Some countries(for example, Greece and Portugal) relied on debt-financed government spendingto fuel economy activity. Others (think Cyprus, Iceland, Ireland, the UK, andthe US) resorted to unsustainable surges in leverage among financialinstitutions to fund private-sector activities, sometimes almost irrespectiveof underlying fundamentals. Still others (China and Korea) exploited seeminglylimitless globalization and buoyantinternational trade to capture growing market shares. And a final group rodeChina’s coattails.

Highly leveraged systems in finance-dependent economieswere the first to hit awall, surprising many who had uncritically bought into the “Great Moderation” – the idea thatmacroeconomic and asset-market volatility had eased permanently. The boldpolicy action that countered the initial disorder prevented a globaldepression, but it encumberedpublic-sector balance sheets.
As a result, highly indebted governments were the next tohit the wall. Some were pushed there by the high cost of containing the damagefrom banks’ irresponsible behavior. Facing immediate credit rationing and large outputcontractions, they could be stabilized only by exceptional official financingfrom abroad, and, in some extreme cases, by defaulting on past commitments(including to bondholders and, most recently, bank depositors).
For other countries, including the US, medium-term issuescame to the fore. But, rather than catalyzing sensible policy discussions,these issues played into polarizedand polarizing politics, creating new and more immediate headwinds to economicgrowth.
Meanwhile, a highly interdependent and (now) less dynamic worldeconomy has been limiting the scope for external growth drivers. Accordingly,even countries with sound balance sheets and manageable leverage haveexperienced a growth slowdown.



The consequences have become painfully clear, especially inWestern countries. With insufficient growth to deleverage safely, social costshave been considerable. Alarmingly high youth unemployment, shrinking socialsafety nets, and under-investment in infrastructure and human capital areburdening current generations and, in a growing number of cases, will adverselyaffect future generations as well.Inthe process, inequality has risen further.



We should expect countries like the US to benefit fromdynamic bottom-up entrepreneurship and traditional cyclical economic healing.
Governments’ role will be different in countries likeChina, where officials will guide a shift from dependence on external sourcesof growth to more balanced demand.