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分享 Charting Poverty In Ferguson: Then And Now
insight 2014-8-18 07:52
Charting Poverty In Ferguson: Then And Now Submitted by Tyler Durden on 08/17/2014 17:05 -0400 Ben Bernanke Ben Bernanke None Reality Unemployment in Share 1 While there have been many socio-economic 'explanations and justifications' for the recent events in Ferguson, many of which have exceeded the realm of the factual and have brazenly encroached on feelings, emotions, heartstrings, and various other of the media's favorite manipulative mechanisms to achieve a desired outcome, the unpleasant reality is that much of what has transpired not only in the small 21,000-person St. Louis suburban community, but what is taking place across all of America has to do with a far simpler phenomenon: the rise of poverty and the destruction of America's middle class. Here are some facts : Ferguson has been home to dramatic economic changes in recent years. The city’s unemployment rate rose from less than 5 percent in 2000 to over 13 percent in 2010-12. For those residents who were employed, inflation-adjusted average earnings fell by one-third. The number of households using federal Housing Choice Vouchers climbed from roughly 300 in 2000 to more than 800 by the end of the decade. Amid these changes, poverty skyrocketed. Between 2000 and 2010-2012, Ferguson’s poor population doubled. By the end of that period, roughly one in four residents lived below the federal poverty line ($23,492 for a family of four in 2012), and 44 percent fell below twice that level. These changes affected neighborhoods throughout Ferguson. At the start of the 2000s, the five census tracts that fall within Ferguson’s border registered poverty rates ranging between 4 and 16 percent. However, by 2008-2012 almost all of Ferguson’s neighborhoods had poverty rates at or above the 20 percent threshold at which the negative effects of concentrated poverty begin to emerge. (One Ferguson tract had a poverty rate of 13.1 percent in 2008-2012, while the remaining tracts fell between 19.8 and 33.3 percent.) Below are charts of Ferguson poverty in 2000 and 2012: Then : Census Tract-Level Poverty Rates in St. Louis County, 2000 and Now : Census Tract-Level Poverty Rates in St. Louis County, 2008-2012 The biggest concern, however, is that Ferguson is merely the canary in the coalmine. According to Brookings, within the nation’s 100 largest metro areas , the number of suburban neighborhoods where more than 20 percent of residents live below the federal poverty line more than doubled between 2000 and 2008-2012. Almost every major metro area saw suburban poverty not only grow during the 2000s but also become more concentrated in high-poverty neighborhoods. By 2008-2012, 38 percent of poor residents in the suburbs lived in neighborhoods with poverty rates of 20 percent or higher. For poor black residents in those communities, the figure was 53 percent. Like Ferguson, many of these changing suburban communities are home to out-of-step power structures, where the leadership class, including the police force , does not reflect the rapid demographic changes that have reshaped these places. Suburban areas with growing poverty are also frequently characterized by many small, fragmented municipalities; Ferguson is just one of 91 jurisdictions in St. Louis County. This often translates into inadequate resources and capacity to respond to growing needs and can complicate efforts to connect residents with economic opportunities that offer a path out of poverty. And as concentrated poverty climbs in communities like Ferguson, they find themselves especially ill-equipped to deal with impacts such as poorer education and health outcomes, and higher crime rates . In an article for Salon , Brittney Cooper writes about the outpouring of anger from the community, “Violence is the effect, not the cause of the concentrated poverty that locks that many poor people up together with no conceivable way out and no productive way to channel their rage at having an existence that is adjacent to the American dream.” We have warned all along that the Fed's disastrous policies are splitting the nation in two, creating a tiny superclass of uber-wealthy oligrachs, and a vast majority of disgruntled, disenfranchised poor. It is the latter, whose life of squalor and poverty, has left them with little if anything to lose. Unless dramatic and rapid changes take place within the executive levels of the US corporato-banking oligrachy and its D.C. puppets, very soon "Ferguson-type" occurences, where participatnts could care less if the SP 500 closed at a fresh all time record high, will become a daily, and very deadly, occurence. All thanks to the Fed's dual mandate of "maximum employment and stable inflation." * * * And as a tangent, we must say that we find the fact that none other than former Fed chairman Ben Bernanke is now a Distinguished Fellow in Residence with the Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution , the source of most of the above data, to be ironic beyond words. Average: 3.857145
个人分类: 美国经济|11 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 American Economic Review: Vol. 104 No. 3 (March 2014)
W¤就是→我 2014-3-8 22:53
Articles Monetary Policy and Rational Asset Price Bubbles (pp. 721-52) Jordi Galí Fiscal Stimulus in a Monetary Union: Evidence from US Regions (pp. 753-92) Emi Nakamura and Jón Steinsson Trade Adjustment and Productivity in Large Crises (pp. 793-831) Gita Gopinath and Brent Neiman Do Prices and Attributes Explain International Differences in Food Purchases? (pp. 832-67) Pierre Dubois , Rachel Griffith and Aviv Nevo The Economics of Predation: What Drives Pricing When There Is Learning-by-Doing? (pp. 868-97) David Besanko , Ulrich Doraszelski and Yaroslav Kryukov Strategic Interaction and Networks (pp. 898-930) Yann Bramoullé , Rachel Kranton and Martin D'Amours How University Endowments Respond to Financial Market Shocks: Evidence and Implications (pp. 931-62) Jeffrey R. Brown , Stephen G. Dimmock , Jun-Koo Kang and Scott J. Weisbenner Shorter Papers When the Levee Breaks: Black Migration and Economic Development in the American South (pp. 963-90) Richard Hornbeck and Suresh Naidu School Choice, School Quality, and Postsecondary Attainment (pp. 991-1013) David J. Deming , Justine S. Hastings , Thomas J. Kane and Douglas O. Staiger Do Employers Use Unemployment as a Sorting Criterion When Hiring? Evidence from a Field Experiment (pp. 1014-39) Stefan Eriksson and Dan-Olof Rooth Risk and Precautionary Saving in Two-Person Households (pp. 1040-46) Patricia Apps , Yuri Andrienko and Ray Rees Does Money Illusion Matter? Comment (pp. 1047-62) Luba Petersen and Abel Winn Does Money Illusion Matter? Reply (pp. 1063-71) Ernst Fehr and Jean-Robert Tyran The Dynamic Behavior of the Real Exchange Rate in Sticky Price Models: Comment (pp. 1072-89) Jens Iversen and Ulf Sderstrm
个人分类: American Economic Review|15 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 American Economic Review: Vol. 104 No. 2 (February 2014)
W¤就是→我 2014-2-25 09:15
Articles Collateral Crises (pp. 343-78) Gary Gorton and Guillermo Ordoez A Macroeconomic Model with a Financial Sector (pp. 379-421) Markus K. Brunnermeier and Yuliy Sannikov Finance and Misallocation: Evidence from Plant-Level Data (pp. 422-58) Virgiliu Midrigan and Daniel Yi Xu Tracing Value-Added and Double Counting in Gross Exports (pp. 459-94) Robert Koopman , Zhi Wang and Shang-Jin Wei Market Size, Competition, and the Product Mix of Exporters (pp. 495-536) Thierry Mayer , Marc J. Melitz and Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano Do Consumers Respond to Marginal or Average Price? Evidence from Nonlinear Electricity Pricing (pp. 537-63) Koichiro Ito Time to Build and Fluctuations in Bulk Shipping (pp. 564-608) Myrto Kalouptsidi Time Allocation and Task Juggling (pp. 609-23) Decio Coviello , Andrea Ichino and Nicola Persico Shorter Papers How Financial Incentives Induce Disability Insurance Recipients to Return to Work (pp. 624-55) Andreas Ravndal Kostol and Magne Mogstad Outside Options and the Failure of the Coase Conjecture (pp. 656-71) Simon Board and Marek Pycia Raising Retailers' Profits: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals (pp. 672-86) John Asker and Heski Bar-Isaac Are Private Markets and Filtering a Viable Source of Low-Income Housing? Estimates from a 'Repeat Income' Model (pp. 687-706) Stuart S. Rosenthal Income and Democracy: Comment (pp. 707-19) Matteo Cervellati , Florian Jung , Uwe Sunde and Thomas Vischer
12 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 qe taper
insight 2013-12-21 16:51
sep Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in July suggests that economic activity has been expanding at a moderate pace. Some indicators of labor market conditions have shown further improvement in recent months, but the unemployment rate remains elevated. Household spending and business fixed investment advanced, and the housing sector has been strengthening, but mortgage rates have risen further and fiscal policy is restraining economic growth. Apart from fluctuations due to changes in energy prices, inflation has been running below the Committee's longer-run objective, but longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable. dec Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in October indicates that economic activity is expanding at a moderate pace. Labor market conditions have shown further improvement; the unemployment rate has declined but remains elevated. Household spending and business fixed investment advanced, while the recovery in the housing sector slowed somewhat in recent months. Fiscal policy is restraining economic growth, although the extent of restraint may be diminishing. Inflation has been running below the Committee's longer-run objective, but longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable. sep Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee expects that, with appropriate policy accommodation, economic growth will pick up from its recent pace and the unemployment rate will gradually decline toward levels the Committee judges consistent with its dual mandate. The Committee sees the downside risks to the outlook for the economy and the labor market as having diminished, on net, since last fall, but the tightening of financial conditions observed in recent months, if sustained, could slow the pace of improvement in the economy and labor market. The Committee recognizes that inflation persistently below its 2 percent objective could pose risks to economic performance, but it anticipates that inflation will move back toward its objective over the medium term. Taking into account the extent of federal fiscal retrenchment, the Committee sees the improvement in economic activity and labor market conditions since it began its asset purchase program a year ago as consistent with growing underlying strength in the broader economy. However, the Committee decided to await more evidence that progress will be sustained before adjusting the pace of its purchases. dec Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee expects that, with appropriate policy accommodation, economic growth will pick up from its recent pace and the unemployment rate will gradually decline toward levels the Committee judges consistent with its dual mandate. The Committee sees the risks to the outlook for the economy and the labor market as having become more nearly balanced. The Committee recognizes that inflation persistently below its 2 percent objective could pose risks to economic performance, and it is monitoring inflation developments carefully for evidence that inflation will move back toward its objective over the medium term. Taking into account the extent of federal fiscal retrenchment since the inception of its current asset purchase program, the Committee sees the improvement in economic activity and labor market conditions over that period as consistent with growing underlying strength in the broader economy. In light of the cumulative progress toward maximum employment and the improvement in the outlook for labor market conditions, the Committee decided to modestly reduce the pace of its asset purchases. monthly employment:http://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/ceseesummary.htm Manufacturers' New Orders: Nondefense Capital Goods Excluding Aircraft http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/NEWORDER?cid=32431 jan feb maraprmayjunejuly aug sep oct Personal consumption expenditures: Current dollars0.1 0.7 0.2-0.20.2 0.60.10.30.20.3 Chained (2009) dollars0.1 0.3 0.3 0 0.1 0.20.0 0.20.10.3 disposalbale income current dollars-5.2 1.30.3-0.10.30.3 0.30.60.5-0.2 Chained (2009) dollars-5.20.9 0.40.2 0.2 -0.1 0.20.50.4-0.2 peraonal saving rate 3.6 4.2 4.3 4.6 4.8 4.6 4.8 5.0 5.2 4.8 existing home sales tumble post first annual decline 29 months day after taper begin http://www.zerohedge.com/news/20 ... y-after-taper-begin 奥巴马再会金融巨头zerohedge发警告 https://bbs.pinggu.org/home.php?mod=spaceuid=720513do=blogid=221404 美媒:美国道德权威正在衰退 https://bbs.pinggu.org/home.php?mod=spaceuid=720513do=blogid=235288 官方力证黄金暴跌人为操纵 “头号嫌疑犯”浮出水面 http://xinyuanxiyu2010.blog.163.com/blog/static/131179796201332710523858/ 专家:钱荒凸显经济结构性问题 中国的银行缺钱 几乎在美联储宣布缩减购债规模的同时,美国传来马克斯・鲍卡斯将出任住 中国大使的消息(20日已获奥巴马正式提名)。马克斯・鲍卡斯是美国国会 参议院财政委员会主席(也有译为金融委员会的,笔者查阅后发现原文虽为 committeeon finance,原来有兼管金融和财政,后来银行和金融委员会成立 后,就只管财政了。)奥巴马任命一位并无安全背景精通财政的政治人物出任 驻华大使一职显示美国在经过一番博弈后更希望用和平的沟通方式取得中国 在美债问题上的支持,对中国十分有利(日本外相立即与中国驻华大使举行了 安倍政权上台以来的首次正式会谈,并表示日方重视对华关系,愿意努力使两国 关系重新回到战略互惠关系的原点中国驻日大使会见日本外相 http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2013-12-21/033929042968.shtml )。而从中国的立场来看,在面临产能过剩,企业资产 负债率偏高,非金融上市公司税息折旧及摊销前利润(EBITDA)与债务规模之比 低于贷款成本,等难题的情况下也十分需要同美国开展互惠互利的经济合作。但 具体到美债问题上,虽然美国财政有巨大的改革空间,以医保为例美国用于医保的 花费远远高于OECD的平均数。但由于日本即将开始减持美债,中国增持美债的结果 是互惠双赢,还是会使外汇储备大幅贬值依然十分不确定。此外,欧元区的反应也 值得关注,今年在习近平主席访美前夕,欧盟突然决定对来自中国的光伏产品征收 反倾销税,牵制中国过分倒向美国的意图十分明显。总体上看由于美元和欧元之间 的激烈竞争中国目前处于有利地位,但由于美欧的力量都明显强于中国,加上经济 形势错综复杂,中国需要开展深入的研究和广泛的讨论,在集思广益的基础上谨慎 应对。
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拌猪莎莎 2013-11-3 22:58
The Economics of Aging David A.Wise(1) Population aging, early retirement, limited but increasing retirement saving, more expensive medical practice patterns, and an established national entitlement to income and health care support after age 65 -- all of these factors largely define the economic environment of the United States (and much of the world) at the beginning of the 21st century. Over the past 30 years, life expectancy has increased from age 71 to age 77, while the most common age of retirement has decreased from age 65 to age 62. Retiring at age 62, the typical American retiree today faces another 20 years of living, consuming and, at one time or another, and in many cases regularly, needing expensive health care services. These trends already have placed significant financial pressure on the public and employer-sponsored programs that provide income and health care support to older Americans. Meanwhile, the massive demographic bulge in the population -- the baby boom generation -- begins turning age 62 in 2008. Going forward, the number of Americans age 62 and older is projected to double from 40 million today to 80 million 30 years from now, while the working age population is projected to grow by just 12 percent over the same period. Compounding the demographic situation is the continuing rise in medical costs. National health care expenditures have grown from $250 billion annually in 1980 to $1.4 trillion today, and show little sign of slowing down. The combination of economic, labor market, health and demographic trends points to any number of social and economic challenges in the decades ahead. Understanding the complexities of this situation, and the relationships between demographics, policy, behavior, economics, and health -- this is the substantive aim of the NBER Program on the Economics of Aging. Begun in 1986, the Aging Program has developed primarily around large, coordinated research projects that simultaneously address several interrelated issues in the economics of aging. Extensive funding for the program has been provided by the National Institute on Aging (NIA), both through multiple research grants and through a Center grant, which provides centralized infrastructure support to the program effort. NIA also has supported our efforts to engage new investigators in studying issues in aging, and at least a dozen graduate students and post-doctoral research fellows become engaged in the program each year through NIA fellowships. Many more become engaged as research assistants on project grants. A number of smaller "exploratory" projects on issues in aging are supported through the Center, as well as projects that integrate related components of the overall research effort. More than 100 papers are completed annually by participants in the NBER program. Some of these also appear in a series of books published by the University of Chicago Press.(2) The Economic Circumstances of Older Americans Personal Retirement Accounts A major theme of the Aging Program since its inception has been to better understand the economic circumstances of older Americans. A key fact from early project work was the very small amount of financial assets of most retirees in the United States in the early 1980s and the overwhelming reliance on Social Security, and in some cases firm pension plans, for financial support in retirement. But over the last two decades, there has been a dramatic transformation in the magnitude of saving that is taking place in personal retirement accounts, such as IRAs and 401(k) plans. Now about 85 percent of contributions to retirement plans are to personal accounts. In decomposing trends in plan eligibility, participation given eligibility, participant contributions, and aggregate wealth accumulation in personal retirement accounts, and in projecting the future of these trends, James Poterba, Steven Venti and I have confirmed the potential of 401(k) plans to significantly alter the financial circumstances of individuals retiring in the future . Because more individuals will have had more years of participation in 401(k)-type savings plans, they will reach retirement with increasing accumulations of financial assets. For many, their personal retirement accounts will contribute as much or more in retirement than Social Security. The most recent in a long series of studies on this topic shows that the ratio of retirement plan assets to wage and salary earnings has grown more than five fold since 1975. This represents a fundamental transition in the composition of post-retirement financial support in the United States. Despite these aggregate trends, its clear that there is wide variation in saving behavior across the population. For example, Venti and I have found that saving rates vary substantially at all income levels, and that these variations lead to vastly different levels of asset accumulation over a working career . What explains this variation in behavior? Part of the answer is simply choice: some people choose to save a lot, and others do not. But that choice is made in the context of one's social and economic environment, as well as the public and employer policies that relate to individual saving decisions. In a series of studies, James Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte Madrian, Andrew Metrick, and Dennis G. Shea find that the "default" provisions of 401(k) plans make a huge difference in whether and how much people save in their 401(k) plans . Many more employees participate when there is automatic enrollment; and they contribute more to their plans, on average, when the default contribution rate of the program is higher. Recent research by Esther Duflo and Emmanuel Saez provides complementary evidence of increased participation in retirement plans by individuals who received a financial incentive to attend a program information session, as well as by individuals who did not receive the incentive, but who worked in departments where others received the incentive . Thus the influence of peer behavior was found to be a significant factor in plan participation decisions. Related studies from the Aging Program have considered more specific aspects of retirement saving. Studies of pre-retirement withdrawals from 401(k) plans find little effect on the total dollar accumulations in these plans, as a large fraction of job changers don't withdraw assets from their personal accounts and a large fraction of assets that are withdrawn are "rolled over" into other personal retirement accounts . Studies of whether the assets in retirement accounts have replaced saving that would have otherwise taken place in other forms conclude that the large majority of personal retirement saving is new saving that would not have occurred without these plans . Studies of the potential offsetting decline in defined benefit pension plan coverage conclude that the growth of personal retirement accounts dwarfs any displacement of assets in traditional plans . And, studies of alternative measures of saving emphasize the implications of not counting capital gains as part of saving in the NIPA personal saving rate, while the expenditure of money that has accumulated in the form of capital gains is still counted as dis-saving (or spending) . As a result, the NIPA-measured saving rate can be very low-about 2 percent now--while the retirement plan contribution rate (as a percentage of wage and salary earnings) has been over 8 percent. Looking ahead, our research agenda has evolved to focus on the risks associated with different forms of retirement saving, and how recent trends may have changed the risk exposure of individuals in providing for their retirement. The different risk characteristics of fixed assets (like 401(k) accounts), as compared with annuitized assets (like Social Security and traditional pension plans) is one piece of this work. Another is the increased exposure to market fluctuations that is associated with personal retirement accounts. The extreme case of company stock as a retirement investment has been explored recently by Olivia S. Mitchell and Stephen P. Utkus; they confirm the risk of such investments, and identify policy tools that might encourage greater diversification . Poterba, with various coauthors, also has looked at the allocation of investments in personal retirement accounts, focusing particularly on the mix between debt and equity holdings . Among other findings, his research shows that the aggregate allocation between stocks and bonds in individual accounts is broadly similar to the allocation one finds in defined benefit plans, which are managed by financial professionals. But there is much more variation across individual retirement accounts. For instance, just over 45 percent of households with tax-deferred accounts appear to hold only equities, and 22 percent hold only debt. These results provide a starting point from which to consider the market risk of personal accounts. Social Security, Housing, Annuities, and Bequests As the primary source of retirement income support in the United States, Social Security defines the economic circumstances of many older Americans. Many members of the Aging Program are engaged in analyses of Social Security, as well as on the potential design and implications of various Social Security reform possibilities. In this report, I have focused on projects supported by the National Institute on Aging as part of NIA research grants. One such project, directed by Jeff B. Liebman, looks at how alternative Social Security reforms would be likely to affect lower-income households. Social Security is widely recognized as a redistributive program, replacing a greater fraction of earnings for those at lower income levels. Liebman's research, however, points to many other redistributive aspects of Social Security -- from people with shorter life expectancies to people with longer life expectancies, from single workers and dual-earning couples to one-earner couples, and from long-career workers to short-career workers. Because of these other factors, about 20 percent of Social Security participants in the top income quintile receive a larger net transfer from Social Security than the average transfer for people in the lowest income quintile . Liebman also finds that Social Security reforms that blend the current system with an investment-based component could give most Social Security beneficiaries higher expected benefits than the current system, and lower the percentage of widowed, divorced, and never married women with benefits below the poverty line from 26 percent to 9 percent . Kathleen McGarry has also looked at poverty among the elderly, noting that reforms to the Supplemental Security Income Program could have a significant effect in reducing elderly poverty . She also finds that a surprising number of potential SSI recipients do not apply for benefits. Aside from Social Security (and for some, an employer-provided pension), housing equity is the major asset of a large fraction of current retirees. Despite the value of these housing assets, Venti and I find that housing equity is rarely used to support general non-housing consumption during retirement . We find that in the absence of a precipitating event (such as divorce, the death of a spouse, or the entry of a family member into a nursing home), families are unlikely to sell their homes, downsize, or remortgage. And even among those experiencing major life changes, discontinuing ownership is the exception rather than the rule. A related study by Gary V. Engelhardt, Jonathan Gruber, and Cynthia Perry finds that the living arrangements of widows and divorcees are more sensitive to economic circumstances than the living arrangements of couples . They estimate that a 10 percent cut in Social Security benefits would lead more than 600,000 single-resident elderly households to move into shared living arrangements. The role of bequests in the financial circumstances of older Americans also has been considered in a number of recent studies. One study by Michael D. Hurd and James Smith finds that the distribution of bequests is highly skewed, so that the typical baby-boom person will receive a very modest inheritance . This is partly because of the skewed distribution of wealth and partly because of the tendency of the wealthy to have fewer children. But it is also attributable to anticipated dis-saving: it is estimated that households aged 70-74 will bequeath just 39 percent of their wealth, consuming the rest before they die. Jeff Brown and Scott Weisbenner also have explored the magnitude of assets that are passed from one generation to another through bequests and other intergenerational transfers . They find that about one-fifth of current household wealth (on average) was obtained as a result of transfers and bequests, while four-fifths resulted from individual decisions about how much income to save. But, as in the Hurd and Smith study, they find a heavy concentration of transfer wealth among a relative smaller number of households. Focusing on the allocation of bequests among siblings, McGarry and Audrey Light find that 80 percent of older parents plan to make equal bequests. Among those planning to divide their estates unequally, about half point to the inequality as compensation for a child taking care of them in their old age, and half point to differences in the needs of different children. Aging Program research is also exploring how assets are used at older ages, and how consumption changes at retirement. Recent work by Hurd and Susann Rohwedder, for example, finds a reduction in both anticipated and actual spending at retirement . Brown, Amy Finkelstein, Poterba, Mitchell, and others are studying issues in annuity pricing, the differences in mortality experience between annuitants and the population at large, the potential for good inflation-adjusted annuity products, the differing characteristics of individual and joint-life annuity products, the differences in pricing between mandatory and voluntary annuity products, and the redistributive effects of annuities from those with shorter to those with longer life expectancies . As more assets are being accumulated in personal retirement accounts, the question of whether, under what circumstances, and how much those assets might be annuitized is an increasingly important one. An important finding of this work is the higher longevity of those who purchase annuities, relative to the population as a whole, and the need to price annuities higher because of this differential. Finally, a broad view of the financial circumstances of older Americans is presented in a recent study by Victor R. Fuchs . Fuchs takes what he calls "a holistic approach" to the financial problems of the elderly, focusing simultaneously on expenditures that are self-financed and those financed by transfers from the young (under age 65). He finds that about 35 percent of the elderly's full income was devoted to health care; 65 percent to other goods and services. He also finds that 56 percent of full income was supported by transfers from the young; compared with 44 percent from the elderly themselves. He also points to future trends which may stimulate the need for more saving and more work prior to retirement. Retirement Policies and Labor Market Behavior Retirement Policy in the United States A second major theme of the Aging Program is the relationship between retirement policies and labor market behavior, as well as the determinants of work and retirement decisions more generally. Over the years, the strong relationship between the economic incentives of retirement policies and the ages at which individuals retire from the labor force has been confirmed in multiple studies, using multiple data sources, and applying multiple research methodologies. The most recent have been conducted by Courtney Coile and Gruber , Alan L. Gustman and Thomas L. Steinmeier , and Andrew A. Samwick and me.(3) These studies point to the younger retirement that occurs, when younger retirement is encouraged by the economic structure of the benefit programs. Recent work by Courtney Coile has extended this line of analysis to the joint retirement decisions of couples, finding for example that the economic incentives in a wife's retirement plan can have a significant effect on the retirement decisions of both husband and wife . Gustman and Steinmeier also have explored joint retirement decisions, and find much stronger interdependence when the spouses say they value spending time together . Many other studies have looked at other determinants of retirement. A recent study by McGarry finds that changes in retirement expectations are driven to a much greater degree by changes in health than by changes in income or wealth . Gustman and Steinmeier find that the dramatic stock market rise in the 1990s had an effect in increasing retirement, while it lasted, but any continuing effects since the decline in the market are much more modest . A study by Hurd, James Smith, and Julie M. Zissimopoulos finds that those who have worse survival expectations retire sooner, and collect retirement benefits sooner, although the majority of workers claim Social Security benefits as soon as they are eligible, regardless of their survival expectations . Leora Friedberg finds that computer users retire later than non-users . And a review of the literature by Gruber and Madrian (including a number of their own studies) concludes that health insurance availability is another important determinant of retirement . This collection of studies makes clear the complexity of interrelated health, economic, social, and job circumstances that contribute to individual retirement decisions. Social Security and Retirement Around the World Beyond the analyses of retirement behavior in the United States, we also have been engaged in a major cross-national project on social security systems and retirement around the world. This project, now in its third phase, has brought together a team of investigators from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Italy, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For each phase of the project, a set of parallel studies has been conducted in each country; and these studies are then integrated together to allow comparisons across countries. Both the individual studies and the integrated analyses are published in a series of volumes by the University of Chicago Press.(4) These volumes have been supplemented by publications that describe the overall results .(5) The first phase of the project mapped out the detailed provision of social security programs into measures of retirement incentives comparable across countries. The studies demonstrated a very strong correspondence across countries between the social security incentives to retire and the age at which older workers withdraw from the labor force. The second phase of the project applied micro-data from each country to estimate more formally the relationship between social security provisions and retirement in each country. The models emphasized the effect on retirement of the age of eligibility for retirement programs, and measures of the incentive to leave the labor force once a person is eligible. The model simulations confirmed very large effects of program provisions on retirement decisions in every country. The third phase of the project (just finished) has used the retirement model estimates from phase two to describe the fiscal implications of various illustrative social security reforms. The first simulation predicts the effect of delaying all program benefit eligibility ages by three years. The second reform is a common social security system in all countries. The third reform is an adjustment of each country's program to an actuarially fair level with benefit payment rates adjusted on an actuarial basis for earlier or later retirement. While the simulations were conducted for each of the countries in the project, the character of the findings can be illustrated by looking at the case of Germany, which has not (until recently) reduced retirement benefit rates for those qualifying for early retirement. The findings suggest that implementing actuarially fair adjustments to retirement benefits in Germany would lead to an increase in the average retirement age of about 3 years, for both men and women. Combining the impact of such a reform on retirement behavior, benefit payments, contributions to the social security system, and other taxes paid as a result of retention in the labor force -- there is an estimated fiscal benefit to the illustrative policy change of over 80,000 Euros per worker, or about 1.2 percent of GDP in Germany. Continuing work on the project will consider the relationship between social security system provisions and the well-being of the elderly, as well as the young; the more complicated relationships between health, functional disability, social security provisions, and retirement; and the relationship between social security system provisions and the employment of the young. All of the new work is being done in the context of an evolving retirement policy environment worldwide, a policy evolution driven in large part by a growing awareness that social security programs are not sustainable under demographic trends which are compounded by program inducements for older workers to leave the labor force at younger and younger ages. Socioeconomic Circumstances, Health, and Health Disparities There is a dramatic and well documented correlation between socioeconomic measures, such as education, income, and wealth, on the one hand, and health measures, such as self-reported health status and mortality, on the other. What leads those with more income, education, wealth, and other measures of social status to be in better health, on average; and what leads those in better health to have more economic resources? Many potential causal links have been explored in NBER research, and the subject is a key aspect of our research agenda going forward. In a series of studies, Angus Deaton and Christina Paxson have explored the multiple facets of the relationship between health and economic circumstances, using data from a number of countries, and making clear that there is no simple causal relationship . Indeed the nature of the relationship may be quite different across geographic regions with different living standards, health conditions, racial composition, population density, inequality, and other factors. Most recently, the focus of this work has been on economic inequality, independent from economic status, as a potential determinant of inequalities in health. One approach of this investigation has focused on long-term historical trends in income inequality in the United States and United Kingdom, finding that the long-term decline in mortality rates over the last half century occurred most rapidly when income inequality was rising -- just the opposite of what one might expect if income inequality were an important causal factor of poorer health. The project also has looked at relative deprivation (low income relative to a reference group) as a potential influence on health, developing a relative deprivation model of health determination, along with empirical analyses to test the model. In the empirical work, relative deprivation as a measure of inequality also appears to have little effect on health outcomes. The general conclusion of this line of research is that while the direction of the causal relationship between health and wealth may be in doubt, the relationship is not determined by economic inequality. Studies by Anne C. Case and Duflo have looked at the relationship between socioeconomic status and health from a somewhat different angle, focusing on the health effects of the expanded pension program in South Africa. This program dramatically elevated the economic resources of many extended families in South Africa, and not just the individuals directly eligible for the pension. Case finds a large causal effect of income on health status in poorer populations -- an effect that works at least in part through sanitation and living standards, in part through nutritional status, and in part through the reduction of depression and psychosocial stress . Duflo finds larger effects on the health of family members when a woman is the recipient of the pension than when a man is the recipient, suggesting differences in how income is allocated within households . Research by Case, Darren Lubotsky, and Paxson has focused on the childhood origins of the relationship between socioeconomic status and health . Using numerous data sources, they find that health is positively related to household income even in childhood. The relationship between household income and children's health status becomes more pronounced as children grow older, as the adverse health effects of lower income accumulate over children's lives. Thus, part of the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status may work through the impact of parents' long-run average income on children's health. Fuchs, Mark McClellan, Jon Skinner, and others have studied the geographic, income, and racial distribution of medical utilization . One study explores the flow of Medicare benefits to high-income and low-income neighborhoods in 1990 and 1995. The authors find that Medicare spending per capita for the lowest income groups grew much more rapidly than Medicare spending in either high income or middle income neighborhoods. Thus, disparities in health care access and health care utilization may be decreasing over time. Another set of studies looks at the potential impact of insurance coverage as a determining factor in health care utilization and access to care. For example, a question addressed in several studies is whether managed care has limited access to care. Paul Heidenreich, Mark McClellan, Craig Frances, and Laurence Baker find that patients in geographic settings with a high share of managed care patients, following a heart attack, are more likely to received appropriate treatment with beta-blockers and aspirin, but less likely to undergo coronary angiography . In a similar study, Daniel Altman, David Cutler, and Richard Zeckhauser find almost no difference between treatment intensity among individuals enrolled in HMO plans and those enrolled in indemnity insurance plans in the same health care markets .(6) The reason HMOs cost less, they conclude, is not because HMOs provide less care. Instead, about half of HMO cost savings is attributable to lower incidence of disease among HMO enrollees; and about half results from HMOs paying lower prices for the same treatments. Where managed care may make a difference, however, is in the medical practice patterns used in geographical regions that have more or less managed care penetration, and in the spillover effects of cost containment on the provision of unreimbursed care. According to Cutler, one implication of the expansion of managed care -- and indeed the cost containment strategies in all health insurance plans -- is increased financial pressure on hospitals and associated limitations on "charity" care. This has led to more division of patients across hospitals according to their ability to pay. Low or non-paying patients increasingly are directed toward safety net hospitals, and fewer resources are available to these hospitals to provide un-reimbursed care. In other words, hospitals that have traditionally provided more care to uninsured patients are being doubly affected: first by having responsibility for an even larger portion of uninsured care; and second by getting less reimbursement from insured patients. Many other components of NBER research in the Aging Program relate to the theme of socioeconomic status, health and health disparities. Rob Jensen has been engaged in a project on the effects of the macro economy on health circumstances in Russia and Eastern Europe. McClellan has looked at the effects of adverse health events on work and earnings. Daniel L. McFadden has developed a new research project on the dynamics of health and wealth, building on methodological work done in cooperation with Peter Adams, Hurd, Angela Merrill, and Tiago Ribeiro.(7) With Hurd and Merrill, McFadden also has looked at the quantitative importance of various predictors of mortality, including income, wealth and education . All of these investigations relate to the causal links between socioeconomic circumstances and health; the Aging Program plays a significant role in integrating them in a coordinated programmatic way. Health, Health Care, and Health Policy Health, Disability and Mortality Many have worried that increasing longevity would create a new burden of health and long-term care needs for an increasingly sick and disabled elderly population. While population aging has created additional health and long-term care needs, the potential cost has been moderated -- at least in the short run -- by a significant long-term decline over time in the functional limitations of older people. This trend has been documented in numerous data sources. However, much less is known about the rate, acceleration, character, causes, and consequences of the decline. Thus the study of disability has become a new high priority area of research in the Aging Program. In some initial work on this topic, David Cutler has conducted an overview of the evidence on disability decline, and potential causal explanations.(8) He quantifies the rate of disability decline at 1 percent or more per year for the past several decades. Among the potential explanations of disability decline that Cutler cites are medical care improvements, improved health behaviors, increasing use of assistive devices and improvements in living conditions that increase independence with functional limitations, higher levels of education and improved socioeconomic status, reductions in disease exposure, and social supports. He and I are engaged in an ongoing research effort to better understand disability decline, its causes, the potential of interventions to extend it, and the cost implications of the decline for Medicare expenditures. A related project deals with the role of health behaviors as a determining factor of health and functional ability. Dora L. Costa also has been studying trends in chronic illness, functional disability, and mortality. Her focus has been on longer-term historical trends, and the historical underpinnings of more recent health trends. For example, Costa finds that functional disability (disability in walking, difficulty in bending, paralysis, blindness, and deafness) in the United States has fallen at an average annual rate of 0.6 percent among men age 50 to 74 from the early twentieth century to the early 1990s . Another recent study by Costa looks at the socioeconomic and demographic determinants of frame size using a data set of Civil War soldiers . Costa finds that changes in frame size explain about three-fifths of the mortality decline among white men between 1915 and 1988 and predict even sharper declines in older age mortality between 1988 and 2022. Another study finds that the immediate effects of reduced infectious disease rates and reduced mortality from acute disease account for 62 percent of the 20thcentury increase in survival rates, and the long-term effects account for another 12 percent of the increase . This line of research has provided a valuable historical perspective on more recent health and disability trends. Alan M. Garber, Jay Bhattacharya, and Thomas E. MaCurdy also have initiated a new project on disability decline, focusing on medical care for the disabled elderly. This work will explore the individual patterns of disability decline (and improvement), the persistence of disability status of individuals over time, the inter-temporal links between disabilities and chronic diseases, and the medical utilization and expenses of individuals before and after the development of disability, and as individual functional ability evolves over time. Trends in Treatment, Utilization, and Costs A diversity of health care and health policy issues have been studied as part of the Aging Program in recent years. These include studies of trends in utilization, the composition of medical care costs in different health insurance programs, the persistence of individual health care expenditures over time, the role of technology change in medical practices as a key factor in medical expenditure growth, the increasingly disproportionate spending on medical care at older ages, the effectiveness of medical technology in treating various health conditions, the effects of different policy provisions in containing health care costs, and the differences in access to medical care across the population. One line of research, involving Garber, MaCurdy, McClellan, and others, has focused on the one-third of Medicare expenditures that are spent on patients near the end of life.(9) In recent years, hospice care and other out-of-hospital treatment has decreased the proportion of the population that dies in the hospital, a trend that might have been expected to reduce costs. Instead, while there has been a decline in hospitalization rates over the 1988-95 period, the use of intensive care and intensive inpatient procedures has continued to increase, offsetting any potential cost savings. Another set of studies has looked at trends in the treatment of specific health conditions, such as acute myocardial infarction or liver disease or ventricular arrhythmia.(10) Illustrative of the findings, a study of implantable cardioverter-defibrillators finds that their use, at a cost of up to $50,000 for the procedure and treatment of complications, grew more than 10-fold among Medicare beneficiaries between 1987 and 1995. Increasing use of bypass surgery and angioplasty, the more intensive approaches to heart attack treatment, also have increased rapidly, raising overall expenditure on heart attack treatment, despite a drop in the cost of any particular approach to treatment. The increasing technological intensity of medicine dominates almost all other sources of health care cost growth, including demographics, decreasing mortality, decreasing hospitalization rates, decreasing chronic illness rates, and other factors. Complementing these studies of treatment trends are a collection of studies on the incremental benefits of intensive treatment, and the changing productivity of medical care.(11) A recent study of angioplasty by Cutler and Robert S. Huckman is representative of this work . The use of angioplasty has spread dramatically over the 20 years since its introduction. It has raised the cost of treatment for coronary artery disease. However, because it now sometimes substitutes for bypass surgery, a more expensive procedure, there is some offset in costs with the same or better health outcomes as bypass surgery. And where angioplasty has replaced non-intensive medical management, the value of the technology is likely enough to justify the cost. Indeed many of the analyses of medical productivity by NBER investigators find that the increasing use of intensive procedures has done a lot to improve health, on average, although the procedures may be less effective in marginal patients. Health Insurance, Hospital Organization, and Health Policy Reform In large part as a response to rising costs, the health insurance and health policy environment in the United States has continued to evolve. Cutler has explored the decline in health insurance coverage among working families in the United States in the 1990s, finding that coverage declined primarily because fewer workers took up coverage when offered it, not because fewer workers were offered insurance or were eligible for it .(12) Project estimates suggest that increased costs to employees can explain the entire decline in take-up rates in the 1990s. Kessler and McClellan have been engaged in a project on the effects of hospital organizational form on medical productivity. A recent study from this project finds that areas with a for-profit hospital have about 2.4 percent lower hospital expenditures, but virtually the same patient health outcomes . Kessler and McClellan attribute this to the likely spillover effects of for-profit hospitals on their nonprofit and public counterparts: the competition from for-profit hospitals may limit the ability of non-profits to behave inefficiently. In another study, Kessler, McClellan, and Henry Hansmann compare the responsiveness of hospitals to reductions in demand, finding that for-profit hospitals respond most rapidly, followed in turn by public and religiously affiliated non-profit hospitals, while secular non-profits are distinctly the least responsive ownership form . Matthew Eichner, McClellan, and I have considered the incentives, characteristics, and potential limitations of medical savings accounts (MSAs) as an alternative approach to firm health insurance provision.(13) Under these plans, a specified amount of money is deposited each year in an employee MSA, and these funds are available to support non-catastrophic medical care expenses as needed. Unused assets in the MSA account are treated as long-term retirement saving. A catastrophic insurance plan covers any expenditures above this deductible. Such schemes are designed to provide consumers -- and their health care providers -- incentives not to spend money on care which offers only low marginal benefit. Our research has considered both the desirable incentive features of MSA plans and the potential limitations that might result for individuals with long-term continuing health care expenditures. We find that only a small fraction of households have continuing medical expenditures year after year at a level that would overwhelm their MSA balances. Indeed our most recent work on the project shows how MSA plans might work in conjunction with other personal retirement accounts as a means of financial preparation for retirement. Based on actual medical histories, our simulations suggest that more than half of plan enrollees participating in an equity-invested MSA program over a working career would accumulate MSA balances of over three times the amount contributed to the plans. And very few would accumulate less than 100 percent of their contributions, even after paying for non-catastrophic health care costs. Thus a key finding from the project is that MSA plans may not only be effective in containing health care costs; they may also work in conjunction with other programs to increase pre-retirement saving. Cutler also has considered the dynamics of international health policy reform.(14) One study finds that as new and expensive medical technologies have developed over time, the policy commitment to equal access to care has become ever more expensive. Historically, countries have dealt with rising costs by maintaining equal access and restricting total spending. Today, many countries are considering a move away from spending controls and toward incentive-based medical care reform -- possibly inducing more cost-effective health care decisions, but also greater reductions in care among those less able to afford the incentive-based cost-sharing provisions of the plans. Database Development in Aging Many NBER investigators have been involved in the development of data on older people in the United States and abroad. The Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) began about a decade ago and now provides longitudinal information on the health and economic circumstances of about 25,000 older Americans from 1992 to the present. NBER affiliates Charles Brown, Alan L. Gustman, Hurd, and Mitchell are members of the HRS management team; David O. Meltzer, John Rust, and Jonathan S. Skinner are on the HRS Steering Committee; and Cutler, David I. Laibson, and I are on the NIA Data Monitoring Committee for the HRS. The HRS project has developed and applied numerous survey innovations, including the use of bracketing questions to minimize non-response, the use of experimental modules for continuous database development, the inclusion of data on expectations, the linkage of survey data to administrative records from the Social Security Administration and the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services, and the inclusion and coding of pension and health plan data obtained directly from firms. Many participants in the Aging Program have assisted in developing, analyzing, and improving these innovative components. Daniel L. McFadden has been a leader in the study of survey response bias and in the development of internet survey methodologies. A major accomplishment of this work has been to implement an experimental internet survey method for data collection, administered through an internet virtual laboratory, or IVLab, developed explicitly for the project. The IVLab has confirmed the value of internet-based questioning as a low-cost survey methodology that enables cost-effective experimentation with questionnaire formatting and survey content -- experimentation that is generally cost-prohibitive using other survey approaches. McFadden's work also has been at the cutting edge in exploring how the format, sequencing, and context of questioning affects responses, and how to effectively correct (or at least correctly interpret) biases that result from these survey limitations. In addition to the methodological advances made through the IVLab, McFadden and colleagues have completed both a pilot and a larger-scale version of an internet-based survey of older Americans, called the Retirement Perspectives Survey (RPS). The content of the RPS survey draws heavily on the asset and health components of HRS, but with substantially more variation in questionnaire format, sequencing, cues and context. These experimental treatments have enabled the research team to test order effects and other framing effects on subject responses. The larger-scale RPS survey also includes both mail-out and internet versions of the survey, so investigators can begin to assess how both sample selection and response biases differ between them, as well as between these experimental surveys and the HRS itself. The analysis of survey response bias has continued to be a key element of this work. For example, a recent study by Li Gan, Hurd, and McFadden looks at people's mortality expectations, which are very close to actual mortality risks on average, but which have problematic characteristics, such as unrealistic focal point responses . The methodological research being done by Hurd, McFadden, and others is helping to explain these anomalies, correct for them whenever possible, and appropriately interpret research that uses these data. Yet another exciting area of database development has been in the development of international data on aging. Axel Börsch-Supan is the coordinator of the Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). SHARE is a coordinated data collection effort in Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. It evolved in part from the HRS, and from the NBER project on social security systems and retirement around the world, and a number of NBER investigators (in addition to Börsch-Supan) are advisors to the SHARE project. In other parts of the world, Anne C. Case, Angus Deaton, and others have been involved in designing surveys and conducting research on the effects of the pension system in South Africa. Aging Program investigators also have been involved, peripherally at this point, in discussions with a larger consortium of research and data sites in developing regions throughout Africa and parts of Asia (the INDEPTH network). Duflo is involved in database development in areas of poor health in various regions of India. And Jensen has extended his research and database development work on health and economic circumstances in Russia and Eastern Europe to developing countries in Asia, including India and Pakistan. For almost two decades, the NBER Aging Program has focused widespread attention on population aging, and the health and economic circumstances of individuals as they age. It has also worked well in integrating a wide range of related research projects into a cohesive program, including regular interaction among members of the research team, extensive dissemination of research findings in both academic publications and non-technical reports, external involvement in promoting aging-related research and data resource development in aging, organizing international collaborations and cross national comparisons of aging issues, sponsoring regular workshops and conferences on the economics of aging, and inspiring the collaborative engagement of both senior scholars and new investigators in the study of aging issues. 1. Wise is Director of the NBER's Program on the Economics of Aging and the Stambaugh Professor of Political Economy at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. The numbers in brackets throughout this report refer to NBER Working Papers. This report has been prepared with the intensive help of Richard Woodbury. 2. These volumes include The Economics of Aging (1989), Issues in the Economics of Aging (1990), Topics in the Economics of Aging (1992), Studies in the Economics of Aging (1994), Advances in the Economics of Aging (1996), Inquiries in the Economics of Aging (1998), Frontiers in the Economics of Aging (1998), Themes in the Economics of Aging (2001), and Perspectives on the Economics of Aging (forthcoming). 3. A. Samwick and D.A. Wise, "Option Value Estimation with Health and Retirement Survey Data," in S. Ogura, T. Tachibanaki, and D.A. Wise, eds., Labor Markets and Firm Benefit Policies in Japan and the United States, Chicag University of Chicago Press, forthcoming. 4. J. Gruber and D.A. Wise, eds., Social Security and Retirement Around the World, University of Chicago Press, 1999; J. Gruber and D.A. Wise, eds., Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World: Micro-Estimation, Chicag University of Chicago Press, forthcoming. 5. J. Gruber and D.A. Wise, "Social Security and Retirement Around the World: Introduction and Summary," in S. Polacheck and J. Robst, eds., Research in Labor Economics, Vol 18, JAI Press Inc., 1999; J. Gruber and D.A. Wise, "Social Security, Retirement Incentives, and Retirement Behavior: An International Perspective," in A.J.Auerbach and R.D. Lee, eds., Demographic Change and Fiscal Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; J. Gruber and D.A. Wise, "An International Perspective on Policies for an Aging Society," in S. Altman and D. Schactman, eds., Policies for an Aging Society: Confronting the Economic and Political Challenges, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2002; J. Gruber and D.A. Wise, "Different Approaches to Pension Reform from an Economic Point of View," in M. Feldstein and H. Siebert, eds., Social Security Pension Reform in Europe, Chicag University of Chicago Press, 2002. 6. See also D.M. Cutler and J. Seinfeld, "Managed Care Enrollment and Care for the Poor," working paper, 2003. 7. P. Adams, M.D. Hurd, D.L. McFadden, A. Merrill, and T. Ribeiro. "Healthy, Wealthy, and Wise? Tests for Direct Causal Paths between Health and Socioeconomic Status," Journal of Econometrics, 2003. 8. D.M. Cutler, "Declining Disability Among the Elderly," Health Affairs, 2001. 9. A.E. Barnato, A.M. Garber, C.R. Kagay, and M.B. McClellan, "Trends in the Use of Intensive Procedures at the End of Life," in A. Garber, ed., Frontiers in Health Policy Research, Vol. 4, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001; J. Geppert and M. McClellan, "Trends in Medicare Spending near the End of Life," in D. Wise, ed., Themes in the Economics of Aging, Chicag University of Chicago Press, 2001; A.M. Garber, T.E. MaCurdy and M.B. McClellan, "Medical Care at the End of Life: Diseases, Treatment Patterns, and Costs," in A.M. Garber, ed., Frontiers in Health Policy Research, Vol. 2, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999. 10. J.H. Best, J. Geppert and D. L. Veenstra, "Trends in Expenditures for Medicare Liver Transplant Recipients," Liver Transplantation, 2001; N. Every, A.M. Garber, P. Heidenreich, M. Hlatky, D. Kessler, M.B. McClellan, J.P. Newhouse and O. Saynina, "Technological Change in Heart Attack Care in the United States: Causes and Consequences," in M.B. McClellan and D.P. Kessler, eds., Technological Change in Health Care: A Global Analysis of Heart Attack, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002; P. Heidenreich and M.B. McClellan, "Trends in Heart Attack Treatment and Outcomes, 1975-95: Literature Review and Synthesis," in D.M. Cutler and E.R. Berndt, eds., Medical Care Output and Productivity, Chicag University of Chicago Press, 2001; P. Heidenreich and M.B. McClellan, "Trends in Treatment and Outcomes for Acute Myocardial Infarction: 1975-1995, American Journal of Medicine, 2001; D. Kessler and M.B. McClellan, "A Global Analysis of Technological Change in Health Care: The Case of Heart Attacks," Health Affairs, 1999; M.B. McClellan, "Biomedical Research and Then Some: the Causes of Technological Change in Heart Attack Care," in K. Murphy and R.H. Topel, eds., The Value of Biomedical Research, Chicag University of Chicago Press, forthcoming; A.M. Garber, M. Hlatky, M.B. McClellan, K. McDonald, and O. Saynina, "Utilization and Outcomes of the Implantable Cardioverter Defribrillators: 1987-1995, American Heart Journal, 2001. 11. D.M. Cutler and M.B. McClellan, "Productivity Change in Health Care," Amercian Economic Review, 2001; D.M. Cutler and M.B. McClellan, "Is Technological Change in Medicine Worth It?" Health Affairs, 2001; J.M. Brooks, M.B. McClellan, and H.S. Wong, "The Marginal Benefits of Invasive Treatments for Acute Myocardial Infarction: Does Insurance Coverage Matter?," Inquiry, 2000; A. Brown and A.M. Garber, "A Concise Review of the Cost-Effectiveness of Coronary Heart Disease Prevention," Medical Clinics of North America, 2000; W. Browner, C. Frances, B. Massie, M.B. McClellan, H. Noguchi, and M.G. Shlipak, "Comparison of the Effects of Angiotensin Converting-enzyme Inhibitors and Beta Blockers on Survival in Elderly Patients with Reduced Left Ventricular Function after Myocardial Infarction," American Journal of Medicine, 2001; C. Frances, M.G. Shlipak, H. Noguchi, P.Heidenreich, and M.B. McClellan, "Does Physician Specialty Affect Survival of Elderly Patients with Myocardial Infarction?, Health Services Research, 2000; A.M. Garber, "Advances in Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Health Interventions," in A. Culyer and J.P. Newhouse, eds., Handbook of Health Economics, North-Holland, 2000. 12. See also M. Chernew, D.M. Cutler and P. Keenan, "Rising Medical Costs and the Decline in Insurance Coverage," working paper, 2003. 13. M. Eichner, M.B. McClellan and D.A. Wise, "Individual Expenditures and Medical Savings Accounts: Can They Work?" in S. Ogura, T. Tachibanaki, and D.A. Wise (eds.), Labor Markets and Firm Benefit Policies in Japan and the United States, Chicag University of Chicago Press, forthcoming; M. Eichner and D.A. Wise, "Little Saving and Too Much Medical Insurance: Medical Savings Accounts Could Help," in D. Wise, ed., Personal Saving, Personal Choice, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1999. 14. D.M. Cutler, "Equality, Efficiency, and Market Fundamentals: The Dynamics of International Medical Care Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, 2002; D.M. Cutler, "The Third Wave in Health Care Reform," in S. Ogura, T. Tachibanaki and D.A. Wise, eds., Aging Issues in the United States and Japan, Chicag University of Chicago Press, 2001; D.M. Cutler, "Supplementing Public Insurance Coverage with Private Coverage: Implications for Medical Care Systems," in S. Ogura, T. Tachibanaki, and D.A. Wise, eds., Labor Markets and Firm Benefit Policies in Japan and the United States, Chicag University of Chicago Press, forthcoming .
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分享 In the aftermath of the worst recession in decades, the richest Americans have b
insight 2013-10-12 21:01
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/12/top-one-percent-income-gains_n_2670455.html In the aftermath of the worst recession in decades, the richest Americans have been getting richer -- a lot richer -- while most Americans have gone the other direction. Add it all together, and the top 1 percent of households by income captured 121 percent of all income gains between 2009 and 2011, during the first two years of the economic recovery, according to new research by Emmanuel Saez, an economics professor at the University of California at Berkeley. (Saez is a renowned income inequality expert and winner of the prestigious John Bates Clark Medal, an award that the American Economic Association gives every year to the top economist under age 40.) How was the top 1 percent able to capture more than all of the recovery's income gains? They became 11.2 percent richer while the bottom 99 percent got 0.4 percent poorer, when accounting for inflation, according to Saez. Saez released the updated figures in late January after finding last year that the top 1 percent had captured 93 percent of all income gains in 2010, the first full year of the economic recovery. Overall, between 1993 and 2011, the top 1 percent's incomes surged 57.5 percent, while the incomes of the bottom 99 percent grew just 5.8 percent, according to Saez. (Hat tip: The New Republic's Timothy Noah .)
个人分类: inequality|24 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 Economic is an interesting Subject
Henter.Qiu 2013-8-23 16:43
I start learning economics fromone year ago. I did not touch Economics before, and i thought it is very boring to see so much data. And I could not get anything from economics. When I start my journey of economics. I find it is full of magic.All the things can be explained by economics! Why Developed Country's people consume more than Developing Country's people? Why you need a Job? Why the salary of people with high education is higher than others? It is so wonderful. Human's history is the development of economy. Also including why war happen. Learning Economics give me another thinking way to look the world. When I learning more, i feel i should learn more. Hi Henter! You should hurry up, and your life more meaningful! Cheer up! Tomorrow is an another day!
个人分类: To Myself|11 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 Why The Taper Matters (In One Simple Chart)
insight 2013-8-16 14:50
Why The Taper Matters (In One Simple Chart) Submitted by Tyler Durden on 08/15/2013 21:31 -0400 Obviously, there are numerous reasons why (no matter what the economic situation is) the Fed will need to Taper ( deficits , technical fragilities , and sentiment ). Furthermore, it seems the world is more than happy to give the central bankers the benefit of the doubt that not only is Tapering not tightening but that Tapering is a 'positive' as it means all is rosy in the world (despite our earlier point of the 'difficulty' that any actual unwind poses ). However, there is one big reason ( highlighted further this morning in the TIC data ) why the Fed's Taper matters... they are (simply put) the only one buying... 5Y-30Y Treasury holdings... Source: BofAML Average: 4.833335 Your rating: None Average: 4.8 ( 6 votes) Similar Articles You Might Enjoy: Housing Recovery Lessons From Japan (In One Chart) Why The ECB's Monetization Is Doomed In One Simple Chart Why Politicians Hate Austerity - In One Simple Chart Pick The Fraud One Out: An Abridged Overview Of US Markets And Economics In Five Plus One Simple Charts Charting The Simple Reason Why Every 'Bailout' In Europe Will Be Faded
个人分类: treasury yield|14 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 The 4 Charts Your Friendly Equity Hedge Fund Manager Does Not Want You To See
insight 2013-6-11 10:50
The 4 Charts Your Friendly Equity Hedge Fund Manager Does Not Want You To See Submitted by Tyler Durden on 06/10/2013 16:40 -0400 Exchange Traded Fund Morgan Stanley Russell 3000 A funny thing happens when there is only one driver of economic market growth, any chance of intelligent fact-based, logic-induced, fundamental-biased investing becomes reduced to the rubble of momentum-chasing leveraged beta. No matter how much your 2-and-20 taking manager explains his 'process', the charts below show that the thundering herd of 'dumb' money that used to be so useful in identifying the extremes of market hubris and dysphoria appear to have overwhelmed the world of 'smart' money. Hedge funds have never been more net long US equities ; hedge fund returns have never been more correlated to the market; hedge funds have never produced so little alpha; and hedge funds are as leveraged to this beta as they were at the top in 2007 . This will not end well... The alpha-generation has left the building... as hedgies are increasingly mimicking their low-cost low-tracking-error ETF nemeses... Which has meant that hedge funds have never been more net long US equities... and in order to justify their fees, they have had to lever - and have never been more leveraged... Gross exposure rose by 12% to $1280bn notional in 1Q13. Percentage-wise, gross exposure increased to about 160%. When including ETF positions the gross exposure increases to 180%. In Q1 2013, hedge funds reduced cash holdings to the 2Q07 trough of 4.3%, while raising net exposure to the 2Q07 peak of 59% in 1Q13. Meanwhile, dollar notional net exposure rose by 11% to $463bn notional in 1Q13 – setting a new record. The bullish positioning indicates that risk appetite is back to the peak set in 2007. At of the end of 1Q13, hedge funds owned 5.0% of the Russell 3000 float shares, second only to the 2Q08 peak of 5.1%. Charts: BofAML and Morgan Stanley Average: 4.833335 Your rating: None Average: 4.8 ( 6 votes) Tweet - advertisements - Login or register to post comments 12640 reads Printer-friendly version Send to friend Similar Articles You Might Enjoy: This Is The Government: Your Legal Right To Redeem Your Money Market Account Has Been Denied - The Sequel This Is The Government: Your Legal Right To Redeem Your Money Market Account Has Been Denied The One Chart US Banks Don't Want You To See The Complete Q2 Hedge Fund Holdings Update (In Which We Discover That 181 HFs Hold Apple Stock) Guest Post: The Driver For Gold You’re Not Watching
个人分类: market|21 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 Worth Over $500,000? Then QE Has Worked For You; Everyone Else Better Luck Next
insight 2013-4-25 15:21
Worth Over $500,000? Then QE Has Worked For You; Everyone Else Better Luck Next Time Submitted by Tyler Durden on 04/23/2013 19:33 -0400 recovery Not supremely confident despite the stock market being at all-time highs? Unsure of the future and feeling poorer than in the past? You are not alone. In fact, you are among the 93% majority. As the Pew Research Center finds , during the first two years of the US economic 'recovery', the mean net worth of households in the upper 7% of the wealth distribution rose by an estimated 28%, while the mean net worth of households in the lower 93% dropped by 4% . As they explain, affluent households typically have their assets concentrated in stocks and other financial holdings, while less affluent households typically have their wealth more heavily concentrated in the value of their home. Due to these differences, wealth inequality increased during the first two years of the recovery. The upper 7% of households saw their aggregate share of the nation’s overall household wealth pie rise to 63% in 2011, up from 56% in 2009, with the mean wealth of affluent households now 24x the less affluent group (up from 18x in 2009) . So the next time you see some talking-head on TV devoutly proclaiming his faith in the Fed's QE policies, perhaps it's worth considering in which cohort he and his clients sit. Source: Pew Research Center Average:
个人分类: inequality|15 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 How The Super-Rich Avoid Paying Taxes
insight 2013-2-16 10:09
How The Super-Rich Avoid Paying Taxes Submitted by Tyler Durden on 02/15/2013 20:23 -0500 If you're one of the 1% of Americans who control over 40% of the country's wealth, life is full of choices. Among them - how best to keep all that money away from the government? The U.S. economic system offers no shortage of loopholes allowing the ultra-rich to shortchange Uncle Sam. The following infographic explains how exactly do the super rich hide that much money from the government every year? Source: TopAccountingDegrees.org Average: 5 Your rating: None Average: 5 ( 2 votes) Tweet Login or register to post comments 2123 reads Printer-friendly version Send to friend Similar Articles You Might Enjoy: Super Rich Indians Abandon Super Cars En Masse To Avoid Arrest In Massive Smuggling And Tax Fraud Crack Down Guest Post: Should The Rich Pay More Taxes? The Millionaire Man Exodus: What Obama Can Learn From The UK's "Tax The Rich" Plan Buffett Goes To Britain: Clegg Calls For 'One-Off' Tax On Super Rich Why 'Tax The Rich' Doesn't Solve Anything: It's The Math, Stupid
个人分类: taxes|16 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 Guest Post: China 'Addicted To Credit'
insight 2012-12-24 16:54
Guest Post: China 'Addicted To Credit' Submitted by Tyler Durden on 11/03/2012 17:55 -0500 Auto Sales China Crude Guest Post Natural Gas recovery Shadow Banking Authored by James Parker via The Diplomat , Whilst the economic data shows at least some signs of an anaemic turnaround, China’s corporate results are demonstrating just how difficult things have been. China’s companies are busy reporting their 3 rd quarter 2012 results and there have already been some disappointing results – pretty much explained by the general slowdown. Connected to this however, a worrying trend is developing on many companies’ balance sheets. Some big names have already seen disappointing profit growth. State owned-Sinopec, China’s (and Asia’s) largest oil refiner , saw its 3 rd quarter profit fall 9.4% and January-September profits slump by 30%. Sinopec is trapped between high crude costs and government mandated price ceilings on sales to consumers. Oil giant PetroChina also suffered, with its 3 rd quarter net profit down 33% compared to last year , driven in part by a $6 billion refining loss over the year-to-date (YTD), and part by a similar squeeze on its natural gas import business (in which its YTD profits have fallen 93% compared to 2011). China Southern Airlines saw third quarter (3Q) net profit fall 29%, whilst China Life, the largest Chinese insurer measured by premiums, swung to an outright loss in the July-Sept. period. Meanwhile Sany Heavy Industry Co. Ltd, China’s largest maker of heavy machinery and construction equipment, was hit by 59% fall in 3Q net profit. Baosteel, one of the largest producers of the metal, saw net profit down 4.88% from a year earlier. The auto industry in China is undergoing stresses too. Compounded by the fallout affecting Japanese automakers over the island dispute, data shows that overall national auto sales at the end of September fell 1.8% compared to the end of September 2011. BYD, the Chinese company famously backed by Warren Buffet, reported its 3Q 2012 profit sliding 94% compared to 3Q 2011. Indeed the auto making sector was put on notice by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology last week when the latter warned in a statement that the industry required some serious downsizing or consolidation . The statement contained the shocking news that nearly a quarter of China’s nearly 1,300 automobile makers are on the verge of bankruptcy, and hinted that involuntary bankruptcy may be forced onto some of the smaller players. Most worrying is a drastic rise in the amount of “accounts receivable” (A/R) on the balance sheets of Chinese companies. Accounts receivable is an item of money owed to the company (from customers) which has not yet been paid. Many transactions are done on credit, and it is normal for companies to have these items on their accounts. However, Chinese firms’ accounts receivable are estimated to have risen by 45% year-on-year (YOY) according to reports filed so far, whilst sales have climbed by less than half that rate. During a slowdown, it is common for payments to be delayed as everyone hangs on to cash. Some companies, though, can be tempted to avoid curtailing production by offering reluctant customers much easier credit to encourage sales , the hope being that the slump will soon end and “natural” demand will pick up again. The trouble of course is that if the slowdown is prolonged, or the recovery weaker than expected, these accounts receivable might turn “un-receivable”, and thus have to be written down as losses. An increase in A/R is expected, but such a large increase suggests that some companies have been staying in operations through this vendor financing. In the struggling coal sector, at the end of June, accounts receivable had jumped 52.8 % for the 90 biggest coal firms. YOY Sany’s tally increased 83% over the first nine months of this year, outpacing a still worrying general trend in the heavy machinery sector. The steel sector is also under stress, as are some parts of the country’s export industry. China’s economy, as explored previously, is addicted to credit . These large rises in accounts receivable show that it is not only financial institutions and the shadow banking sector which are involved in credit creation. A payment delay or failure by one company can resonate through an entire supply chain, as each entity feeling the cash pressure then delays payments of its own. The need for a stronger turnaround is becoming more and more urgent. Average: 4.25 Your rating: None Average: 4.3 ( 8 votes) Tweet Login or register to post comments 12185 reads Printer-friendly version Send to friend Similar Articles You Might Enjoy: Chinese CAT-Equivalent, Sany, Finds Itself In Liquidity Crunch, Seeks Covenant Waiver Did The Great Financial Crisis Start With The End Of The Gold Standard? White House Hypocrisy And Trade Sanctions Against China 'Shadow Banking' In China Frontrunning: July 5
13 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 Personal Income And Spending Weigh On Economic Recovery Hopes
insight 2012-12-3 11:04
Personal Income And Spending Weigh On Economic Recovery Hopes Submitted by Tyler Durden on 12/02/2012 11:28 -0500 Core CPI CPI Debt Ceiling Global Warming Gross Domestic Product Guest Post Personal Consumption Personal Income Rate of Change Recession recovery Savings Rate Via Lance Roberts of Street Talk Live , The personal income and spending report Friday morning left a lot to be desired for those expecting a stronger economic environment soon. However, the report fell well in line with what I have been expecting over the past several months (see here , here and here ) as the drag on real wages and incomes have weighed on the consumer. As we discussed in yesterday's report on GDP - personal consumption makes up more the 70% of the economy therefore changes to employment, incomes or credit has an immediate and significant impact to growth. First, let me argue the claim that the impact to personal incomes was due to Hurricane Sandy. While the storm is going to be the excuse for everything from economic reports to global warming the impact from Sandy on personal incomes was most likely very limited. The storm did not occur until the last two days of the month. Even if we assume that everyone in the Northeast was hourly pay, all quit their job five days before the hurricane, and then left town, the overall impact to the entire month of personal incomes for the entire country would still be fairly limited. Secondly, the Hurricane excuse doesn't account for the negative revisions to the personal income data going back to April of this year. The chart below shows the level of personal incomes both pre- and post revisions in October. These revisions also resolve some the imbalances that we have noted between reported personal income data and other economic reports pre-election. We have suggested that many of these anomalies would be revised away in the months ahead which we are now seeing come to fruition. However, for the sake of argument let's assume that the BEA is correct in their statement that 24 states were affected by Sandy for a total of about $18 billion at an annual rate . This still doesn't explain the complete lack of income growth nationwide. The chart below shows the contributions to personal incomes over the last months. More curious was the very large jump in interest income for the month of October after two previous months of decline. Absent that bump in interest income overall personal incomes would have been negative for the month. However, in the next month or two we should see the estimates used to account for the impact of the storm revised with actual data. This could show a minor increase to the October data. Moving on to personal spending it is not surprising that the previous estimates to spending were likewise revised down in October to reflect weaker income growth . The chart below shows the revision to the major categories of spending for the months of July, August and September. These negative revisions show that spending in the previous months was far less robust than previously estimated which is likely to lead to a downward revision of Q3 GDP next month. The continuing problem that faces the economy remains the impact of rising cost of living which is offsetting increases in compensation. We stated in our last report that: "...it is important to note that wage and salary disbursements have risen since the beginning of the year which has contributed to the increase in personal incomes. However, the recent rise in wages has been very nascent and has come very late in the current economic expansion. Secondly, the rise in wages has been more than offset by a large surge in food and energy costs in recent months as shown in the chart below. While the annualized rate of change in wage and salary disbursements rose again September continuing a steady trend since the beginning of this year, food and energy as a percentage of wages and salaries surged substantially more . The problem with this is that it grossly impacts the consumer. In the most recent report - personal incomes rose by 0.4% while consumer spending surged by 0.8%. Unfortunately, when spending outstrips income the difference has to come either from savings or credit. The chart below shows food and energy as a percentage of disposable personal incomes (DPI) versus the personal savings rate as a percentage of DPI. See the problem here? While core CPI remains very mild - rising food and energy costs at the headline have an immediate impact on the consumer's ability to make ends meet ." This is still the case this month. In October that annualized rate of change in wages showed an increase of 3.04% which was enough of an increase to keep food and energy at 22% of wages. Are We There Yet? When it comes to the economy, and particularly the ongoing recession watch that has nearly become a sporting event, it is real (inflation adjusted) incomes that matter. In the most recent report we see that real personal incomes declined for the month from $11,546 to $11,532 billion for the month reflecting a -.12 change. Doug Short always does an excellent job of tracking the four primary indicators used in distinguishing periods of economic expansion from contraction: "At this point, with all indicators for October on the books, the average of the Big Four (the gray line in the chart above) shows us that economic expansion since the last recession has been hovering around a flat line for the past seven months . Are we tipping into a recession? ECRI has reinforced its claim that we are in a recession and puts the cycle peak in July (more here ). On the other hand, a post-Sandy rebound, good holiday sales and favorably received outcome to Fiscal Cliff negotiations could easily put the economy into indisputable expansion mode. As for the recent data, of course they are subject to revision, so we must view these numbers accordingly." He is correct in his assessment that we are not currently in a recession. However, I am not optimistic the post-Sandy rebound will be enough to stem the tide of contracting wage growth. I am also less than convinced that Washington will come to a resolution for the fiscal cliff and the debt ceiling before it impacts the economy further. The next couple of months will be very telling about the strength of the underlying economy. The manufacturing data continues to point to further economic weakness, hiring plans have deteriorated and the main drivers of economic growth have all stagnated. With the recession in Europe continuing to erode exports, and impact corporate profitability, this leaves investors exposed to a sharp valuation adjustment in the months ahead. While we can hope to get lucky that things will work out for the best - "hope" rarely works out as an investment strategy. Average: 4 Your rating: None Average: 4 ( 2 votes) Tweet Login or register to post comments 2960 reads Printer-friendly version Send to friend Similar Articles You Might Enjoy: Guest Post: CFNAI: Not Seeing The Growth Economists' Predict Overnight Sentiment: Cloudy, If Not Quite Frankenstormy Guest Post: GDP And Durable Goods - Heading To Recession? Europe's Recessionary Collapse Beating Even Most Optimistic Expectations Guest Post: New Home Sales - Not As Strong As Headlines Suggest
19 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 Russell Napier's "Most Important Chart In The World"
insight 2012-11-23 10:36
Russell Napier's "Most Important Chart In The World" Submitted by Tyler Durden on 11/22/2012 11:28 -0500 China Global Economy Recession recovery Yield Curve Hopes for an early recovery in the global economy may be overoptimistic, according to CLSA's Russel Napier, as he notes the expansion of China's reserves, which has been an engine of global economic growth, is about to come to a shuddering halt. As eFinancial News notes , Chinese reserves have decelerated dramatically over the last five years and are now close to zero. Napier said of the graph: "It is the most important chart in the world. The growth in Chinese reserves has determined all the key developments in financial markets in the last two decades. It printed lots of currency and artificially depressed the US yield curve. It has been the cornerstone of global growth, and now it's over ." Via eFinancial News : ... The last time the Chinese reserve growth rate was below 10% was at the end of the 1990s, just before the bursting of the technology stock market bubble and a recession. The recovery in the growth rate from 2001 onwards was followed by the economic boom of the last decade. The growth rate turned down decisively in 2007, just before the onset of the financial crisis. China's reserves have come from a trading surplus, and the Chinese authorities have used the money to buy US Treasury bonds. The finance that China supplied to the US helped fuel economic growth in that country and the rest of the world. Once again, we are reminded that it is the flow not the stock that counts for 'growth' is credit expansion and credit is growth... Average: 5 Your rating: None Average: 5 ( 7 votes) Tweet Login or register to post comments 13588 reads Printer-friendly version Send to friend Similar Articles You Might Enjoy: Are 401(k) Loan Defaults Set To Resurge? Frontrunning: August 25 Guest Post: The Lie That Is Social Security Desperate Acts Of Government Continued - Europe Edition Broken Promises: Pensions All Over America
15 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 September Retail Sales: Seasonal vs Non-Seasonal - Spot The Difference
insight 2012-10-16 14:17
September Retail Sales: Seasonal vs Non-Seasonal - Spot The Difference Submitted by Tyler Durden on 10/15/2012 09:31 -0400 Great Depression St Louis Fed Just when we thought we may finally get one decent economic data point which even we could get excited about, we decided to look at the Non-Seasonally Adjusted September retail sales data. After all the $4.7 billion seasonal increase in headline retail sales was the second highest ever (in absolute terms, second only to 2004). Turns out our curiosity was an enthusiasm-dowsing mistake, as a number which on the surface looked good, was hardly validated by the Not-Seasonally Adjusted number, which plunged by $31.9 billion . How does this September sequential change compare to previous years? See the chart below and decide for yourselves if the massive NSA plunge in September 2012 merits the second best seasonally adjusted retail sales increase in history. If anything, the 2012 spread of SA vs NSA retail change is most comparable to that from September 2007. As a reminder, this is 2 months before the 2nd Great Depression officially started. Source: St Louis Fed Average: 4.285715 Your rating: None Average: 4.3 ( 7 votes) Tweet Login or register to post comments 9960 reads Printer-friendly version Send to friend Similar Articles You Might Enjoy: Is It The Weather, Stupid? David Rosenberg On What "April In January" Means For Seasonal Adjustments Initial Claims In Holiday Shortened Week Drop To 350K From Upward Revised 376K Due To "One-Time Factors" Seasonal Adjustments: Big Swing Factor? Retail Sales Beat Expectations, As Empire Index Misses, Negative For Third Month In A Row The Strangest Number In Today's Jobs Number
13 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 随感
熊肉 2012-10-16 09:25
经济政策没有高级与低级的区别,只有合适与不合适的区别。 跨越式发展的提法是不恰当的。 怎样将经济研究做成具有艺术表现的美感。 只有将工作与生活很好的融合,在工作中体现生活的乐趣,在生活中亦有工作的激情,才能登上工作和生 活的顶峰。 没有实证的研究是不可靠的。 what's "the tools of modern economic analysis"? 经济研究具有很强的区域特性,每一个区域的研究团队都着重于研究其所在区域的经济问题。 城市群或区域一体化或一个行政管辖范围的有效空间是多大? 【2012-8-28 10:44:22】有一些经济理论需要进行实验验证,但是对于单个研究者来说,进行实验的可能 性微乎其微,这就要运用历史数据进行分析,所以对研究者来说,掌握一定的经济史是必要的,并且需要 了解国内外的经济史。 【2012-8-28 14:41:32】我们不应该去追求本来不存在的所谓的规律。
个人分类: 日记|19 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 Tax Cuts For The Rich Linked To Income Inequality, Not Economic Growth, Study Fi
insight 2012-9-19 14:19
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/17/tax-cuts-for-the-rich_n_1889686.html?utm_hp_ref=business A new study by the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service has found that over the past 65 years, tax cuts for the rich have not led to economic growth and instead are linked to greater income inequality in the United States. The study found that cutting taxes for the rich does not increase saving, investment, or productivity growth . "The top tax rates appear to have little or no relation to the size of the economic pie," the study said. Two graphs show the lack of connection between tax rates for the rich and economic growth: The authors noted that top-tier tax rates could have an effect on "how the economic pie is sliced." The study noted that in 1945, when the richest families had to pay a marginal tax rate of more than 90 percent, the top 0.1 percent of U.S. families accumulated 4.2 percent of all income gains. In 2007, in contrast, when the top marginal tax rate was 35 percent (which it still is), the top 0.1 percent of U.S. families captured 12.3 percent of all income gains. Two graphs from the study show a clear connection between higher taxes for the rich and less income inequality: Those findings are inconvenient for the Romney campaign. In a continuation of trickle-down economic theory, the Republican presidential nominee has argued that cutting taxes for the rich would "stimulate entrepreneurship, job creation, and investment," thus "breathing life into the present anemic recovery." Romney has said he wants to extend all of the Bush tax cuts , while President Obama wants to extend those tax cuts only on the first $250,000 of taxable income. Romney also wants to slash marginal tax rates and taxes on investment income , as well as eliminate the estate tax -- all of which would disproportionately benefit the rich . A recent study by Owen Zidar, a PhD student in Economics at the University of California at Berkeley, also found that tax cuts for the rich are not correlated with economic growth . But Zidar did find that tax cuts for the bottom 90 percent of income earners can stimulate economic growth and job creation. (Hat tip: the New York Times' David Leonhardt .)
21 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 The Asian-American Arms Race In Charts
insight 2012-7-19 11:05
The Asian-American Arms Race In Charts Submitted by Tyler Durden on 07/18/2012 18:43 -0400 China "Asia is a study in contrasts. It is home to economic freedom and political liberty; it is also home to political instability and tyranny. Some of Asia’s borders are unsettled and volatile. And military budgets and capabilities are expanding, sometimes faster than economic growth. The rise of China as a great power presents both sides of this equation. It is being watched carefully by all the countries of the region. It is the U.S. that is recognized as the catalyst in ensuring a prosperous peace over conflict. America is a Pacific power. That much is a matter of geography and history. But the facts – and America’s principles and interests – demand more than resignation to geography. They call for continued American leadership, commitment, and the predominant comprehensive power that has enabled Asia’s very welcomed, opportunity-laden rise." Thus prefaces the Heritage Foundation its Asian 'Book of Charts', which summarizes most of the key economic, financial, trade, geopolitical, most importantly militaristic tensions both in Asia and, by dint of being the global marginal economic force, the world itself. And while we will present the complete deck shortly, of particular interest we find the summary in 7 easy charts how Asia is slowly but surely catching up on that accepted by conventional wisdom GloboCop - the United States. We present it in its entirety below. Average: 3.7 Your rating: None Average: 3.7 ( 10 votes) Tweet Login or register to post comments 5400 reads Printer-friendly version Send to friend Similar Articles You Might Enjoy: Third US Aircraft Carrier Returning Unexpectedly To Mideast Ahead Of Schedule Introduction To The Road Through 2012: Revolution or World War III Iran Outlines Key Steps And Actors In A Potential Straits Of Hormuz Closure Guest Post: Pakistan And India To Go To War Over Water? Complete Chinese War Preparedness And Military Update
10 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 Guest Post: The Fed And Goldilocks Economic Forecasting
insight 2012-6-25 15:43
Guest Post: The Fed And Goldilocks Economic Forecasting Submitted by Tyler Durden on 06/22/2012 15:57 -040 Submitted by Lance Roberts of StreetTalk Advisors The Fed And Goldilocks Economic Forecasting Beginning in 2011 the Federal Reserve begin releasing its economic forecast for the present year and two years forward covering GDP, Unemployment, and Inflation. The question is after 18 months of forecasting - just how good has the Fed at forecasting these economic variables? I have compiled the data from each of the releases for each category and compared it to the real figures and used a current trend analysis for future estimates. GDP When it comes to the economy the Fed has consistently overstated economic strength. Take a look at the chart and table. In January of 2011 the Fed was predicting GDP growth for 2011 at 3.7%. Actual real GDP (inflation adjusted) was 1.6% or a negative 56% difference. The estimate at that time for 2012 was almost 4% versus 1.8% currently. We have been stating repeatedly over the last 2 years that we are in for a low growth economy due to the debt deleveraging, deficits and continued fiscal and monetary policies that are retardants for economic prosperity. The simple fact is that when an economy requires nearly $5 of debt to provide $1 of economic growth the engine of prosperity is broken. As of the latest Fed meeting the forecast for 2013 and 2014 economic growth has been revised down as the realization of a slow-growth economy has been recognized. However, the current annualized trend of GDP suggests growth rates in the next two years that will roughly be half of the Fed's current estimates of 2.85 and 3.4%. A recession in 2013 is a strong likelihood given the current annualized trend of economic growth since 2000. A recession followed by a rebound in 2014 would leave economic growth running at annual rate close to 1%-1.5% versus the current estimate of nearly 3%. What is very important is the long run outlook of 2.6% economic growth. That rate of growth is very sub-par and, over the longer term, does not sustain the level of incomes and employment that were enjoyed in previous decades. Unemployment The Fed is as overly optimistic about the level of unemployment as they are about economic growth. One of the Fed's mandates is "full employment." At the beginning of 2011 the Fed predicted the unemployment rate for the year would be 8.7% for 2011, 7.8% for 2012 and 6.95% for 2013. The unemployment rate for 2011 was 9.1% and is currently at 8.2% currently likely to rise in the coming reports ahead as the economy again weakens. The Fed sees 2014 unemployment falling to 7% and ultimately returning to a 5.6% "full employment" rate in the long run. The issue with this full employment prediction really becomes what the definition of reality is. Today, even the average American has begun to question the credibility of the BLS employment reports. Recently even Congress has launched an inquiry into the data collection and analysis methods used to determine employment reports. Since the end of the last recession employment has improved modestly but mostly centered around temporary and lower paying positions. Since mid-2011 there has been a fairly sharp decline in the unemployment rate from 9.1% to 8.2% currently. The main driver of that decline has come from a shrinkage of the labor pool versus substantial increases in employment. In our past employment reports we have discussed the increasing number of individuals that are moving into the "Not In Labor Force" category where they are no longer counted as part of the labor pool. For the Fed the reality of "full employment" and statistical "full employment" are two entirely different things. While the Fed could be very correct at achieving "full employment" of 5.6% in their longer run scenario - it certainly doesn't mean that 94.4% of working age Americans will be gainfully employed. Inflation When it comes to inflation the Fed's outlook, for the most part, have been below reality. In January of 2011 The Fed's prediction for 2011 inflation was 1.5% which was 2% lower than what inflation turned out to be. As of the latest meeting the Fed's 2012 inflation prediction is 1.6%. With current deflationary pressures pulling headline inflation down from 3% at the beginning of this year to 1.7% currently the Fed's prediction appears to be fairly accurate. The question, however, is how long can inflation remain suppressed at or below 2% which is the long run prediction of the Fed? The Fed has much more control over inflationary pressures in the economy than they do at stimulating economic growth or increasing employment. By increasing or decreasing interest rates, using monetary policy tools and coordinated actions the Fed has historically been able to influence inflation. Unfortunately, their actions in this regard can also be directly linked to economic and market booms and busts. What the Fed has much less control over are deflationary pressures. We have discussed that the threat of deflation in the U.S. economy is currently a much greater than inflation. It is also the primary concern of the Fed. However, there are two things that are likely occur that could drive headline inflation higher than the Fed's current long run estimate of 2%. The first is further stimulative action which expands the Fed's balance sheet known as "quantitative easing." The direct impact of these programs, as liquidity is injected into the financial system, has been higher commodity prices which translates to an increase in headline inflation. The second, and more importantly, is that an organic economic recovery will eventually take hold. During real economic expansions where demand is increasing, wages are rising and the velocity of money is accelerating - real levels of higher inflation take hold. However, an organic economic expansion is likely some years away as the balance sheet deleveraging cycle continues globally. Why The Fed Forecasts Like Goldilocks Is the Federal Reserve really as bad at predicting future economic conditions as it appears? The answer is no. The Federal Reserve faces a severe challenge, when communicating to the financial markets and the media, which is the creation of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Imagine that following an FOMC meeting Bernanke stated: "The policies and actions that we have implemented to date have done little to curb economic weakness. The economy is in much worse shape that we have previously communicated as the transmission system of Fed policy through the economy, and the financial markets, is obviously broken." The immediate reaction to such a statement would be a complete collapse of the financial markets. Such a collapse in the financial markets would negatively impact consumer confidence which would subsequently throw the economy into a recession. Conversely, an overly optimistic outlook would lead to an increase of inflationary pressures and asset bubbles. Neither situation is healthy for the economy in the longer term. Therefore, communication from the Federal Reserve must be very guided in its approach - not too hot or cold. This "goldilocks" appoach works to create a "glide path" to the Fed's destination while giving the financial markets and economy time to adjust to the incremental adjustments to forecasts. Let me be clear. I am not making a case for the relevance of the Federal Reserve or its policies. That is another article entirely. What I am stating is that the communications from the Federal Reserve should NEVER be taken at face value. Since the Fed can not communicate its real position at any given time, due to the immediately excessive postive or negative effect on the economy and financial markets, as investors we must read between the lines. The problem for the financial markets, and the mainstream media, is that they tend to extrapolate current estimates indefinitely and generally in an upwardly biased manner. This is not the Fed's objective nor have they been able to repeal the economic and business cycles. The Fed has been slowly guiding economic forecasts lower since 2011. The reality is that 2.6% economic growth is not a boon of economic prosperity, corporate profitability, increasing incomes or a secular bull market. It is also not the "death of America" or the return to the stone age. What is important to understand, as investors, is the impact on investment portfolios, expectated real rates of returns and the realization that higher levels of market volatility with more frequent "booms and busts" are here to stay. Average: 4 Your rating: None Average: 4 ( 7 votes) Tweet Login or register to post comments 7066 reads Printer-friendly version Send to friend Similar Articles You Might Enjoy: Guest Post: Change In Corporate Profits Leads To Market Movements Guest Post: The Return Of Economic Weakness Jan Hatzius On Centrally-Planned Goldilocks New Forecast From NABE 'Professional' Economists Guest Post: 10 More Years Of Low Returns
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分享 Labor Day Gaps
insight 2012-6-20 15:54
Labor Day Gaps Posted on September 5, 2011 by Michael Morrison On this Labor Day weekend it’s appropriate to examine economic trends that influence all Americans and our collective quality of life. A number of interwoven trends follow. Everything is connected! Employment issues are at the forefront of this Labor Day weekend so let’s begin with that topic. Unemployment claims, per the following figure, remain high and GDP growth is not sufficiently robust to accommodate population growth for those desiring to enter the workforce. In addition, the percent of job losses relative to peak employment in the most recent recession have never been as large or persisted for so long, when compared with other post WWII recessions. Intermixed with reluctant job recovery are record corporate profits . Corporations are making profits (good) but they are not hiring (bad). Here’s a graph I created using the FRED online application at the St. Louis Federal Reserve, demonstrating the gap between after tax corporate profits and civilian employment. Note that prior to and during the recession civilian employment and corporate profits tracked fairly well. After the official recession (gray bar) there’s a huge disjunction between the two. Corporations are not hiring, despite record profits. Corporations have become leaner and American worker productivity has steadily increased over several years. Robert Reich’s opinion piece summarizes the concerns. Here’s a graph he produced from many sources: From 1947 to approximately 1980 increases in productivity, average hourly compensation and average hourly wage tracked steadily upward. Contrast those 33 years with the trend lines from 1980 to 2009. Productivity steadily accelerates with an 80% change from 1980 to 2009. On the other hand, average hourly wages and average hourly compensation remained relatively flat with 7 and 8 percent increases, respectively over the same time period. Despite rising worker productivity the following graph depicts a widening gap between real GDP and real disposable income, occurring over five decades. The above graphs depict averages so they don’t demonstrate how income is distributed in the economy. When the distribution of income is taken into account the gaps are even more staggering. Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez found the bottom 99 percent of incomes grew only 1.3 percent per year from 2002 to 2007 while the top 1 percent captured over two-thirds (65 percent) of income growth. Looking at the issue over a longer period of time economist Robert Reich produced the following graph using data from Piketty and Saez classic study: Income has become more concentrated in the hands of the top 1%, matching similar levels of inequality just before the beginning of the Great Depression. (Reich’s “wealth” labeling of the above graph is actually an error as the graph depicts income, not wealth. Wealth is even more highly concentrated .) A recent study by Northeastern University economists demonstrates that corporations have been one of the primary beneficiaries of sluggish economic growth: “Between the second quarter of 2009 and the fourth quarter of 2010, real national income in the U.S. increased by $528 billion. Pre-tax corporate profits by themselves had increased by $464 billion while aggregate real wages and salaries rose by only $7 billion or only .1%. Over this six quarter period, corporate profits captured 88% of the growth in real national income while aggregate wages and salaries accounted for only slightly more than 1% of the growth in real national income . …The absence of any positive share of national income growth due to wages and salaries received by American workers during the current economic recovery is historically unprecedented.” Don’t misunderstand — profits are good! But the current system is out of balance with a great segment of our society in financial, and probably, emotional trouble. Labor’s share of the economy has dwindled, to stay afloat the middle class workforce was given massive quantities of credit, and women joined the workforce in record numbers to help the family achieve the American Dream. The following graph clearly depicts a troubling decline in labor’s share of the economy. Equally troubling is the gap between real GDP per capita and median household income as revealed by a graph produced by Princeton economist Uwe Reinhardt from data from the Economic Report of the President to the Congress . From 1975 to 2009, the gap between real GDP per capita and real median household income is staggering. Real GDP per capita rose by an annual compound rate of 1.9 percent while real median household income rose by an annual compound rate of 1.18 percent. Conclusion This Labor Day is characterized by many economic challenges. Yet, don’t bet against the United States! We have faced more difficult challenges and come out on top. We are an adaptive, innovative society, changing when change is required. In that regard I pass along Nouriel Roubin’s recommendation for a balanced approach to the challenges we face: “To enable market-oriented economies to operate as they should and can, we need to return to the right balance between markets and provision of public goods. That means moving away from both the Anglo-Saxon model of laissez-faire and voodoo economics and the continental European model of deficit-driven welfare states. Both are broken. The right balance today requires creating jobs partly through additional fiscal stimulus aimed at productive infrastructure investment. It also requires more progressive taxation; more short-term fiscal stimulus with medium- and long-term fiscal discipline; lender-of-last-resort support by monetary authorities to prevent ruinous runs on banks; reduction of the debt burden for insolvent households and other distressed economic agents; and stricter supervision and regulation of a financial system run amok; breaking up too-big-to-fail banks and oligopolistic trusts. Over time, advanced economies will need to invest in human capital, skills and social safety nets to increase productivity and enable workers to compete, be flexible and thrive in a globalized economy. The alternative is – like in the 1930s – unending stagnation, depression, currency and trade wars, capital controls, financial crisis, sovereign insolvencies, and massive social and political instability.” The American Dream holds promise for all, not just the few. Let’s not forget the marginal propensity to consume by the top 5% cannot be the engine to drive a consumption-based economy. (Recall consumption spending accounts for 70 percent of GDP.) Our capitalist system requires a strong, viable middle class and an enlightened self-interest that recognizes the need to find a more balanced economic outcome for people who are working hard, following the rules and trying to raise good families. This entry was posted in Economy , Inequality and tagged corporate profits , disposable personal income , distribution of income , economy , inequality , median household income , productivity , real GDP per capita , unemployment . Bookmark the permalink . ← Why Didn’t Canada Have a Banking Crisis in 2008 (or in 1930, or 1907, or …)? More Evidence: The American Dream is in Trouble →
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