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英文文献：Stable Agreements in Infinitely Repeated Games-无限重复博弈中的稳定协议
英文文献作者：Licun Xue
英文文献摘要：
This paper studies infinitely repeated games where players can form coalitions to coordinate their actions via self-enforcing agreements. The proposed notion of "stable agreements" extends a characterization of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium paths by Greenberg (1989, 1990) to account for self-enforcing coalitional deviations. An agreement is stable if no coalition can deviate in such a way that by solely coordinating the actions of its own members, it guarantees a higher payoff for each member. Existence of the proposed notion is established and its relation to other notions is investigated.
本文研究无限重复博弈，其中玩家可以通过自我协议形成联盟来协调他们的行动。提出的“稳定协议”概念扩展了格林伯格(1989,1990)对子博弈完美均衡路径集的描述，以解释自我强化的联盟偏差。一个协议是稳定的，如果任何联盟都不能偏离这样一种方式，通过单独协调其成员的行动，它保证了更高的回报给每个成员。提出的概念的存在性被确立，它与其他概念的关系被研究。
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