英文文献:Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia-《出售法律:来自俄罗斯的证据》
英文文献作者:Irina Slinko,Evgeny Yakovlev,Ekaterina Zhuravskaya
英文文献摘要:
How does regulatory capture affect growth? We construct measures of the political power of firms and regional regulatory capture using micro-level data on the preferential treatment of firms through regional laws and regulations in Russia during the period 1992-2000. Using these measures, we find that: 1) politically powerful firms perform better on average; 2) a high level of regulatory capture hurts the performance of firms that have no political connections and boosts the performance of politically connected firms; 3) capture adversely affects small business growth and the tax capacity of the state; 4) there is no evidence that capture affects aggregate growth.
监管俘获如何影响增长?我们利用1992-2000年期间俄罗斯地区法律和法规对企业的优惠待遇的微观层面数据,构建了企业政治权力和区域监管俘获的衡量标准。通过使用这些指标,我们发现:1)政治势力强大的公司平均表现更好;2)高水平的监管俘获会损害没有政治关系的公司的绩效,并提升有政治关系的公司的绩效;3)捕捉对小企业增长和国家税收能力产生不利影响;4)没有证据表明捕获会影响总体增长。


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