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It has beenalmost a year since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe launched his plan to lift Japan’seconomy out of two decades of deflation and recession. How has “Abenomics”fared so far?
Answering thisquestion requires breaking Abenomics down into its three components – massive monetary easing,expansionary fiscal policy, and a long-term growth strategy – which Abe,referring to the tale of Motonari Mori, a sixteenth-century daimyo(feudal lord), calls the “three arrows.” According to legend, Mori instructedeach of his three sons to snap an arrow in half. After they had succeeded, hetold them to tie three arrows together, and break the whole bundle at once;none was able to do it.
Like Mori’sthree arrows, the three arrows of Abenomics are supposed to reinforce eachother. But Mori’s arrows were bound together in parallel, whereas Abe’s policyarrows are connected through underlying structural relationships. While thefirst and second arrows aim to transform Japan’s actual growth path, the thirdoperates on the economy’s potential growth path, which assumes the optimal useof all available resources and technologies.
SinceAbenomics was launched, the “deflation gap” (the difference between actual andpotential output) has dropped from roughly three percentage points to below1.5. This implies that, while the first two arrows are helping to improveJapan’s actual growth path, the third arrow has yet to do much for potentialgrowth.
In fact, sinceAbe’s first arrow took flight, Japan’s stock market has soared with it,recording an unprecedented 40% annual gain, while the yen has depreciatedagainst the dollar by 20%, boosting Japanese firms’ export competitiveness.Moreover, credit growthhas accelerated and asset prices have risen – trends that will encourage consumption bytriggering the wealth effect (when people spend more because they feelricher). And monetary expansion is also having a positive impact on the labormarket: the unemployment rate has fallen to 4%, and the job-to-applicant ratiois nearing parity.
With real GDPgrowth around 4% in the first half of the year (though it did fall below 2% inthe third quarter), the first arrow has already hit the bull’s eye – aperformance worthy of an A+.
The secondarrow entails a sharp increase in short-term fiscal expenditure, especiallyinvestment in infrastructure projects. While those who, like me, adhere to theMundell-Fleming framework (according to which fiscal stimulus will be offset bythe resulting increase in capital inflows, currency appreciation, and reducedexport competitiveness) do not stress the impact of flexible fiscal policy,Keynesians take it very seriously. On the assumption that faster growth willneutralize any threat to debt sustainability, the second arrow receives a B.
When the firstand second arrows lift actual growth above potential growth, monetary expansionwill no longer be able to produce substantial GDP or employment gains. That iswhen the third arrow, which aims to boost Japan’s potential growth throughstructural change (including increased private investment, technologicalinnovation, improved trade links, and reformed corporate-tax policy), willbecome far more important.
Abe has setout the vision behind his long-term growth plan. “Japan is a country thatchallenges, that is open, and that innovates,” he says. But many of the detailsof his strategy remain uncertain.
Japan’slongtime approach to industrial policy, in which the Ministry of InternationalTrade and Industry provided support and subsidies for selected industries,helping them to compete in world markets, is now obsolete (indeed, MITI’s rolewas taken over by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry in 2001). WhenJapanese firms operate at the frontier of industry, bureaucrats cannot choosethe winners. Given this, the government’s role should be confined to areaswhere externalities exist, such as carbon-emissions reduction.
Unfortunately,a new, clearly defined approach to industrial policy is still missing. In fact,descriptions of some third-arrow projects seem to be based on little more thanwishful thinking, with new technology or knowhow apparently expected simply tofall into Japan’s lap. A more effective approach would entail achievable,concrete goals like relaxing labor- and financial-market regulations, reducingcorporate income taxes, liberalizing trade by joining the Trans-PacificPartnership, and perhaps easing immigration policy.
The problem isthat bureaucrats like the power that regulation affords them. Indeed,deregulation would require them to put their country’s long-term interestsabove their own short-term interests – a choice that they have so far resisted.To paraphrase John F. Kennedy, it is time for Japan’s leaders to ask not whattheir country can do for its government, but what the government can undofor its country.
In thiscontext, the third arrow of Abenomics cannot yet be fairly assessed. While itsimpact has so far been lacking, it certainly cannot be deemed a failure, withJapan’s top leaders still working tirelessly to build the needed momentum. Themost appropriate grade is therefore an “E” for effort. One hopes that it is aneffort that proves adequate to overcome bureaucratic resistance to deregulationin the coming year.
With an A+, aB, and an “E,” Abenomics’s first-year report card reflects important progress,providing plenty of reason for enthusiasm. It even spells its originator’sname.
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