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Theory of Public Finance in a Federal State (Hardcover)
by Dietmar Wellisch (Author)
"I highly recommend this work both for the excellent synthesis of the existing works on fiscal decentralization and the important contributions to issues of public finance under conditions of factor mobility...it is a tremendous contribution to the field and a must read for scholars of federalism and decentralization." Publius
Book Description
This book gives a new answer to the old question about the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization in a federal state. It shows that fiscal decentralization is a method to disclose the preferences of currently living and future generations for local public goods, to limit the size of the government, and to avoid excessive public debt finance. While the allocative branch of the government benefits from fiscal decentralization, it is difficult to obtain a distribution of incomes that differs from the outcome that the market brings along.
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Acknowledgments page x
1 Fiscal Decentralization: Benefits and Problems 1
1.1 Assignment of Government Functions and Mobility 1
1.1.1 Assignment of Government Functions 1
1.1.2 Mobility and Taxation: Empirical Facts 3
1.2 Purpose, Justification, and Limits of the Study 9
1.2.1 Purpose of the Book 9
1.2.2 Justification of the Study 10
1.2.3 Limits of the Study 13
1.3 Benefits of Fiscal Decentralization 14
1.3.1 Sensitivity to Diverse Regional Preferences 14
1.3.2 Preference Revelation by Household Mobility 15
1.3.3 Protecting the Interests of Future Generations 15
1.3.4 Restraining the Leviathan 16
1.4 Problems of Fiscal Decentralization 17
1.4.1 Inefficient Interregional Resource Allocation 17
1.4.2 Destructive Tax Competition for Mobile Factors 18
1.4.3 Tax Export and Spillover Effects 19
1.4.4 Suboptimal Income Distribution within Regions 19
1.4.5 Suboptimal Income Distribution across Regions 20
1.4.6 Suboptimal Stabilization Policy 21
1.4.7 Optimal Degree of Fiscal Decentralization 22
1.5 Outline of the Book 22
2 Locational Efficiency and Efficiency-Supporting Tax Systems 27
2.1 Efficient Locational Pattern 28
2.1.1 The Model 28
2.1.2 First-Order Conditions 30
2.1.3 Efficient Interregional Resource Distribution 32
2.2 Efficiency-Supporting Tax Systems 35
2.2.1 Private Behavior 35
2.2.2 Efficient Taxation 37
3 Perfect Interregional Competition 40
3.1 Fiscal Decentralization with a Complete Tax
Instrument Set 42
3.1.1 Private Behavior 43
3.1.2 Local Government Behavior 45
3.2 Fiscal Decentralization with an Incomplete Tax
Instrument Set 46
3.2.1 A Direct Household Tax Is Not Available 47
3.2.2 A Direct Firm Tax Is Not Available 48
3.2.3 An Undistortive Tax Is Not Available 50
3.3 Appendix 53
3.3.1 First-Order Conditions and Migration Responses 53
3.3.2 Distortionary Taxation 55
4 Interregional Tax Competition for Mobile Capital 58
4.1 Underprovision of Local Public Goods 60
4.1.1 Private Behavior 60
4.1.2 Regional Government Behavior 63
4.1.3 Central Government Intervention 66
4.2 Tax Competition and Regional Size 69
4.3 The Advantage of Small Regions 71
4.4 Restraining the Leviathan by Interregional Tax
Competition 74
4.4.1 Government Behavior 75
4.4.2 Fiscal Decentralization with Undistortive Taxes 76
4.4.3 Fiscal Decentralization with Interregional
Tax Competition 77
4.5 Property Tax Incidence and Land Taxation 79
4.5.1 The Traditional View 79
4.5.2 The New View 81
4.5.3 The Benefit View 82
4.5.4 Land Taxation 85
4.6 Appendix 86
5 Optimal Structure of Local Governments 88
5.1 Tiebout and the Theory of Clubs 90
5.2 The Henry George Theorem 92
5.3 Overlapping Market Areas of Local Public Goods 95
Contents vii
5.3.1 The Optimal Allocation 95
5.3.2 Private Behavior 98
5.3.3 Decentralization through Competing Metropolitan
Governments 99
5.3.4 Decentralization with Smaller Jurisdictions 100
5.4 Appendix 102
5.4.1 Optimal Allocation with Overlapping Market Areas 102
5.4.2 Optimal Decentralization through Metropolitan
Governments 103
6 Incentive Equivalence through Perfect Household Mobility 105
6.1 Tax Export and Spillover Effects with Household Mobility 106
6.1.1 Private Behavior 106
6.1.2 Regional Government Behavior 108
6.2 Tax Competition and Household Mobility 111
6.2.1 Private Behavior 111
6.2.2 Regional Government Behavior 113
6.3 Appendix 115
6.3.1 Tax Export and Spillover Effects 115
6.3.2 Tax Competition 116
7 Efficiency and the Degree of Household Mobility 118
7.1 Efficient Allocation 120
7.1.1 The Model 120
7.1.2 First-Order Conditions 122
7.2 Decentralized Nash Equilibrium 124
7.2.1 Private Behavior 124
7.2.2 Regional Government Behavior 126
7.2.3 Transfer-Constrained Region 127
7.3 Different Degrees of Household Mobility 129
7.3.1 Perfect Household Mobility 129
7.3.2 Perfect Immobility of Households 130
7.3.3 Imperfect Household Mobility 131
7.4 Appendix 133
7.4.1 First-Order Conditions 133
7.4.2 Expressions of a Transfer-Constrained Region 136
8 Decentralized Redistribution Policy 137
8.1 Uncoordinated Regional Redistribution Policy 139
8.1.1 Private Behavior 139
8.1.2 Socially Optimal Allocation 141
8.1.3 Regional Government Policy 142
viii Contents
8.2 Internalizing Fiscal Externalities 146
8.2.1 Central Government Intervention 146
8.2.2 Corrected Equilibrium 148
8.3 Appendix 149
8.3.1 Derivation of Welfare Effects 149
8.3.2 Central Government Intervention 150
9 Decentralization and Intergenerational Problems 152
9.1 Efficient Allocation 155
9.1.1 The Model 155
9.1.2 First-Order Conditions 156
9.2 Decentralized Environmental Policy 158
9.2.1 Private Behavior 158
9.2.2 Local Government Behavior 160
9.3 Local Public Debt 162
9.3.1 Private Behavior 163
9.3.2 Local Government Behavior 164
9.4 Appendix 166
9.4.1 Decentralized Environmental Policy 166
9.4.2 Nonneutrality of Local Public Debt 168
10 Informational Asymmetry between the Regions and
the Center 170
10.1 Optimal Redistribution with Complete Information 172
10.1.1 Private Behavior 172
10.1.2 Regional Government Behavior 175
10.1.3 Socially Optimal Allocation 176
10.2 Incomplete Information, Adverse Selection, and Optimal
Redistribution 177
10.2.1 Incentive Compatibility Constraints 177
10.2.2 Central Government Policy 179
10.3 Incomplete Information and Moral Hazard 181
10.3.1 Private Behavior 181
10.3.2 Regional Government Behavior 183
10.3.3 Optimal Policy with Incomplete Information 183
10.4 Appendix 187
10.4.1 First-Order Conditions of the Central
Government Problem 187
10.4.2 First-Best Optimum 188
10.4.3 Optimum with Incomplete Information and
Adverse Selection 188
Contents ix
10.4.4 Optimum with Incomplete Information and
Moral Hazard 188
11 Conclusions 191
11.1 Efficiency and Decentralization 191
11.2 Redistribution and Decentralization 193
11.3 Policy Applications 194
11.3.1 Tax Autonomy of Local Governments 195
11.3.2 Interregional Tax Competition 195
11.3.3 Restructuring of Jurisdictional Boundaries 196
11.3.4 Degree of Higher Governmental Intervention 197
11.3.5 Redistribution Policy within the Regions of a
Federal State 198
11.3.6 Redistribution Policy across the Regions of a
Federal State 198
11.3.7 Harmonization of Debt and Pension Policies in
the EU 199
References 201
Index 211
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