英文文献:State fragility, rent seeking and lobbying: evidence from African data-国家脆弱、寻租和游说:来自非洲数据的证据
英文文献作者:Asongu Simplice,Oasis Kodila-Tedika
英文文献摘要:
This paper assesses the determinants of state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa using hitherto unexplored variables in the literature. The previously missing dimension of nation building is integrated and the hypothesis of state fragility being a function of rent seeking and/or lobbying by de facto power holders is tested. The resulting interesting finding is that, political interference, rent seeking and lobbying increase the probability of state fragility by mitigating the effectiveness of governance capacity. This relationship (after controlling for a range of economic, institutional and demographic factors) is consistent with a plethora of models and specifications. The validity of the hypothesis is confirmed in a scenario of extreme state fragility. Moreover, the interaction between political interferences and revolutions mitigate the probability of state fragility while the interaction between natural resources and political interferences breeds the probability of extreme state fragility. As a policy implication, there is a ‘sub-Saharan African specificity’ in ‘nation building’ and prevention of conflicts. Blanket fragility oriented policies will be misplaced unless they are contingent on the degree of fragility, since ‘fragile’ and ‘extreme fragile’ countries respond differently to economic, institutional and demographic characteristics of state fragility.
本文利用文献中迄今尚未探索的变量评估了撒哈拉以南非洲国家脆弱性的决定因素。之前缺失的国家建设维度被整合,国家脆弱性是寻租和/或事实上的权力拥有者的游说的函数的假设被检验。结果有趣的发现是,政治干预、寻租和游说通过降低治理能力的有效性,增加了国家脆弱的可能性。这种关系(在控制了一系列经济、制度和人口因素之后)与过多的模型和规格是一致的。在极端脆弱状态下验证了假设的有效性。此外,政治干预与革命的相互作用降低了国家脆弱性的可能性,而自然资源与政治干预的相互作用则孕育了极端国家脆弱性的可能性。作为一项政策暗示,在“国家建设”和预防冲突方面存在着“撒哈拉以南非洲的特殊性”。除非根据脆弱性的程度来决定,否则全面的以脆弱性为导向的政策将是错误的,因为“脆弱”和“极端脆弱”国家对国家脆弱性的经济、体制和人口特征的反应不同。


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