A Stakeholder Rationale for Risk Management

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A Stakeholder Rationale for Risk Management
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关键词：Stakeholder Management Managemen Rationale Rational Management Risk Rationale Stakeholder

1  Introduction...........................................................................................................1
1.1  Relevance of the topic......................................................................................1
1.2  Objectives of the dissertation and research questions......................................2
1.3  Structure...........................................................................................................3
2  Stakeholder Theory...............................................................................................5
2.1  Historical roots of stakeholder theory..............................................................5
2.2  Stakeholder definitions ....................................................................................6
2.3  Classifications of stakeholder theory...............................................................7
2.3.1  The classification by Donaldson and Preston (1995)...............................7
2.3.2  The classification by Roberts and Mahoney (2004).................................9
2.3.3  Concluding remarks................................................................................10
3  The Theory of the Firm.......................................................................................13
3.1  The firm in neoclassical economic theory.....................................................13
3.2  The firm within the framework of new institutional economic theory..........14
3.2.1  Positive agency theory............................................................................14
3.2.2  Transaction cost theory...........................................................................16
3.2.2.1  Characteristics of transactions.........................................................17
3.2.2.2  Holdup and moral hazard................................................................19
3.2.2.3  The firm as a governance mechanism.............................................19
3.2.3  Property rights theory.............................................................................20
3.2.3.1  Traditional property rights theory...................................................20
3.2.3.2  Property rights theory of Grossmann, Hart and Moore...................22
3.2.4  The modern firm as a nexus of specific investments .............................24
3.3  The resource-based view of the firm..............................................................25
3.3.1  General....................................................................................................25
3.3.2  Comparing the resource-based view to alternative theories of the firm.27
3.4  A stakeholder-centered concept of the modern firm......................................29
3.4.1  Value creation in the modern firm..........................................................29
3.4.2  Conceptualizing firm value through Net Organizational Capital...........30
4  The Theory of Corporate Risk Management....................................................33
4.1  The foundations of modern finance...............................................................33
4.1.1  The Modigliani Miller-framework in the context of corporate 
 
risk management.....................................................................................33
4.1.2  Capital market theory in the context of corporate risk management......34
4.1.2.1  A critical appraisal of the Capital Asset Pricing Model..................38
4.1.2.1.1  Challenges from a financial economics' perspective...................38
4.1.2.1.2  Challenges from a strategic management's perspective...............39
4.2  The financial theory of corporate risk management......................................41
4.2.1  The managerial utility maximization hypothesis of corporate 
 
risk management.....................................................................................43

4.2.2
  The shareholder value maximization hypothesis of corporate 
risk management.....................................................................................44
 
4.2.2.1  Large undiversified shareholders....................................................44
4.2.2.2  Taxes...............................................................................................44
4.2.2.3  Underinvestment and asset substitution problems..........................45
4.2.2.4  Investment policy and capital market imperfections......................47
4.2.2.5  Direct costs of bankruptcy and financial distress............................48
4.3  A stakeholder rationale for risk management................................................49
4.3.1  Non-financial stakeholders as risk bearers.............................................49
4.3.1.1  Contractual incompleteness and opportunistic firm behavior.........49
4.3.1.2  Costs of financial distress and the firm's financial standing...........51
4.3.1.2.1  Sources of indirect costs of financial distress..............................51
4.3.1.2.2  Probability of default...................................................................53
4.3.2  Implications of a stakeholder reasoning for risk management...............53
4.3.2.1  Widening the scope of corporate risk management........................53
4.3.2.2  The role of corporate financial policy.............................................55
4.3.2.2.1  Signaling through financial policy...............................................55
4.3.2.2.2  Increasing management's flexibility............................................56
4.3.2.3  The performance effect...................................................................58
4.3.3  Empirical evidence.................................................................................60
4.3.3.1  Evidence from financial economics literature.................................61
4.3.3.1.1  Evidence on capital structure choice............................................61
4.3.3.1.2  Evidence on dividend policy........................................................63
4.3.3.1.3  Evidence on cash holdings...........................................................63
4.3.3.1.4  Evidence on corporate hedging....................................................64
4.3.3.2  Evidence from strategic management literature..............................64
4.3.3.3  Evidence from accounting literature...............................................65
4.3.4  Concluding remarks................................................................................66
5  Theories of Corporate Finance Decisions.........................................................69
5.1  Capital structure.............................................................................................69
5.1.1  Theoretical evidence...............................................................................69
5.1.1.1  Neoclassical theories of capital structure........................................69
5.1.1.2  Neo-institutional theories of capital structure.................................71
5.1.1.2.1  Agency cost models of capital structure......................................72
5.1.1.2.2  Asymmetric information models of capital structure..................74
5.1.1.2.3  Capital structure models based on product/input 
 
market interactions.......................................................................76
5.1.1.2.4  Transaction cost arguments for capital structure.........................80
5.1.1.3  Stakeholder theory of capital structure ...........................................81
5.1.1.4  Capital structure and corporate strategy..........................................81
5.1.2  Empirical evidence.................................................................................83
5.1.2.1  General............................................................................................83
5.1.2.2  Studies considering strategic aspects of the capital structure 
choice...............................................................................................85
 
5.1.2.2.1  Barton and Gordon (1988)...........................................................85
5.1.2.2.2  Barton et al. (1989)......................................................................85

5.1.2.2.3
  Lowe et al. (1994) and Jordan et al. (1998).................................87
5.1.2.2.4  Balakrishnan and Fox (1993).......................................................87
5.1.2.2.5  Vicente-Lorente (2001)................................................................89
5.1.2.2.6  O'Brien (2003).............................................................................90
5.1.2.3  Studies considering product/input market interactions...................91
5.1.2.3.1  Sarig (1998)..................................................................................92
5.1.2.3.2  Banerjee et al. (2004)...................................................................92
5.1.2.3.3  Franck and Huyghebaert (2006)..................................................94
5.1.2.3.4  Kale and Shahrur (2007)..............................................................95
5.2  Dividend policy..............................................................................................96
5.2.1  Theoretical evidence...............................................................................96
5.2.1.1  Asymmetric information - signaling models of dividend policy....97
5.2.1.2  Agency models of dividend policy..................................................98
5.2.1.3  A stakeholder-based argument on dividend policy.........................98
5.2.2  Empirical evidence.................................................................................99
5.2.2.1  Holder et al. (1998).......................................................................100
5.2.2.2  Brav et al. (2004)...........................................................................102
5.3  Corporate cash holdings...............................................................................103
5.3.1  Theoretical evidence.............................................................................103
5.3.1.1  Static trade-off theory....................................................................104
5.3.1.2  Financing hierarchy theory............................................................107
5.3.1.3  A corporate hedging based argument on cash holdings................108
5.3.1.4  A stakeholder-based argument on cash holdings..........................110
5.3.2  Empirical evidence...............................................................................110
5.3.2.1  Kim et al. (1998)...........................................................................110
5.3.2.2  Opler et al. (1999).........................................................................111
5.3.2.3  Dittmar et al. (2003)......................................................................111
5.3.2.4  Mikkelson and Partch (2003)........................................................112
5.3.2.5  Schwetzler and Reimund (2004)...................................................113
5.3.2.6  Ozkan and Ozkan (2004)...............................................................114
5.3.2.7  Bates et al. (2006)..........................................................................114
5.4  Conservatism in finance and accounting.....................................................115
5.5  Concluding remarks.....................................................................................116
6  Statistical methodology.....................................................................................119
6.1  Multiple linear regression............................................................................119
6.2  Panel data.....................................................................................................122
6.2.1  General..................................................................................................122
6.2.2  The omitted variables problem.............................................................123
6.2.3  The basic linear unobserved effects panel data model.........................123
6.2.4  Methods of estimation..........................................................................124
6.2.4.1  Pooled OLS estimation..................................................................124
6.2.4.2  First differencing estimation.........................................................125
6.2.4.3  Fixed effects estimation................................................................126
6.2.4.3.1  Estimation with cross-section fixed effects...............................126
6.2.4.3.2  Estimation with time fixed effects.............................................128
6.2.4.3.3  Estimation with both cross-section and time fixed effects........128

6.2.4.4
  Random effects estimation............................................................129
6.2.5  Comparison of estimation methods......................................................130
6.2.5.1  Fixed effects or first differencing..................................................130
6.2.5.2  Fixed effects or random effects.....................................................130
7  Empirical study..................................................................................................133
7.1  Research gap................................................................................................133
7.2  Hypotheses...................................................................................................133
7.3  Data..............................................................................................................134
7.3.1  Data collection......................................................................................134
7.3.2  Sample deletion process.......................................................................135
7.3.3  Subsamples based on reported accounting standards...........................136
7.4  Variables......................................................................................................138
7.4.1  Capital structure variables....................................................................138
7.4.1.1  Dependent variable........................................................................138
7.4.1.2  Independent financial control variables........................................140
7.4.2  Cash holdings variables........................................................................143
7.4.2.1  Dependent variable........................................................................143
7.4.2.2  Independent financial control variables........................................143
7.4.3  Stakeholder variables............................................................................146
7.4.3.1  An accounting-based approach of measuring implicit 
 
stakeholder claims.........................................................................146
7.4.3.1.1  Bowen et al. (1995)....................................................................146
7.4.3.1.2  Matsumoto (2002)......................................................................150
7.4.3.2  Independent stakeholder variables employed in this study...........150
7.5  FD and FE model specifications..................................................................153
7.5.1  Capital structure models.......................................................................154
7.5.2  Cash holdings models...........................................................................155
7.6  Results and discussion .................................................................................155
7.6.1  Univariate descriptive results...............................................................155
7.6.1.1  Univariate descriptive results of corporate capital structure.........155
7.6.1.2  Univariate descriptive results of corporate cash holdings.............157
7.6.2  Multivariate results...............................................................................158
7.6.2.1  Multivariate analysis of corporate capital structure......................159
7.6.2.2  Multivariate analysis of corporate cash holdings..........................163
8  Conclusions and suggestions for future research...........................................167
Appendix A (Industry classification of all samples for the 1998-2004 period).........171
Appendix B (Descriptive statistics of all samples for the 2002-2004 period)............175
Appendix C (Correlation matrices of all samples for the 2002-2004 period)............179
Appendix D (FD capital structure model results of Local Standards/IFRS firms)....180
Appendix E (FD cash holdings model results of US GAAP/Overall sample firms)..181
References..................................................................................................................183