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[经济学方法论] 微观经济英文版. [推广有奖]

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既学经济又学英文的好方法,本来不想要钱的,但是我的论坛币不多了,没办法,还是得收点辛苦费了,不好意思,各位坛友!
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关键词:微观经济 英文版 收点辛苦费 不好意思 学英文 英文版 微观经济

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learning_ye 发表于 2009-6-26 21:44:34 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群
什么版本的,介绍一下啊

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这也太模糊了吧,一共就那么点银子,总得知道花在哪了呀

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板凳
dongjinpeng 发表于 2009-7-24 04:40:36 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群
似乎是黄有光的讲义:
Department of Economics

ADVANCED MICROECONOMICS - Course Outline and Reading Guide
Lecturer: Yew-Kwang Ng  (phone: 65642051; Room 112;        Email: Kwang.ng@buseco.monash.edu.au )

Students who have solid background and are not adverse to a mathematical approach may use H.R. Varian, Microeconomic Analysis, Norton, 3rd edition, 1992.  An alternative advanced text emphasizing game theory is David M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton University Press, 1990. Even more advanced texts includes:

Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston and Jerry R. Green, 1995. Microeconomics Theory. Oxford University Press.  (An advanced textbook in microeconomics theory.)

However, the following texts are referred to frequently.

Geoffery A. Jehle & Philip J. Reny (2001). Advanced Microeconomic Theory (2nd Edition). Boston: Addison-Wesley. (JR)
Y.-K. Ng, Mesoeconomics:  A Micro-Macro Analysis, London:  Harvester, 1986.

A simpler alternative to JR is:
David G. Luenberger (1995). Microeconomic Theory. McGraw-Hill. (DL)  

The following topics are provided for reading. The lectures may not cover all topics and may not proceed in the same order.:

(0)        Mathematical Introduction (May be skipped if students are already familiar)
       
JR:  Ch. A1 & A2
DL: Appendix C

(1)        Basic Consumer Theory

Mainly on consumer preferences and the existence of utility functions, properties of demand functions, the composite commodity theorem, and the Slutsky equation.

DL: Ch. 4
JR:  Ch. 1, 2, 3.
Ng, Welfare Economics, App.1B.

H.A.J. Green, Consumer Theory, Chapters 1-7

P.R.G. Layard and A.A. Walters, Microeconomic Theory, McGraw-Hill, Sections 5.1 and 5.2

Varian, Chapters 7-9

(2)        Some Extensions

R.H. Frank, “If Homo Economicus could choose his own utility function, would he want one with a conscience?”  American Economic Review, September 1987, 593-604; June 1989, 588-596.

Y.-K. Ng, “Step-optimization, secondary constraints, and Giffen goods”, Canadian Journal of Economics, November 1972, 553-560.

Y.-K. Ng, “Diamonds are a government’s best friend:  Burden-free taxes on goods valued for their values”, American Economic Review, March 1987, 77: 186-191.

Y.-K. Ng, “Mixed diamond goods and anomalies in consumer theory:  Upward-sloping compensated demand curves with unchanged diamondness”, Mathematical Social Sciences, 1993, 25: 287-293.

(3)        Uncertainty

DL: Ch.11

Gravelle & Rees, Chapters 19 and 20

Green, Chapters 13, 14 & 15

Y.-K. Ng, “Why do people buy lottery tickets?  Choices involving risk and the indivisibility of expenditure”, Journal of Political Economy, October 1965, 530-535.

Varian, Chapter 11

Y.-K. Ng, “Expected subjective utility:  Is the Neumann-Morgenstern utility the same as the neoclassical’s?” Social Choice Welfare, 1984, pp. 177-186.

(4)         Production and Marginal Productivity Theories

DL: Ch. 5
JR:  Ch. 2, 3.

Baumol, Chapter 11

Henderson & Quandt, Chapter 3

Varian, Chapters 1-5

R.H. Frank, “Are workers paid their marginal products”, American Economic Review, 1984, 549-571.

L. Borghans & L. Groot, “Superstardom and monopolistic power: Why media stars earn more than their marginal contribution to welfare”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 1998, pp.546-

(5)        Introduction to Mesoeconomic Analysis

Y.-K. Ng, Mesoeconomics:  A Micro-Macro Analysis, London:  Harvester, 1986.

Y.-K. Ng, “Business confidence and depression prevention:  A mesoeconomic perspective”, American Economic Review, May 1992, 82(2): 365-371.

Ng, “Non-neutrality of money under non-perfect competition: why do economists fail to see the possibility?” In Arrow, Ng, and Yang, eds., Increasing Returns and Economic Analysis, London: Macmillan, 1998, pp.232-252.

(6)        General Equilibrium

DL: Ch. 7;  JR: Ch.5

K.J. Arrow & F. Hahn (1971), General Competitive Analysis, Chapter 1

F. Black (1995), Exploring General Equilibrium, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

J.S. Chipman, “The nature and meaning of equilibrium in economic theory”, in D. Martindale, ed., Functionalism in Social Sciences; reprinted in H. Townsend, ed., Price Theory, Penguin.

Gravelle & Rees, Chapter 16

W. Nicholson, Appendix B to Chapter 19, “The existence of general equilibrium prices”, Microeconomic Theory, 1985, The Dryden Press, 684-694.

Starr. R.M. (1997). General Equilibrium Theory: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press.

Varian, Chapters 17 & 21

S. Zamagni, Microeconomic Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987, Ch. 16.


(7)                Selected Topics in Microeconomic Analysis

(a)        Adverse selection, signalling, and screening.

Akerlof, G. “The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970, 89: 488-500.

Mas-Colell, Andreu, Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., Microeconomic theory New York : Oxford University Press, 1995, Ch. 13.

(b)        The principal-agent problem

Holmstrom, B., (1979), “Moral hazard and Observability”, Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 74-91

Mas-Colell, Andreu, Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., Microeconomic theory New York : Oxford University Press, 1995, Ch. 14.

(c)        Incentives and mechanism design

Mirrlees, James A. “An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation”, Review of Economic Studies, 1971, 38:175-208.

Mas-Colell, Andreu, Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., Microeconomic theory New York : Oxford University Press, 1995, Ch. 23.


(d)        Should the benefit/cost ratio for public projects/spending be higher due to the excess burden of raising public revenue?

Feldstein, Martin “How Big Should Government Be?” National Tax Journal
50 No.2 (June 1997): 197-213.

Kaplow, Louis “The optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation.” National Tax Journal 49 No.4 (Dec.1996): 513-533.

Ng, “The optimal size of public spending and the distortionary cost of taxation”, National Tax Journal 53 No.2 (June 2000): 252-272.



(e)        Relative-income effects, economic growth, environmental quality, and welfare: Further considerations on the optimal size of public spending.

Ng, "Relative-Income Effects and the Appropriate Level of Public Expenditure", Oxford Economic Papers, June 1987, pp. 293-300.

Ng & Wang, J. "Relative Income, Aspiration, Environmental Quality, Individual and Political Myopia:  Why May the Rat-Race for Material Growth be Welfare-Reducing?", Mathematical Social Sciences, 1993, Vol. 26, pp. 3-23.

Ng, Siang & Ng, Yew-Kwang, “Why do governments increase with growth but happiness remains unchanged?”, Social Choice and Welfare, 2001..

NG, Yew-Kwang (2003), ‘From preference to happiness: Towards a more complete welfare economics”, Social Coice and Welfare, 20: 307-50.

(g) One answer to two parodoxes?

Ng, "The Older the More Valuable: Divergence between Utility and Dollar Values of Life as One Ages", Journal of Economics (Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie), 1992, Vol. 55, No. 1, pp. 1-16.

Ng, "The Paradox of the Adventurous Young and the Cautious Old: Natural Selection versus Rational Calculation", Journal of Theoretical Biology, 1991, Vol. 153, pp. 339-352.

                  Sun, Guangzhen & Ng, “A Theory of Age-Dependent Value of Life and Time ”, typescript.

(h) Specialization and Economic Organization

Yang, Xiaokai, Economics: New Classical versus Neoclassical Frameworks, Blackwell, 2001, Chs.5-7, 11.

Yang, Xiaokai & Ng, Y.-K. Specialization and Economic Organization:  A New Classical Microeconomic Framework.  In "Contributions to Economic Analysis", Vol. 215, 1993, Amsterdam:  North Holland, pp. xvi + 507. (Mainly Chs.0-2, 5.)

        Yang, Xiaokai & Ng, Siang, “Specialization and Division of Labour: A Survey”, in Kenneth J. Arrow, et al, eds., Increasing Returns and Economic Analysis, London: Macmillan, 1998, pp. 3-63.

        Yang, Xiaokai & Ng, Y.-K. “Theory of the Firm and Structure of Residual Rights”, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, Vol. 16, pp. 107-28, 1995.

(i)        Does the enrichment of a sector benefit others?

Ng, "The Enrichment of a Sector (Individual/Region/Country) Benefits Others: The Third Welfare Theorem?", Pacific Economic Review, Nov. 1996, Vol. 1, No.2, pp.93-115.

Ng, Siang & Y.-K., “The enrichment of a sector(individual/region/country) benefits others: a generalization”, Pacific Economic Review, Oct. 2000, 5(3): 299-302.

Ng, Siang & Y.-K., “The enrichment of a sector(individual/region/country) benefits others: the case of trade for specialization”, International Journal of Development Planning Literature, 1999, 14(3): 403-410.

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