似乎是黄有光的讲义:
Department of Economics
ADVANCED MICROECONOMICS - Course Outline and Reading Guide
Lecturer: Yew-Kwang Ng (phone: 65642051; Room 112; Email:
Kwang.ng@buseco.monash.edu.au )
Students who have solid background and are not adverse to a mathematical approach may use H.R. Varian, Microeconomic Analysis, Norton, 3rd edition, 1992. An alternative advanced text emphasizing game theory is David M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton University Press, 1990. Even more advanced texts includes:
Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston and Jerry R. Green, 1995. Microeconomics Theory. Oxford University Press. (An advanced textbook in microeconomics theory.)
However, the following texts are referred to frequently.
Geoffery A. Jehle & Philip J. Reny (2001). Advanced Microeconomic Theory (2nd Edition). Boston: Addison-Wesley. (JR)
Y.-K. Ng, Mesoeconomics: A Micro-Macro Analysis, London: Harvester, 1986.
A simpler alternative to JR is:
David G. Luenberger (1995). Microeconomic Theory. McGraw-Hill. (DL)
The following topics are provided for reading. The lectures may not cover all topics and may not proceed in the same order.:
(0) Mathematical Introduction (May be skipped if students are already familiar)
JR: Ch. A1 & A2
DL: Appendix C
(1) Basic Consumer Theory
Mainly on consumer preferences and the existence of utility functions, properties of demand functions, the composite commodity theorem, and the Slutsky equation.
DL: Ch. 4
JR: Ch. 1, 2, 3.
Ng, Welfare Economics, App.1B.
H.A.J. Green, Consumer Theory, Chapters 1-7
P.R.G. Layard and A.A. Walters, Microeconomic Theory, McGraw-Hill, Sections 5.1 and 5.2
Varian, Chapters 7-9
(2) Some Extensions
R.H. Frank, “If Homo Economicus could choose his own utility function, would he want one with a conscience?” American Economic Review, September 1987, 593-604; June 1989, 588-596.
Y.-K. Ng, “Step-optimization, secondary constraints, and Giffen goods”, Canadian Journal of Economics, November 1972, 553-560.
Y.-K. Ng, “Diamonds are a government’s best friend: Burden-free taxes on goods valued for their values”, American Economic Review, March 1987, 77: 186-191.
Y.-K. Ng, “Mixed diamond goods and anomalies in consumer theory: Upward-sloping compensated demand curves with unchanged diamondness”, Mathematical Social Sciences, 1993, 25: 287-293.
(3) Uncertainty
DL: Ch.11
Gravelle & Rees, Chapters 19 and 20
Green, Chapters 13, 14 & 15
Y.-K. Ng, “Why do people buy lottery tickets? Choices involving risk and the indivisibility of expenditure”, Journal of Political Economy, October 1965, 530-535.
Varian, Chapter 11
Y.-K. Ng, “Expected subjective utility: Is the Neumann-Morgenstern utility the same as the neoclassical’s?” Social Choice Welfare, 1984, pp. 177-186.
(4) Production and Marginal Productivity Theories
DL: Ch. 5
JR: Ch. 2, 3.
Baumol, Chapter 11
Henderson & Quandt, Chapter 3
Varian, Chapters 1-5
R.H. Frank, “Are workers paid their marginal products”, American Economic Review, 1984, 549-571.
L. Borghans & L. Groot, “Superstardom and monopolistic power: Why media stars earn more than their marginal contribution to welfare”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 1998, pp.546-
(5) Introduction to Mesoeconomic Analysis
Y.-K. Ng, Mesoeconomics: A Micro-Macro Analysis, London: Harvester, 1986.
Y.-K. Ng, “Business confidence and depression prevention: A mesoeconomic perspective”, American Economic Review, May 1992, 82(2): 365-371.
Ng, “Non-neutrality of money under non-perfect competition: why do economists fail to see the possibility?” In Arrow, Ng, and Yang, eds., Increasing Returns and Economic Analysis, London: Macmillan, 1998, pp.232-252.
(6) General Equilibrium
DL: Ch. 7; JR: Ch.5
K.J. Arrow & F. Hahn (1971), General Competitive Analysis, Chapter 1
F. Black (1995), Exploring General Equilibrium, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
J.S. Chipman, “The nature and meaning of equilibrium in economic theory”, in D. Martindale, ed., Functionalism in Social Sciences; reprinted in H. Townsend, ed., Price Theory, Penguin.
Gravelle & Rees, Chapter 16
W. Nicholson, Appendix B to Chapter 19, “The existence of general equilibrium prices”, Microeconomic Theory, 1985, The Dryden Press, 684-694.
Starr. R.M. (1997). General Equilibrium Theory: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press.
Varian, Chapters 17 & 21
S. Zamagni, Microeconomic Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987, Ch. 16.
(7) Selected Topics in Microeconomic Analysis
(a) Adverse selection, signalling, and screening.
Akerlof, G. “The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970, 89: 488-500.
Mas-Colell, Andreu, Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., Microeconomic theory New York : Oxford University Press, 1995, Ch. 13.
(b) The principal-agent problem
Holmstrom, B., (1979), “Moral hazard and Observability”, Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 74-91
Mas-Colell, Andreu, Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., Microeconomic theory New York : Oxford University Press, 1995, Ch. 14.
(c) Incentives and mechanism design
Mirrlees, James A. “An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation”, Review of Economic Studies, 1971, 38:175-208.
Mas-Colell, Andreu, Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., Microeconomic theory New York : Oxford University Press, 1995, Ch. 23.
(d) Should the benefit/cost ratio for public projects/spending be higher due to the excess burden of raising public revenue?
Feldstein, Martin “How Big Should Government Be?” National Tax Journal
50 No.2 (June 1997): 197-213.
Kaplow, Louis “The optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation.” National Tax Journal 49 No.4 (Dec.1996): 513-533.
Ng, “The optimal size of public spending and the distortionary cost of taxation”, National Tax Journal 53 No.2 (June 2000): 252-272.
(e) Relative-income effects, economic growth, environmental quality, and welfare: Further considerations on the optimal size of public spending.
Ng, "Relative-Income Effects and the Appropriate Level of Public Expenditure", Oxford Economic Papers, June 1987, pp. 293-300.
Ng & Wang, J. "Relative Income, Aspiration, Environmental Quality, Individual and Political Myopia: Why May the Rat-Race for Material Growth be Welfare-Reducing?", Mathematical Social Sciences, 1993, Vol. 26, pp. 3-23.
Ng, Siang & Ng, Yew-Kwang, “Why do governments increase with growth but happiness remains unchanged?”, Social Choice and Welfare, 2001..
NG, Yew-Kwang (2003), ‘From preference to happiness: Towards a more complete welfare economics”, Social Coice and Welfare, 20: 307-50.
(g) One answer to two parodoxes?
Ng, "The Older the More Valuable: Divergence between Utility and Dollar Values of Life as One Ages", Journal of Economics (Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie), 1992, Vol. 55, No. 1, pp. 1-16.
Ng, "The Paradox of the Adventurous Young and the Cautious Old: Natural Selection versus Rational Calculation", Journal of Theoretical Biology, 1991, Vol. 153, pp. 339-352.
Sun, Guangzhen & Ng, “A Theory of Age-Dependent Value of Life and Time ”, typescript.
(h) Specialization and Economic Organization
Yang, Xiaokai, Economics: New Classical versus Neoclassical Frameworks, Blackwell, 2001, Chs.5-7, 11.
Yang, Xiaokai & Ng, Y.-K. Specialization and Economic Organization: A New Classical Microeconomic Framework. In "Contributions to Economic Analysis", Vol. 215, 1993, Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. xvi + 507. (Mainly Chs.0-2, 5.)
Yang, Xiaokai & Ng, Siang, “Specialization and Division of Labour: A Survey”, in Kenneth J. Arrow, et al, eds., Increasing Returns and Economic Analysis, London: Macmillan, 1998, pp. 3-63.
Yang, Xiaokai & Ng, Y.-K. “Theory of the Firm and Structure of Residual Rights”, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, Vol. 16, pp. 107-28, 1995.
(i) Does the enrichment of a sector benefit others?
Ng, "The Enrichment of a Sector (Individual/Region/Country) Benefits Others: The Third Welfare Theorem?", Pacific Economic Review, Nov. 1996, Vol. 1, No.2, pp.93-115.
Ng, Siang & Y.-K., “The enrichment of a sector(individual/region/country) benefits others: a generalization”, Pacific Economic Review, Oct. 2000, 5(3): 299-302.
Ng, Siang & Y.-K., “The enrichment of a sector(individual/region/country) benefits others: the case of trade for specialization”, International Journal of Development Planning Literature, 1999, 14(3): 403-410.