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请教高人啊~~解此题~
Assume that the supply side of the economy is described by yt-y0=1/r(πt − πet)+ εt where as always yt is the log of output, ¯y0 is the log of the natural level of output, πt is the inflation rate, πet is the public’s expectations of the inflation rate, and εt is an additive supply shock. It is assumed that the general public does not know that value of the supply shock εt when they form their expectation, but that the central bank knows that value of εt when setting monetary policy. This also implies that monetary policy is set after the inflation expectations πet have been set. The central bank ”manages” demand through monetary policy and thus is implicitly able to choose the inflation rate πt. The social loss function is given by
SL = (yt − y*) (yt-y*)+ K· (πt − π*)(πt − π*) where ¯y0 = y* − ω, ω > 0
Question b: Suppose that the central bank announces that it will follow the inflation rule πt = μ0 + μ1εt. What are the optimal parameter values of μ0 and μ1, assuming that the central bank can credibly precommit to this rule? (Hint: Solve for the expected social loss policy given parameters μ0 and μ1, and minimize this expected loss with respect to μ0 and μ1. Note that because the inflation rule is viewed as binding, the public’s forecast of the inflation rate is πet= E (πt) = μ0. How do the optimal values of μ0 and μ1 compare to the monetary response implied by a standard Taylor rule?
[此贴子已经被作者于2005-11-7 11:47:21编辑过]
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