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英文文献：Can Cocoa Farmer Organizations Countervail Buyer Market Power?-可可种植组织能否制衡买方市场力量?可可种植组织能否制衡买方市场力量?较不发达国家的结构调整往往要求取消国营销售委员会，以提高销售链的效率和提高农业收入
英文文献作者：Wilcox, Michael D.,Abbott, Philip C.
英文文献摘要：
Structural adjustment in less developed countries has often mandated removal of state-run marketing boards to enhance efficiency in the marketing chain and to raise farm income. Concerns have been mounting about the negative side effects of cocoa market liberalization, including replacement of the parastatal by imperfectly competitive marketing institutions and the loss of public goods (e.g. research and extension). It is believed that the link of the supply chain closest to the farmgate may be the least competitive, as farmers in remote areas lack good market information and encounter relatively few buying agents. These concerns, especially related to domestic market competitiveness, have prompted governments, foreign donors and NGOs to promote farmer organizations in an effort to protect farmers (Rabobank, 2000; Baffes, et. al., 2003). The objective of this study is to estimate the degree of market power that exists at the farmgate and determine the efficacy of existing farmer groups to countervail this market power. In the case of cocoa, widely dispersed farmers create a challenge for those who wish to secure supply for export. If the market post-liberalization were characterized by perfect competition then margins should vary across space by differences in transaction costs that are determined by infrastructure conditions, distance to port or buying center, fuel prices, technology, and other costs that are incurred during transport. If private agents who now interface directly with farmers have the ability to exert monopsony power, then margins will also contain rents that allow part of the efficiency gains to accrue to the private intermediaries, and these may vary according to institutional relationships. Cameroon provides an opportunity to examine whether cooperatives provide a competitive yardstick that serves to countervail the market power exerted by local buyers and large traders on farmers since after liberalization farmer organizations have remained active to varying degrees across the country. To examine these issues, price transmission models that estimate the effect institutional forces have on the marketing margins that exist between the internal market (buying center) price and the farmgate price are developed using primary data from a survey performed in 2004. Our price transmission models for various cocoa producing regions in Cameroon attempt to capture intervening policy, institutional factors (e.g. cooperatives as buyers) and transactions costs. Results show that price transmission and so market integration between the port or buying center and the farmgate dissipates as product passes downstream, with significant regional variation. Institutional arrangements have a significant effect on the prices received by farmers. Infrastructure and market distance variables do not significantly affect market outcomes due to the hub-and-spoke nature of procurement at the farmgate and, in some regions, the captive supply nature of doing business. Market information, once provided by the government, is asymmetric in favor of the buyer, resulting in significantly lowers prices being received by farmers. Access to accurate and timely information often comes from membership in a farmer group. In addition, itinerant buyers exert market power against farmers who often do not have another outlet for their product. This power is also rooted in the inability of farmers to measure product quality at the farmgate, previous arrangements for credit and the tendency of itinerant buyers to demand a discount based simply upon the lack of other willing buyers. Institutional innovations of antiquated supply chain links, fostered by farmer organizations, may also reduce transactions costs currently contributing to low farm income. Marketing cocoa via farmer groups does appear to countervail buyer power but the results are sensitive to the transparency of the internal governance and regional institutional structure. Premiums are found for transactions involving farmer organizations in the center region where coops are most active and successful, and depend on how fees collected by the cooperative are treated. Farmer groups receive additional premiums associated with their capacity to aggregate production and control quality allowing buyers to gain from associated scale economies and limit quality-related risk.
人们越来越担心可可市场自由化的负面副作用，包括半国营市场被不完全竞争的销售机构取代，以及公共产品(例如研究和推广)的损失。据信，由于偏远地区的农民缺乏良好的市场信息，而且遇到的采购代理相对较少，因此最接近农场大门的供应链环节可能是最缺乏竞争力的。这些关切，特别是与国内市场竞争力有关的关切，促使各国政府、外国捐助者和非政府组织促进农民组织以保护农民(荷兰合作银行，2000年;Baffes等，2003年)。本研究的目的是估计存在于农场大门的市场力量的程度，并确定现有的农民群体对这种市场力量的制衡效力。就可可而言，分散在各地的农民给那些希望获得出口供应的人带来了挑战。如果市场自由化后的特点是完全竞争，那么利润应该因交易成本的不同而不同，而交易成本是由基础设施条件、到港口或购买中心的距离、燃料价格、技术和运输过程中产生的其他成本决定的。如果现在与农民直接接触的私人代理商有能力发挥垄断力量，那么利润也将包含租金，让私人中间商获得部分效率收益，而这可能会根据制度关系而有所不同。喀麦隆提供了一个机会，研究合作社是否提供了一种竞争性标准，以抵消当地买家和大贸易商对农民施加的市场力量，因为自自由化以来，全国各地的农民组织在不同程度上仍然活跃。为了研究这些问题，我们利用2004年进行的一项调查的原始数据开发了价格传递模型，该模型估计了制度力量对存在于内部市场(购买中心)价格和农场大门价格之间的营销边际的影响。我们为喀麦隆各可可生产区建立的价格传导模型试图捕捉干预政策、制度因素(例如合作社作为买家)和交易成本。结果表明，港口或购买中心与农场之间的价格传导和市场整合随着产品的下游传递而减弱，且存在显著的区域差异。制度安排对农民接受的价格有显著影响。基础设施和市场距离变量并不会显著影响市场结果，因为在农场采购的中心和辐射型性质，以及在一些地区的商业活动的控制供应性质。政府提供的市场信息是不对称的，有利于买方，导致农民收到的价格显著降低。准确和及时的信息通常来自于农民群体的成员。此外，流动买家对农民施加市场影响力，而农民的产品往往没有其他出口渠道。这种力量的根源还在于农民无法在农场门口衡量产品质量，之前的信贷安排，以及流动买家仅仅因为没有其他愿意购买的买家而要求折扣的倾向。由农民组织推动的陈旧的供应链环节的制度创新，也可能减少交易成本，目前导致农民收入较低。通过农民团体推销可可豆，似乎确实会抵消买家的影响力，但其结果对内部政府的透明度很敏感
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