拍卖理论与机制设计经典论文Optimal Auction Design ROGER B. MYERSON

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This paper considers the problem faced by a seller who has a single object to sell to one several possible buyers, when the seller has imperfect information about how much the might be willing to pay for the object. The seller's problem is to design an auction game has a Nash equilibrium giving him the highest possible expected utility. Optimal auctions derived in this paper for a wide class of auction design
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关键词：Myerson optimal auction Design Optima

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很好，可以好好看看。