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[英文文献] Managing Quantity, Quality and Timing in Cane Sugar Production: Ex Post Mar... [推广有奖]

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社会发展242 发表于 2006-2-3 00:28:10 |AI写论文

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英文文献:Managing Quantity, Quality and Timing in Cane Sugar Production: Ex Post Marketing Permits or Ex Ante Production Contracts?-管理蔗糖生产的数量、质量和时间:事后销售许可证或事前生产合同
英文文献作者:Patlolla, Sandhyarani
英文文献摘要:
Sugarcane produced in India is utilized to manufacture three sweetening agents: sugar, gur, and khandsari. Sugar processors must comply with a floor price for cane, but gur and khandsari producers are exempt from the floor price. Thus, any effect of the sugar processor’s choice of procurement method on the incentives facing farmers will depend on the expected cane price in these competing unregulated markets. In Andhra Pradesh (AP), India, private sugar processors use an unusual form of vertical coordination. Rather than conventional pre-planting contracts, they issue ‘permits’ to selected cane growers a few weeks before harvest. I explore the potential motivations behind this choice of sugar processors and hypothesize that the probabilistic permit system is the low-cost way of procuring high-quality cane. I develop a theoretical model of the AP cane procurement market that incorporates the floor price policy that applies only to the cane used for sugar processing, and compare processor profits under the probabilistic ex post permit system and ex ante production contracts. The model predicts that both the quality of cane procured and the profits from unit cane purchase are higher when the processor uses ex post permits. These gains come at the expense of increased cultivation costs incurred by the farmers. I test and confirm the predictions of the theoretical model using data from a household survey conducted in fall 2008.

印度生产的甘蔗被用来制造三种甜味剂:糖、gur和khandsari。蔗糖加工商必须遵守甘蔗的底价,但gur和khandsari生产商则不受底价约束。因此,制糖商选择的采购方法对农民面临的激励措施的任何影响将取决于这些竞争不受监管的市场中甘蔗的预期价格。在印度的安得拉邦(AP),私人糖加工商使用一种不寻常的垂直协调形式。与传统的种植前合同不同,他们在收获前几周向选定的甘蔗种植者发放“许可证”。我探讨了选择糖加工商背后的潜在动机,并假设概率许可制度是一种获取高质量甘蔗的低成本方式。我开发了一个AP甘蔗采购市场的理论模型,该模型包含了仅适用于用于制糖加工的甘蔗的底价政策,并比较了在事后许可概率制度和事前生产合同下的加工商利润。该模型预测,当加工商使用事后许可证时,采购的甘蔗质量和单位甘蔗采购的利润都更高。这些收益是以农民增加的种植成本为代价的。我使用2008年秋季进行的一项家庭调查的数据,检验并证实了这一理论模型的预测。
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