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英文文献：Regulating from the Demand Side: Public Health Insurance with Monopolistically Competitive Providers and Optional Spot Sales-从需求方进行监管:提供垄断性竞争的公共医疗保险和可选的现货销售
英文文献作者：Gilad Sorek,Randolph T. Beard
英文文献摘要：
We study the implications of extending public-insurance coverage to an existing medical market in Salop’s spatial model of imperfect competition. In this setup a public insurer sets a price to medical providers, which must maintain their reservation pro.t from selling on the spot market directly to consumers. We show that the public insurer can manipulate this reservation profit by setting the coinsurance rate, and that setting the coinsurance rate properly yields the market first best product diversification. The results survive generalizations including moral hazard and incomplete coverage. When adding quality choice to the analysis, a minimum quality standard that is combined with a proper coinsurance rate can still support market efficiency.
在Salop的不完全竞争空间模型中，我们研究了将公共保险覆盖范围扩大到现有医疗市场的影响。在这种情况下，公共保险公司为医疗供应商设定了价格，医疗供应商必须保持他们的预订专业。我们不能直接在现货市场上销售给消费者。结果表明，公共保险人可以通过设定共保费率来操纵这一保留利润，合理的设定共保费率可以获得市场第一最优的产品多样化。这些结果在包括道德风险和不完全覆盖在内的归纳中幸存下来。当将质量选择加入分析时，最低质量标准与适当的共保费率相结合仍然可以支持市场效率。
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