by Bernard C. Beaudreau (Author)
About the Author
Bernard Beaudreau is a professor and program director in the Department of Economics, University of Laval, Canada. In recent decades, he has focused his work on the underpinnings of productivity growth, with a special emphasis on the physics (mechanics and thermodynamics) of the underlying production processes.
About this book
This is the first book to examine the “nuts and bolts” of production processes. It proposes a truly consilient approach to modeling production processes – one that goes beyond the vague principles found in standard economics – and provides details that are consistent with the applied mechanics and engineering literature. Providing a credible analysis of some of the most pressing questions of our era, such as the productivity slowdown and the information paradox, and bridging the gap between engineering, applied physics, economics, and management science, this book is a fascinating read for anyone interested in industry, the modern economy, and how physical factors constrain productivity growth.
Brief contents
1 Introduction 1
References 4
2 The Magic Hand of Speed: A Historical Account 5
2.1 Introduction 5
2.2 Machine Speed: First Principles. 6
2.2.1 Definitions 6
2.2.2 Illustrations 7
2.3 Two Ages of Machine Speed 7
2.3.1 First Age of Machine Speed 8
2.3.2 Second Age of Machine Speed 8
2.4 Machine Speed: The Invisible Factor 9
2.4.1 The Dearth of Work on Machine Speed in General 9
2.5 Speed and Speed-ups: The Economics, Engineering, and Management Literatures 10
2.5.1 Nineteenth- and Twentieth-century Political Economy: Energy and Motion, or Machine Speed by Another Name 10
2.5.2 Engineering 20
2.5.3 Management 24
2.6 Summary and Conclusions 26
References 27
3 The Kinetics Approach to Production 29
3.1 Introduction 29
3.2 Model 30
3.2.1 Tier I: Mechanical and Chemical Kinetics at the Sub-process and Plant Levels 31
3.2.2 Tier II: Organization and the Demand for Supervision and Tools 35
3.2.3 Aggregating Across Firms Within an Industry/Sector 37
3.2.4 Production Per Factor Indexes 38
3.3 Empirical Evidence 39
3.3.1 Tier I: Testing the Theory of Process/Sub-process Kinetics 39
3.4 The Kinetic Approach to Production: Applications and Implications 50
3.4.1 Factor Substitution: Separating Fact from Fiction. 51
3.4.2 The End of Human Supervision, Not the End of Work 52
3.4.3 The Labor PFI in the Post-WWII Era 52
3.5 Summary and Conclusions 53
References 54
4 Speed-ups: Logistics and Profitability 57
4.1 Introduction 57
4.2 Statistical Speed-ups: The Two Dimensions 58
4.2.1 The Logistics of Machine Speed-ups 58
4.2.2 Statistical Machine Speed: The Role of Machine Downtime 64
4.3 Case Studies. 65
4.3.1 Case Study I: The Hawkeye Meat Company 65
4.3.2 Case Study II: Canada Wire and Cable Company 67
4.3.3 Case Study III: The McLean Shipping Company 68
4.4 Summary and Conclusions 69
Reference 70
5 The End of the Age of Speed and the Productivity Slowdown 71
5.1 Introduction 71
5.2 The Age of Speed: Illustrations 72
5.2.1 1955, the Post-WWII Year of Speed 73
5.3 The Limits to Speed, Control Technologies, and the Productivity Slowdown 75
5.3.1 Asymptotic setT and the Productivity Slowdown 75
5.3.2 Continuous Flow and Batch Material Processes 77
5.4 Case Studies. 77
5.4.1 Manufacturing 77
5.4.2 Transportation 79
5.4.3 Coal Mining 80
5.4.4 The Construction Sector 80
5.4.5 Information Technology 81
5.5 The Age of Speed 81
5.6 Implications of Our Findings 82
5.6.1 Knowledge-based Growth Is Bounded 82
5.6.2 The Singularity of the Post-WWII Period in History 83
5.6.3 Conventional Labor Productivity 84
5.6.4 The Inelastic Demand for Speed-up-based Energy Use 84
5.6.5 ICT and Productivity: General and Sector-specific 85
5.6.6 The Universal Nature of the Productivity Slowdown 85
5.6.7 Living with Speedstatis 86
5.6.8 Exceptions to the Rule 86
5.7 Summary and Conclusions 87
References 87
6 Machine Speed and the Great Depression. 89
6.1 Introduction 89
6.2 Machine Speed: The Invisible Technology Shock 90
6.3 EUD and Excess Capacity: The Evidence 91
6.3.1 Pre-crash, EUD-based Excess Capacity 93
6.3.2 Not Monetized, Ergo No Increase in Profits 94
6.3.3 Delayed Downturn: The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill and the Promise of Greater Market Share 95
6.3.4 The Defeat of the Bill and the Crash 100
6.4 The Depth of the Depression and the Delayed Recovery. 101
6.4.1 How New Deal Policies Exacerbated the Problem of Excess Rated Capacity 101
6.4.2 Investment in Electrical Equipment: The Evidence. 103
6.5 EUD and Investment Expenditure: The Evidence 108
6.6 Possible Solutions? 111
6.7 Speed-ups and Depressions: The Nineteenth Century 114
6.8 Summary and Conclusions 115
References 117
7 Summary and Conclusions 119
References 122
Series: Lecture Notes in Production Engineering
Pages: 122 pages
Publisher: Springer; 1st ed. 2020 edition (October 22, 2019)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 3030267121
ISBN-13: 978-3030267124