1.On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting 首作者:Dilip Abreu
2.The folk Theorem for Repeated Games:A Neu Condition 首作者:Dilip Abreu
3.Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring 首作者:Dilip Abreu
4.Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring 首作者:Olivier Compte
5.Trade Expansion and Contract Enforcement 首作者:Avinash Dixit
6.Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching 首作者:Glenn Ellison
7.The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 首作者:Drew Fudenberg
8.The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information 首作者:Drew Fudenberg
9.The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring 首作者:Michihiro Kandori
10.Social Norms and Community Enforcement 首作者:Michihiro Kandori
请问这些当中哪些比较简单呢?非常感谢大家!