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英文文献：Assessing A Provision Game For Two Units Of A Public Good, With Different Group Arrangements, Marginal Benefits, And Rebate Rules: Experimental Evidence-评估两个单位的公共产品的供给博弈，不同的组安排，边际收益和回扣规则:实验证据
英文文献作者：Liu, Pengfei,Swallow, Stephen K.,Anderson, Christopher M.
英文文献摘要：
We design two institutions that collect individual contributions to provide multiple public good units, inspired by a problem to deliver ecosystem services as a step-level public good (delivered in discrete increments). We set up a public good experiment wherein either all individuals for one group and are responsible for providing the two units (aggregated-group approach), or two groups provide one unit separately, but both group benefits if any unit is provided (disaggregated-group approach). Our interest is to test which of these two institutions performs “better” through the collective decision process. Our results show that, in general, the aggregated-group has a higher rate of success delivering at least one unit of the public good, while the disaggregated-group institution generates more revenue. Furthermore, we explore the influence of different rebate rules that redistribute the portion of contributions, that exceeds the provision cost, under both institutions. We find rebate rules significantly raise individual contributions, even though they do not change the set of requirements for Nash equilibria.
我们设计了两家收集个人贡献以提供多个公共产品单元的机构，其灵感来自于将生态系统服务作为阶梯式公共产品(以离散增量方式提供)提供的问题。我们建立了一个公益实验，其中所有个体为一个组负责提供两个单元(聚合组方法)，或两个组分别提供一个单元，但如果提供任何一个单元，两个组都受益(分散组方法)。我们的兴趣在于通过集体决策过程检验这两家机构中哪一家表现得“更好”。我们的结果表明，一般而言，聚合的团体有更高的成功率提供至少一个单位的公共利益，而分离的团体产生更多的收入。此外，我们还探讨了在两种制度下，不同的退税规则对超出拨备成本的捐款部分进行重新分配的影响。我们发现退税规则显著提高了个人的贡献，即使他们没有改变纳什均衡的要求集。
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