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英文文献：An Inverse Demand System for New England Groundfish: Welfare Analysis of the Transition to Catch Share Management-新英格兰底栖鱼逆需求系统:捕捞份额管理过渡的福利分析
英文文献作者：Lee, Min-Yang A.,Thunberg, Eric M.
英文文献摘要：
In 2010, the Northeast groundfish fishery transitioned from an effort-control system (Days-at-Sea) to an output-control system (catch shares). Simultaneously, a large decrease in aggregate catch was imposed in order to achieve biological objectives. This research examines the welfare effects of the transition to catch-share management by combining an inverse demand model for groundfish with a simulation based model of supply. The Generalized Differential Inverse Demand System is estimated for groundfish and imports using monthly data from 1994-2011 using a Generalized Method of Moments estimator. The estimated parameters are combined with simulated landings derived from a counterfactual policy scenario had ef- fort controls been retained instead of the catch share system. The simultaneous management change to catch shares and reduction in aggregate catch reduced consumer welfare by approximately $11M. A counterfactual policy in which the Days-at-Sea system was adjusted to meet the catch reductions would have reduced consumer welfare by approximately $37M; this finding is robust to instrument choice in the demand model. Because the 2010 fishing regulations and the counterfactual regulations were designed with the same conservation goals, the difference, approximately $26M, can be attributed to the change in management institution. Finally, reversion to the Days-at-Sea regulatory structure would reduce consumer welfare by approximately $25M from the current (2010) levels.
2010年，东北底栖鱼渔业从“努力控制系统”(海上天数)转变为“产出控制系统”(捕捞份额)。同时，为了实现生物目标，对总渔获量实行了大幅度减少。本研究通过将底栖鱼的逆需求模型与基于供应的模拟模型相结合，探讨了向捕捞份额管理过渡的福利效应。广义微分逆需求系统是估计底栖鱼和进口使用每月数据从1994-2011年使用广义矩估计方法。估计的参数与在保留ef- fort控制而不是渔获份额系统的情况下，从反事实的政策方案中得出的模拟着陆情况相结合。同时改变渔获量的管理和减少总渔获量使消费者的福利减少了约1100万美元。一项与事实相反的政策是，调整海上日捕捞系统以满足减少的捕获量，这将减少大约3700万美元的消费者福利;这一发现对需求模型中的工具选择是稳健的。由于《2010年渔业条例》和《反事实条例》的设计初衷是相同的保护目标，两者之间的差异约为2600万美元，这可以归因于管理制度的变化。最后，回归到海上监管结构将使消费者福利从目前(2010年)的水平减少约2500万美元。
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