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英文文献：Elicit the Values of On- and Off-margin Consumers: Combining Choice Rankings and Auctions-激发线上和线下消费者的价值:结合选择排名和拍卖
英文文献作者：Palma, Marco A.,Zhang, Yu Yvette
英文文献摘要：
Auctions are commonly used when a seller is unsure about the values that potential buyers attach to the object being sold. Bidders’ willingness to pay can be elicited in the form of bids. Many auctions are designed to be truth revealing such that bidders’ optimal strategy is to bid their true value. However, people sometimes do not bid sincerely; in particular off-margin bidders, whose values are far below or above the market-clearing price, are often observed not to bid sincerely (Shorgen et al. 2001). Low-value bidders might believe they will never win, while high-value bidders might believe they will never lose. Therefore, off-margin bidders often do not reveal their true values (Miller and Plott, 1985; Franciosi et al. 1993). For example, Knetsch et al. (2001) found that a second-price auction might not engage low-value bidders, whereas a ninth-price auction might not engage high value bidders. This paper presents a combined choice ranking and 11th-price sealed-bid auction mechanism which reveals the values of both on- and off- margin consumers for seven fruit products. Unlike experimental auctions that use lab-induced values to generate on- and off-margin bidders, the choice rankings reveal bidders’ preference and signal their relative positions on the value distributions. We found that low-value bidders tend not to bid attentively while high-value bidders place bids strongly agreeing with their rankings of the products. Our approach provides an effective mechanism to discriminate sincere bidders from casual bidders and improves the reliability of the elicitation of consumer valuations.
拍卖通常用于卖方不确定潜在买家所附在被出售物品上的价值。投标者的付款意愿可以通过投标的形式得到。许多拍卖的目的是为了揭示真相，因此竞标者的最佳策略是出价他们的真实价值。然而，人们有时出价并不真诚;特别是那些价值远低于或高于市场出清价格的保证金以外的投标者，经常被观察到不真诚地出价(Shorgen et al. 2001)。低价值竞标者可能认为他们永远不会赢，而高价值竞标者可能认为他们永远不会输。因此，保证金以外的竞标者往往不透露他们的真实价值(Miller和Plott, 1985;Franciosi等人，1993)。例如，Knetsch等人(2001)发现，第二价格的拍卖可能不会吸引低价值的竞标者，而第九价格的拍卖可能不会吸引高价值的竞标者。本文提出了一种组合选择排名和第十一价格密封投标拍卖机制，揭示了7种水果产品的边际消费者和边际消费者的价值。与实验拍卖不同的是，选择排名揭示了竞标者的偏好，并显示出他们在价值分布上的相对位置。实验拍卖使用实验室诱导的价值来产生保证金或保证金以外的竞标者。我们发现，低价值的竞标者往往不认真出价，而高价值的竞标者出价强烈同意他们的产品排名。我们的方法提供了一个有效的机制来区分真诚的出价者和非正式的出价者，并提高了客户评估的可靠性。
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