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[CFA] 【英文文献】保险经济学领域有关医疗的研究文献分享 [推广有奖]

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18249079690 学生认证  发表于 2019-12-17 15:31:25 |AI写论文

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保险经济学英文文献分享


两篇关于医疗的保险学研究文献分享给大家。
作者是剑桥麻省理工学院经济系的学者Jonathan Gruber,在IDEAS保险经济学领域月度排名中排名第3 。


英文摘要


SAVING LIVES BY TYING HANDS:
THE UNEXPECTED EFFECTS OF CONSTRAINING HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS

Abstract




The emergency department (ED) is a complex node of healthcare delivery that is facing market and regulatory pressure across developed economies to reduce wait times. In this paper we study how ED doctors respond to such incentives, by focussing on a landmark policy in England that imposed strong incentives to treat ED patients within four hours. Using bunching techniques, we estimate that the policy reduced affected patients’ wait times by 19 minutes, yet distorted a number of medical decisions. In response to the policy, doctors increased the intensity of ED treatment and admitted more patients for costly inpatient care. We also find a striking 14% reduction in mortality. To determine the mechanism behind these health improvements, we exploit heterogeneity in patient severity and hospital crowding, and find strongly suggestive evidence that it is the reduced wait times, rather than the additional admits, that saves lives. Overall we conclude that, despite distorting medical decisions, constraining ED doctors can induce cost-effective reductions in mortality.


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急诊.pdf
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医疗.pdf

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