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[英文文献] Gender Roles and Intra-Household Allocation: Identifying Differences in the... [推广有奖]

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英文文献:Gender Roles and Intra-Household Allocation: Identifying Differences in the Incentives to Hide Money Across Spouses in Ghana-性别角色和家庭内部分配:在加纳查明配偶之间隐藏金钱动机的差异
英文文献作者:Castilla, Carolina,Walker, Thomas F.
英文文献摘要:
We present a simple model of intra-household allocation between spouses to show that when there is asymmetric information over monetary transfers between spouses, the incentives to hide income depend on the role spouses play within the household. We test the model with data from a field experiment in Ghana and an in-depth household survey. Ghana is an interesting place to test this since men and women hold separate economies and spending patterns differ by gender. The model is specified in accordance to the marital contract in Ghana, such that intra-household transfers occur between spouses. In other settings, this threat point may seem of little interest because the redistribution of resources between spouses would have no effect on allocations. However, when household bargaining evidences gender roles and strictly positive transfers occur between spouses, there can be incentives to hide private resources, and these incentives differ depending on the role each spouse plays within the marital contract. Results indicate that hiding occurs and that it differs by gender. Husband‘s allocate private cash transfers to alcohol consumption and gifts to his social network, while the wife lends the money out which makes it difficult for the husband to have access to the money. When the cash transfer is public, both spouses increase their gifts to their social network. Further evidence suggests this could be due to social pressure to share.

我们提出了一个简单的家庭内配偶分配模型,以表明当配偶之间的货币转移信息不对称时,隐藏收入的动机取决于配偶在家庭中所扮演的角色。我们用来自加纳的田间试验和深入的家庭调查的数据来检验这个模型。加纳是检验这一点的一个有趣的地方,因为男性和女性的经济状况不同,消费模式也因性别而异。这一模式是根据加纳的婚姻合同规定的,因此家庭内的转移发生在配偶之间。在其他情况下,这一威胁点似乎没有什么意义,因为在配偶之间重新分配资源不会对分配产生影响。然而,当家庭谈判的证据表明性别角色和严格的正转移发生在配偶之间时,可能存在隐藏私人资源的动机,而这些动机因配偶在婚姻契约中扮演的角色而不同。结果表明,不同性别的人会有不同程度的隐藏。丈夫将私人现金转移到他的社交网络用于饮酒和送礼,而妻子将钱借给丈夫,这使得丈夫很难拿到钱。如果现金转移是公开的,夫妻双方都会增加赠送给自己社交网络的礼物。进一步的证据表明,这可能是由于社会压力造成的。
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